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ABSTRACT 
More than two hundred countries in the world have agreed to 
abide by the anti-money laundering (“AML”) recommendations 
developed by the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”), which is an 
intergovernmental organization. This Article focuses on the potential 
impact on the legal profession of FATF’s fourth round of mutual 
evaluations. During these mutual evaluations, which currently are 
underway, FATF-affiliated countries examine each other’s compliance 
with the FATF Recommendations and recommend follow-up action. 
This Article first presents the legal profession-related results from the 
completed Mutual Evaluation Reports. A number of these FATF 
Reports recommend changes that include requiring lawyers to report 
suspicious client transactions, greater enforcement of existing lawyer 
AML rules, and changing the entities that supervise lawyer AML 
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efforts. The next Part of this Article examines the legal profession AML 
situation in the Authors’ home countries of the United States and Peru, 
noting the current or potential impact in these countries of the FATF 
Recommendations, the FATF Mutual Evaluation process, and lawyer-
related money laundering scandals. The final Part of this Article 
suggests an alternative, education-focused, peer-review approach to 
the legal profession portions of the FATF Mutual Evaluations that 
arguably would decrease lawyer facilitation of criminal money 
laundering activities while better protecting traditional lawyer values 
that are globally recognized as important components of 
administration of justice and rule of law systems.  Because the 
regulatory impact of FATF’s mutual evaluations may be much broader 
than anti-money laundering issues, everyone interested in the topic of 
lawyer regulation should be aware of the FATF Recommendations and 
the ongoing mutual evaluation process.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This Article focuses on international anti-money laundering 
(“AML”) standards and the “mutual evaluation” assessments that 
currently are underway to measure compliance with these standards. 
Viewed from one perspective, this Article focuses on a narrow topic 
that might seem of interest to a limited audience. The Authors submit, 
however, that this topic should be of interest to everyone interested in 
legal services regulation because AML regulations raise issues that 
address the core of what it means to be a lawyer. Moreover, the 
developments discussed in this Article have the potential to shape not 
only lawyers’ AML obligations, but lawyer regulation more broadly, 
including the nature of the lawyer-client relationship. 
This Article proceeds in the following manner. After a brief 
introduction in Part I, Part II continues by explaining why governments 
care about money laundering issues and the ways in which lawyers 
previously have been involved in illegal money laundering. Part III 
provides an introduction to an international intergovernmental body 
called the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) and its AML 
recommendations. Part IV focuses on the mutual evaluation process 
that countries use to evaluate each other’s compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations. Section IV.A provides information about the FATF 
mutual evaluation process and Section IV.B analyzes the treatment of 
the legal profession in the completed reports. Section IV.C explains 
how the legal professions in three countries prepared for their mutual 
evaluations. Sections V.A and V.B examine the AML lawyer 
regulation situation in the United States and Peru, including scandals 
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that already have affected or that may in the future affect lawyer AML 
regulation. Section V.C highlights the polarized nature of discussions 
about lawyer AML issues and identifies two competing narratives that 
are used to discuss lawyer AML issues and regulation.  Part VI sets 
forth a potential new approach towards FATF Mutual Evaluations of 
the legal profession that arguably would be more effective than the 
current approach in reducing lawyer facilitation of money laundering 
and would be more consistent with lawyers’ traditional values. 
II. BACKGROUND: GLOBAL MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 
A. The Global Money Laundering Problem 
Money laundering is a significant societal problem.1 The United 
Nations has estimated that the amount of money laundered globally in 
one year is two to five percent of global gross domestic product, which 
is equivalent to US$800 billion to US$2 trillion.2 Other global bodies 
concur in the significance of the problem. 3  Legal profession 
 
 
1. The FATF Recommendations and the mutual evaluation reports cited throughout this 
Article address money laundering and terrorist financing. This Article, however, focuses 
exclusively on the problem of money laundering. Because of FATF’s multi-pronged mission, 
some of the quotes in this Article also refer to countering the financing of terrorism (“CFT”) or 
terrorist financing (“TF”). For additional information about CFT issues, see Shima Baradaran et 
al., Funding Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2014). 
2.  While the UN recognizes that the margin between these two numbers is huge, it has 
explained that “even the lower estimate underlines the seriousness of the problem governments 
have pledged to address.” UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, Money-
Laundering and Globalization, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/
globalization.html [https://perma.cc/9RKN-FMQJ]. 
3. See, e.g., EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, Report on the inquiry into money laundering, tax 
avoidance and tax evasion (2017/2013(INI)) 1, 10, ¶ AI (A8-9999/2017, Nov. 8, 2017) 
[hereinafter EU PANA Committee Final Report]; The IMF and the Fight against Money 
Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.imf.org/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-Money-
Laundering-the-Financing-of-Terrorism?pdf=1 [https://perma.cc/9U8H-PYSF] [hereinafter 
IMF Factsheet]; The World Bank Group’s Response to Illicit Financial Flows: A Stocktaking, 
WORLD BANK GROUP (Mar. 22, 2016), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
502341468179035132/pdf/104568-BR-SecM2016-0112-IDASecM2016-0071-IFC-
SecM2016-00423-MIGA-SecM2016-0044-Box394878B-PUBLIC-disclosed-4-5-16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WQA7-SEG5]. 
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organizations have described the scope of the problem as 
“staggering.”4 
It is common for countries to provide estimates of the money 
laundering occurring in their jurisdiction. 5  For example, in a 2015 
report, the US government estimated that approximately US$300 
billion is laundered annually in the United States. 6  In 2008, the 
Peruvian government estimated that Peru had laundered US$2.1 billion 
in illicit funds annually, although it had no data about whether that 
money was laundered inside or outside of Peru.7 The European Union 
 
 
4. A Lawyer’s Guide to Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering: A collaborative 
publication of the International Bar Association, the American Bar Association and the Council 
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe 1, 6 (Oct. 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2014oct_abaguide_preventingmoneylaundering.authche
ckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/982V-4JMH] [hereinafter IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide]; see 
Jack P. Sahl, Lawyer Ethics and the Financial Action Task Force: A Call to Action, 59 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 457, 463-65 (2015). 
5 . See Money laundering and terrorist financing risks, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/ml-tf-risks.html 
[https://perma.cc/PW3M-9QKE] (FATF webpage that includes links to multiple risk 
assessments). Countries may refer to this type of report as either a risk assessment or a threat 
assessment. Compare infra note 6 (citing the 2015 US risk assessment report), with infra note 
12 (citing the 2005 US threat assessment report). 
6. See National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2015, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF THE TREASURY 1, 2 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/National Money Laundering Risk Assessment – 2006-12-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WP32-2XLL] (“It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy how much money 
is laundered in the United States. However, while recognizing the limitations of the data sets 
utilized, this assessment estimates that about $300 billion is generated annually in illicit 
proceeds.”). 
7. This estimate is found in Peru’s 2008 Third Round Mutual Evaluation Report. See 
Informe de Evaluación Mutua Anti Lavado de Activos y contra el Financiamiento del 
Terrorismo (3ra Ronda), Peru [Peru Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti Money Laundering and 
against Terrorism Financing (3rd Round)], GRUPO DE ACCIÓN FINANCIERA DE SUDAMÉRICA 
[FINANCIAL ACTION GROUP OF SOUTH AMERICA] 1, 4 (July 31, 2008), 
https://www.sbs.gob.pe/Portals/5/jer/gafi/files/IEM Perú Tercera Ronda 2008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2XUL-BLFP] [hereinafter 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation Report]. 
FATF’s link to this report takes one to a FATF on Latin America (“GAFILAT”) link which 
is broken, but Peru’s report is available on the webpage of the La Superintendencia de 
Banca, Seguros, which is the Peruvian Banking Regulator webpage cited above. At the time 
this Article was submitted, Peru had completed its risk assessment for the current round of 
mutual evaluations, but its Mutual Evaluation Report was not yet publicly available. See infra 
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has reported that “annual revenue losses from tax evasion and tax 
avoidance amounts to at least EU€1 trillion within the EU alone.”8 The 
United Kingdom recently issued its risk assessment report and included 
a separate chapter devoted to AML risks in legal services.9 The World 
Bank encourages money laundering risk assessments and has prepared 
a threat assessment template. 10  Risk assessment reports are now 
required by FATF Recommendation 1. 11  These reports can help 
 
 
note 354 and accompanying text (citing an IMF report that referred to the more recent risk 
assessment). 
8. EU PANA Committee Final Report, supra note 3, at 9 ¶ AC (noting that this figure 
includes losses that arguably go beyond more than money laundering). See EU PANA Committee 
Final Report, supra note 3, at 8 ¶¶ Q, 10 ¶ AI (November 2017 Parliament PANA Report notes 
that “Europol estimates that the Panama Papers account for only 0.6% of the total number of 
money laundering cases recorded annually” and that “money laundering cases are increasing, 
according to Eurojust statistics.”); REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL on the assessment of the risks of money laundering and 
terrorist financing affecting the internal market and relating to cross-border activities, COM 
(2017) 340 final (June 26, 2017). 
9. National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 2018, HER 
MAJESTY TREASURY & HOME OFFICE 1, 49-55 (Oct. 2017), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/655198/National_risk_assessment_of_money_laundering_and_terrorist_financing_2017_p
df_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G6A-WDJQ].  Citing an earlier report, this Report stated that “the 
social and economic costs of the most serious and organised crimes total £24 billion per year, 
with most of this related to drugs supply at £10.7 billion and fraud at £8.9 billion,” Id. at 20. 
10 . See WORLD BANK, Risk Assessment Support for Money Laundering/Terrorist 
Financing, (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/brief/
antimoney-laundering-and-combating-the-financing-of-terrorism-risk-assessment-support 
[https://perma.cc/E43E-P65Y]: 
Why does a country need a national risk assessment for money laundering and 
terrorist financing? A framework designed to prevent money laundering and combat 
terrorist financing is most effective when it targets resources there where they will 
have most effect. This can be done only through a good analysis and understanding 
of the money laundering/terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks in the country. This 
approach is in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF). FATF recommends that countries identify, assess, and understand the 
ML/TF risks within their jurisdiction and then take action and apply resources to 
mitigate such risks, based on a risk-based approach . . . . The World Bank has 
developed an advisory package to guide countries in conducting their ML/TF risk 
assessment. 
11. Since 2012, FATF Recommendation 1 has stated that “[c]ountries should identify, 
assess, and understand the money laundering and terrorist financing risks for the country, and 
should take action, including designating an authority or mechanism to coordinate actions to 
assess risks, and apply resources, aimed at ensuring the risks are mitigated effectively.” THE 
FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 4, 9 (2018), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.p
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“policy makers, regulators, and the law enforcement community better 
understand the landscape of money laundering” and “support strategic 
planning efforts to combat money laundering.”12 
The United Nations has identified negative consequences that 
flow from money laundering.13 It notes that money laundering fuels 
corruption and organized crime. 14  Corrupt public officials need to 
launder their bribes, kick-backs, and theft of public funds; organized 
crime needs to launder the proceeds of illegal activity such as drug 
trafficking and commodity smuggling.15 The United Nations has also 
stated that money laundering can erode a nation’s economy by 
changing the demand for cash, making interest and exchange rates 
more volatile, and by causing high inflation in countries where 
criminals are doing business.16 It observed that developing countries 
that attract “dirty money” as a short-term engine of growth can find it 
difficult “to attract the long-term foreign direct investment that is based 
 
 
dfhttp://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF 
Recommendations 2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RKG-ZQHK] [hereinafter FATF 
RECOMMENDATIONS].  For information about the FATF Recommendations, see infra notes 74-
91 and accompanying text.  
12.  2007 National Money Laundering Strategy, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
TREASURY 1, 16, Appendix A (2007), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Documents/nmls.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8PK-5EUN] (citing this as the purpose behind 
the 2005 Money Laundering Threat Assessment, which was the first government-wide analysis 
of money laundering in the United States). See also World Bank Risk Assessment, supra note 
10 (describing the reasons to conduct a risk assessment). 
13 . See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, Introduction to Money 
Laundering, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/introduction.html?ref=
menuside [https://perma.cc/S8GT-39B9]. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. For US perspectives regarding the dangers of money laundering, see John 
McDowell & Gary Novis, The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime, 6(2) 
ECON. PERSP. 1, 6-8 (May 2001), https://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
State_Dept_journal_2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WF6-6QV8] (listing as negative consequences 
of money laundering: 1) undermining the legitimate private sector; 2) undermining the integrity 
of financial markets; 3) loss of control of economic policy; 4) economic distortion and 
instability; 5) loss of revenue; 6) risks to privatization efforts; 7) reputation risk; and 8) social 
costs that can include driving up the cost of government due to the need for increased law 
enforcement and health care expenditures, transferring economic power from the market, 
government, and citizens to criminals, and corrupting effect on all elements of society). 
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on stable conditions and good governance and that can help them 
sustain development and promote long-term growth.”17  
For additional proof that countries consider money laundering and 
terrorist financing to be significant societal problems, one  can consult 
the list of countries that are members of the Financial Action Task 
Force (“FATF”) or one of its affiliate organizations.18 Most countries 
in the world belong to either FATF or a FATF-affiliate.19 Because 
these countries have agreed to abide by FATF’s Recommendations, 
their membership demonstrates a global consensus that money 
laundering and terrorism financing are serious societal problems that 
need to be addressed. 20  The global consensus to fight money 
laundering is also reflected in United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council resolutions that have stressed the importance of 
implementing FATF’s Recommendations.21 
B. Lawyer Involvement in Money Laundering  
Money laundering typically involves three different stages. 22 The 
first step involves “placement” in which illegal proceeds are deposited 
into the financial system; the second step involves “layering,” which 
conceals the criminal origin of the proceeds; and the third step involves 
“integration,” which creates an apparent legal origin for criminal 
proceeds and allows the criminal to use the criminal proceeds for his or 
her personal benefit.23 In light of this three-step process, criminals who 
 
 
17.  UN Introduction to Money Laundering, supra note 13. 
18.  See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Countries, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ 
[https://perma.cc/YLG5-X6V3] (webpage containing a list of countries and indicates whether it 
is a member of FATF or a FATF-Style Regional Body). Id. This webpage also contains a “map” 
view. Id.  
19. See UN Introduction to Money Laundering, supra note 13.  
20.  See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that countries that 
are members of FATF or a FAT-Style Regional Body have agreed to abide by the FATF 
Recommendations). 
21.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/288 at 6 (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/60/288 [https://perma.cc/LPH2-ZEXN]; S.C. Res. 1617 (July 
29, 2005), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1617%20%282005%29 
[https://perma.cc/3J9Q-T527]. 
22 . See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIMES, The Money-Laundering Cycle, 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/laundrycycle.html 
[https://perma.cc/3AV3-UY83], accord IBA/ABA/CCBE Guide, supra note 4, at 4. 
23.  See UN Introduction to Money Laundering, supra note 13.   
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want to launder their illicit proceeds typically require the assistance of 
others to do so.24 Because Step Two involves creating an apparent legal 
origin for criminal proceeds, lawyers are among those whose assistance 
might be sought.25 
Lawyers who assist clients in money laundering activities might 
do so either intentionally or unwittingly. There clearly have been 
lawyers who have intentionally engaged in criminal money laundering 
activities.26 For example, in 2013, FATF published a report entitled 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal 
Professionals (“FATF Legal Profession Typologies Report”). This 
Report cited a number of criminal prosecutions against lawyers who 
had knowingly engaged in criminal money laundering activities. 27 
Some of the lawyers cited in this Report had masterminded the money 
laundering schemes, whereas other lawyers appear to have been 
brought into these criminal schemes by their clients or other 
 
 
24.  Id. (noting that the layering stage involves “disguising the trail to foil pursuit”). See 
also infra note 25. 
25.  See IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra note 4, at 24: 
There are three main reasons why lawyers are exposed to misuse by criminals 
involved in money laundering activities. First, engaging a lawyer adds respectability 
and an appearance of legitimacy to any activities being undertaken – criminals 
concerned about their activities appearing illegitimate will seek the involvement of a 
lawyer as a stamp of approval” for certain activities. Second, the services that lawyers 
provide, e.g., setting up companies and trusts, or carrying out conveyancing 
procedures, are methods that criminals can use to facilitate money laundering. Third, 
lawyers handle client money in many jurisdictions – this means that they are capable, 
even unwittingly, of “cleansing” money by simply putting it into their client account. 
26.  See Laurel S. Terry, U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat Money Laundering & 
Terrorist Financing, 59 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 487, 499 (2015).  
27. FATF Report: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of Legal 
Professionals, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 30, 30 (2013), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20vulnerabilities%20legal%20prof
essionals.pdf [https://perma.cc/2624-9BNF] [hereinafter FATF Typologies Report] (“Criminal 
prosecutions were started in sixteen countries, with Austria, Spain, Italy, and Poland joining the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaching double figures of prosecutions 
in the last five years.”). 
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associates. 28  The United States is among the countries that have 
prosecuted lawyers for money laundering.29 
Although there have been a number of cases that involve 
intentional wrongdoing by lawyers, it is certainly possible that a lawyer 
might unwittingly assist a criminal money launderer, rather than doing 
so intentionally. 30 Recognizing this possibility, the International Bar 
Association (“IBA”), the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (“CCBE”) worked 
together to produce a document designed to help lawyers avoid such 
unwitting involvement. 31 The IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance document 
identifies a number of “red flags” that could signal a money laundering 
situation. 32  The expectation is that if a lawyer recognizes money 
laundering “red flags,” that lawyer can investigate further.33 If a US 
lawyer concludes that a client is seeking the lawyer’s assistance in 
money laundering activities, the lawyer must refrain from assisting that 
client.34 
Although it is clear that some lawyers have intentionally or 
unwittingly assisted clients in illegal money laundering activity, there 
is a paucity of empirical data about the extent of lawyer involvement 
 
 
28. Terry, supra note 26, at 499; see generally David J. Middleton & Michael Levi, Let 
Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Organized Crime, Lawyers and the Regulation of Legal Services, 55 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 647 (2015). 
29 . See Terry, supra note 26, at 499-500 n.57 (listing the twenty-nine US criminal 
prosecutions or discipline cases against lawyers cited in the FATF Legal Profession Typologies 
Report at 39-146).  Peru is not listed in the FATF Typologies Report.  See generally FATF 
Typologies Report, supra note 21. 
30. See, e.g., Paula Frederick, Money for Nothing, 18 GA. B.J. 50 (2012) (describing a 
lawyer that inadvertently assisted a money laundering scheme); IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s 
Guide, supra note 4 (written to help lawyers from inadvertently assisting money launderers). 
31. See IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra note 4. 
32 . Id. A number of voluntary bar associations and lawyer regulatory bodies have 
produced their own documents.  Links to these documents are available on the webpages of 
organizations such as the AML-related webpages of the ABA, CCBE, Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada, Law Council of Australia, and Law Society of England and Wales, among 
others. See Laurel Terry, FATF Resources 2017, https://works.bepress.com/laurel_terry/69/ 
[https://perma.cc/VV64-XUNL] (including links to AML webpages and other resources). 
33.  See IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra note 4, at 32 
34. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). These rules 
are discussed infra in Section V.A. 
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in money laundering. 35  Consider, for example, a 2011 report the 
consulting firm Deloitte prepared for the European Commission.36 The 
Commission asked Deloitte the following: 
f) Role of lawyers in the AML system. Specifically regarding 
lawyers, which is the impact of the rules on the client’s access to 
law/legal advice? What is the perception of lawyers about their 
role in the AML/CFT system? What is the perception from other 
professions and from credit and financial institutions about the role 
of lawyers?37 
The Deloitte Report concluded that there was a lack of empirical 
data about gatekeeper involvement in money laundering.38 It observed 
that there were differing views about the degree to which lawyers are 
involved in illegal money laundering activities and the considerations 
that that should be paramount when designing AML regulations for 
lawyers. 39  The concluding sentences in this section stated: “This 
 
 
35 . See European Commission: Final Study on the Application of the Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive, Service Contract ETD/2009/IM/F2/90, DELOITTE ENTERPRISE RISK 
SERVICES (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/financial-crime/
20110124_study_amld_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4447-8E88] [hereinafter Deloitte Study]; 
Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 663 (“The extent of intentional lawyer involvement in 
money laundering schemes remains only a little better understood now than a decade ago, and 
then, it is well evidenced mostly in a few Grand Corruption cases.”).  See also Baradaran, supra 
note 1 (describing a small-scale empirical study to test how service providers responded to email 
solicitations that were designed to raise terrorist financing red flags). 
36. See Deloitte Study, supra note 35. 
37. Id. at 310. 
38. Id. at 294 (“Given the lack of quantitative information it is not possible to draw 
conclusions on the frequency with which gatekeepers are misused.”). 
39. Id. at 7, 269-73. To illustrate the differing views, see IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance, supra 
note 4, at 6-7: 
[W]e do not believe [the FATF Typologies] Report is as helpful as FATF 
intended, principally because it focuses heavily on situations in which 
lawyers are knowingly involved in money laundering and/or terrorist 
financing activities. As a result, the FATF report is in danger of creating a 
misleading impression of the legal profession. The profession generally 
believes that, contrary to what the FATF typologies report may suggest, 
circumstances in which lawyers are knowingly involved in criminal 
activities are quite rare. 
Compare, id. with Emily M. Halter et al., The Puppet Masters: How The Corrupt Use Legal 
Structures To Hide Stolen Assets And What To Do About It, WORLD BANK STOLEN ASSET 
RECOVERY (STAR) INITIATIVE 1, 61 (2001), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
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section of the study sets out the opinions of lawyers on their role in the 
AML/CFT system and the opinions of others on the lawyers’ role. It is 
clear that opinions differ.”40 
The ongoing conversations about lawyer involvement in money 
laundering and the proper scope of lawyer AML regulation are not 
taking place in a vacuum, but instead are taking place against the 
backdrop of several high-profile events. One prominent event is the 
“Panama Papers” leak, which involved the release of millions of 
documents taken from the Panama law firm of Mossack Fonseca.41 The 
Panama Papers leak has given rise to discussions about money 
laundering in general and lawyers’ roles in illegal money laundering in 
particular. 42 For example, the Panama Papers leak led the European 
 
 
784961468152973030/The-puppet-masters-how-the-corrupt-use-legal-structures-to-hide-
stolen-assets-and-what-to-do-about-it [https://perma.cc/8CUC-6GFG] [hereinafter The “Puppet 
Masters”]. World Bank report highlighted the resistance by the ABA to AML regulations for 
lawyers.  Id. at 65; See also id. at 22 (noting thirty-two “Grand Corruption” cases in which a 
“[p]rofessional legal advisor, solicitor, or attorney who either established a corporate vehicle or 
held positions of ownership or management” and suggesting widespread lawyer wrongdoing). 
40. Id. at 296.  See also Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 663 (“At this stage, despite 
international differences in both rules and practices of the regulation of the legal profession, the 
extent of cross-border arbitrage by those looking for lawyers to help commit or conceal crimes 
and their proceeds remains more alleged than proven.”). 
41.  See Brian Baxter, Dozens of Big Firms to Appear in New ‘Panama Papers’ Database, 
AM. LAW. DAILY (May 8, 2016), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/d7f4476c-6180-
4589-bf41-a40529df4e00/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/T2XY-LBA4] (“The 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists is poised to unveil a searchable online 
database on Monday drawn from some of the 11.5 million documents that were leaked last 
month from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca.”). 
42. See, e.g., id. (listing by name AmLaw 100 firms named in the documents and the office 
involved.  AmLaw 100 firms is a term used to refer to law firms that the American Lawyer 
magazine has included in their annual ranking as among the top 100 law firms according to 
variables such as size and profits per partner.  The cited Baxter article also includes this 
statement: “The Am Law Daily identified dozens of major US and international firms listed in 
the database already posted by the ICIJ online, one whose universe figures to grow with its 
inclusion of data from Mossack Fonseca. . . . [The ICIJ] also stressed that being included in the 
database does not signal participation in illegal activities.”); see also Has the Legal Profession 
Lost its Moral Compass? The Panama Papers, Lawyers’ Professional Ethics and Due Diligence 
Obligations, ABA SEC. OF INT’L L., Spring Meeting Apr. 28, 2017); see generally Heather M. 
Field, Offshoring Tax Ethics: The Panama Papers, Seeking Refuge from Tax, And Tax Lawyer 
Referrals, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 35 (2017); Michael D. Goldhaber, Americans in Panama: Did 
the Panama Papers scandal net few U.S. citizens because of good policy, or bad? AM. LAW. 
(Aug. 1, 2016); Peter J. Henning, Panama Papers Show How Lawyers Can Turn a Blind Eye, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/business/dealbook/panama-
papers-show-how-lawyers-can-turn-a-blind-eye.html [https://perma.cc/T57L-TJCD]. 
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Parliament to create its “PANA” Committee, which prepared a report 
and resolution, both of which were adopted and included a discussion 
about the role of lawyers. 43  The European Union is not alone in 
instituting action as a result of the Panama Papers leak. By December 
2016, there reportedly had been announcements of more than 150 
inquiries, audits, or investigations in seventy-nine countries, and 
business executives and attorneys were behind bars awaiting criminal 
trials in the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America. 44 News articles 
and scholarly articles, as well as government reports, have discussed 
whether and how lawyers are involved in money laundering 
activities.45 
  In addition to global scandals such as the Panama Papers leak, 
and the subsequent “Paradise Papers” leak,46 there have been scandals 
 
 
43. See EU PANA Committee Final Report, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 131-38; Eur. Parliament, 
Recommendation following the inquiry on money laundering, tax avoidance 
and tax evasion, P8_TA-PROV (2017)0491 (adopted Dec. 13, 2017), at ¶¶ 138-40, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/135340/P8_TA-PROV(2017)0491_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RG27-9J9C] [hereinafter EU Parliament Pana Final Recommendations].  For 
additional PANA committee documents and a link to the subsequent committee, see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/pana/home.html [https://perma.cc/8C36-FFFQ]. 
44. See, e.g., Will Fitzgibbon & Emilia Díaz-Struck, Panama Papers Have Had Historic 
Global Effects — and the Impacts Keep Coming, INT’L CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE 
JOURNALISTS: PANAMA PAPERS (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-
papers/20161201-global-impact/ [https://perma.cc/L3CJ-CRMW]. As of July 2018, the Panama 
Papers homepage on the ICIJ website posts news items that show continued activity. See 
generally Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists: Panama Papers, 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/ [https://perma.cc/E6WC-W672] 
[hereinafter ICIJ Webpage and Database]. The ICIJ webpage includes, inter alia, a database 
where one can search by name or country.  Id. 
45 . Scholarly articles include, inter alia, Field, supra note 42, at nn.11-33 and 
accompanying text (citing numerous sources); Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven 
Secrecy, 18 FL. TAX REV. 483 (2016); Karin Svedberg Helgesson & Ulrika Mörth, Client 
Privilege, Compliance and the Rule of Law: Swedish Lawyers and Money Laundering 
Prevention, 69 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 227 (2018); Middleton & Levi, supra note 28.  
News articles include those cited supra in note 42; Susan Beck, Are US Lawyers a Weak Link 
in the Fight Against Money Laundering? AM. LAW. DAILY (Dec. 22, 2016).  See infra note 48 
(citing a US government report). See also EU PANA Report, supra note 3. 
46 . See Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Investigations: Paradise Papers, 
https://www.icij.org/investigations/paradise-papers/ [https://perma.cc/ULV3-7B8A]; Paradise 
Papers: Who are Appleby, the lawyers at the centre of the leak?, BBC (Nov. 5, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41878881 [https://perma.cc/PQ4B-AND6]; Max Walters, 
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in individual countries that have prompted discussions about lawyers’ 
involvement in money laundering. High-profile events in the United 
States include a series of newspaper articles about luxury real estate 
transactions,47 a Congressional hearing about lawyer involvement with 
the President of Equatorial Guinea,48 and a 60 Minutes TV episode that 
featured a Global Witness undercover investigation in which an actor 
sought legal assistance from a number of US lawyers for a simulated 
transaction that was intended to represent a money laundering 
scheme.49 High profile events in Peru include arrests related to the 
Panama Papers leak, 50  as well as corruption scandals that involve 
 
 
Paradise Papers: Legal Firms ‘Ignore The Law With Impunity’, Margaret Hodge Tells 
Parliament, THE [UK] LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/paradise-papers-legal-firms-ignore-the-law-with-impunity-
margaret-hodge-tells-
parliament/5063696.article?utm_source=dispatch&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=%20
GAZ141016 [https://perma.cc/3P22-T974]. 
47 . See, e.g., Louise Story & Stephanie Saul, Towers of Secrecy: Piercing the Shell 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2015, (a five-part series), http://nyti.ms/2iPeztb 
[https://perma.cc/AUM7-5Y5C].  For an article analyzing the impact of these kinds of 
regulations, see Nicholas Nehamas & Rene Rodriguez, How Dirty Is Miami Real Estate? Secret 
Home Deals Dried Up When Feds Started Watching, MIAMI HERALD, July 18, 2018, 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/real-estate-news/article213797269.html 
[https://perma.cc/F6LE-HMD3] [hereinafter How Dirty is Miami Real Estate]. 
48. S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE COMM. 1, 129-32(2012) 
https://www.congress.gov/112/crpt/srpt193/CRPT-112srpt193.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GVS-
3DZ2]; see also U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea Agrees to 
Relinquish More Than $30 Million of Assets Purchased with Corruption Proceeds (Oct. 10, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/second-vice-president-equatorial-guinea-agrees-
relinquish-more-30-million-assets-purchased [https://perma.cc/9VGU-BFTT]. 
49 . See, e.g., Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes: Anonymous Inc., CBS, (Jan. 31, 2016), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anonymous-inc-60-minutes-steve-kroft-investigation/ 
[https://perma.cc/4NEZ-UW6H] [https://perma.cc/4NEZ-UW6H] (includes a transcript); 
Global Witness, Undercover in New York, https://www.globalwitness.org/shadyinc/ 
[https://perma.cc/5ZBR-X69A] (includes video clips); Louise Story, Report Describes Lawyers’ 
Advice on Moving Suspect Funds Into U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2016, at A12; Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Group goes undercover at 13 law firms to show how US laws facilitate anonymous 
investment, ABA J. (Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/group_goes_undercover_at_13_law_firms_to_show_
how_us_laws_facilitate [https://perma.cc/Y4R9-EYLJ]; AM. B. ASS’N, News: ABA President 
Paulette Brown responds to “60 Minutes” segment (Feb. 1, 2016), 
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2016/01/statement_of_abapre0.html [https://perma.cc/2BWF-HU6P]. 
50. See infra notes 337-43 and accompanying text. 
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public figures, most of whom are lawyers. 51  One could point to 
additional examples, but this discussion should be sufficient to 
demonstrate that money laundering is viewed as a serious societal 
problem, that criminals might want lawyers’ assistance in illegally 
laundering the proceeds of their crimes, that some lawyers have helped 
their clients with illegal money laundering, and that there are differing 
views about the scope of lawyer involvement. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE IN 
SETTING ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING (“AML”) STANDARDS  
A. FATF and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies  
The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is an international 
intergovernmental standard-setting body that has provided global 
leadership and momentum on anti-money laundering issues.52 FATF 
was established in 1989 during the G-7 Summit in Paris. 53  Its 
objectives are to “set standards and promote effective implementation 
of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity 
of the international financial system.”54 FATF has issued anti-money 
 
 
51. See, e.g., Head of Peru’s Judiciary Resigns As Crisis Grips Justice System, REUTERS 
(July 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-corruption-resignation/head-of-perus-
judiciary-resigns-as-crisis-grips-justice-system-idUSKBN1K92OH [https://perma.cc/NB83-
3FW9]; Peru ex-governor, lawyer arrested over ties to Odebrecht bribes, REUTERS (May 17, 
2017). 
52. See generally Who We Are, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
about/whoweare/ [https://perma.cc/NWZ3-S62X]. 
53. History of the FATF, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
about/historyofthefatf/ [https://perma.cc/JW3Y-76D7]. Unlike some other international bodies, 
such as the World Trade Organization, FATF was not established by a Treaty and does not have 
any direct power over the countries that are FATF members. It has great indirect or “soft law” 
influence, however, because FATF members and FSRBs have agreed to implement FATF’s 
Forty Recommendations. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text; Terry, supra note 26, at 
490 n.9 (quoting a 2008 membership policy). The United States is a founding member of FATF. 
Id. at 488. 
54. See FATF Who We Are, supra note 52. See also the asterisk (*) footnote, supra, which 
explains that this Article addresses only money laundering, even though FATF’s mandate also 
includes countering terrorist financing. 
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laundering recommendations that are extremely influential. These 
recommendations are described infra in Section III.B. 
 FATF’s reach is global, even though its members only include 
thirty-five jurisdictions and two regional associations.55 This is because 
FATF has nine “associate members” that are regional organizations 
that fight money laundering.56 All of FATF’s associate members have 
been approved as a FATF-Style Regional Body or FSRB, which means 
that they have satisfied certain criteria, have endorsed the FATF 
Recommendations, and have established processes to monitor 
implementation of the FATF Recommendations by their respective 
members.57 More than 200 countries belong to either FATF itself or 
one of the FATF-Style Regional Bodies that are FATF associate 
members.58 For the remainder of this Article, the term “FATF” will be 
used to encompass both FATF and the FATF-Style Regional Bodies. 
FATF also has as organizational “Observers,” a number of influential 
organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
 
 
55 .  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF Members and Observers,  http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/ [https://perma.cc/WRM3-DSPX] (“The FATF currently 
comprises 35 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organisations, representing most major 
financial centres in all parts of the globe.”). The regional organizations are the European 
Commission and the Gulf Co-operation Council. Id. 
56. FATF Members, supra note 55. FATF’s nine “Associate Members” include 1) the 
Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (“APG”); 2) the Caribbean Financial Action Task 
Force (“CFATF”); 3) the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-
Money Laundering Measure and the Financing of Terrorism (“MONEYVAL”); 4) the Eurasian 
Group (“EAG”); 5) the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(“ESAAMLG”); 6) the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (“GAFILAT”) (formerly 
known as the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America 
(“GAFISUD”)); 7) the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa (“GIABA”); 8) the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force 
(“MENAFATF”); and 9) the Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (“GABAC”). 
Id. 
57 .  Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012-2020), FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 
(2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%20
2012-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AGX-2QV9] ¶ 12, Annex B; Twenty-Five Years and Beyond 
20-21, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
brochuresannualreports/FATF%2025%20years.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SS4-32TN] (describing 
the history of Associate Members). 
58 . See, e.g., Annual Report 2016-17, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 1, 53 (2018), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF-annual-report-2016-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6TN-7BSH] (“The FATF and FSRBs bring together over 200 countries that 
have each committed to implement the FATF’s Recommendations.”). 
2018] RELEVANCE OF FATF’S RECOMMENDATIONS 643 
 
 
 
Fund, the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, 
the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the 
European Central Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.59 
FATF’s organizational Observers include among their functions a 
specific anti-money laundering mission or function. 60    Individual 
countries can also request Observer status if they have endorsed the 
FATF standards. 61  At the time this Article was written, Indonesia, 
Israel, and Saudi Arabia were FATF Observers.62  
FATF members typically meet in a Plenary session three times 
per year.63 The Plenary meetings often take place in Paris, which is the 
location of FATF’s Secretariat or headquarters.64 FATF’s “Outcomes 
of Meetings” webpage includes summaries of these Plenary 
meetings.65 In addition to its Plenary meetings, FATF hosts meetings 
on particular topics66 and has a number of committee meetings.67   
 
 
59.  See FATF Members, supra note 55. 
60. Id. See also FATF Policy on Observers, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/fatfpolicyonobservers.html [https://perma.cc/462E-
FK85]. 
61. See FATF Members, supra note 55. FATF Observer countries have endorsed the 
FATF standards. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Process and criteria for becoming a FATF 
member, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/membershipprocessandcriteria.
html [https://perma.cc/RF4M-D79M]. 
62.  See FATF Members, supra note 55. 
63  See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Calendars, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/calendar/
eventscalendar/?hf=10&b=0&s=asc(fatf_date1) [https://perma.cc/4MQL-PRT3 ] (“During a 
plenary year, the FATF holds three plenary meetings, a meeting of experts on typologies, and, 
depending on the focus of current work, intersessional meetings and meetings of various ad hoc 
groups. The plenary meetings usually take place in October, February and June of each year.”). 
64 . See id.; FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF Secretariat, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/fatfsecretariat/ [https://perma.cc/Y7ST-3P8R] (noting the location of the 
Secretariat); About Us: Outcomes of meetings, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/outcomesofmeetings/#d.en.198108 [https://perma.cc/X5BW-USMV] (listing the 
location of the plenary sessions). 
65. See FATF Outcomes of Meetings, supra note 64. 
66. See FATF Calendars, supra note 63 (describing meetings typically held during the 
year). 
67. See FATF Secretariat, supra note 64 (identifies five teams that operate under the 
Executive Secretary and includes links to FATF’s annual reports and to the FATF Mandate 
2012-2020). 
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FATF’s activities go far beyond simply adopting AML 
recommendations. One of its most important activities is the mutual 
evaluation process and resulting reports that are described infra in 
Section IV.A. FATF also issues a number of advisory papers, reports,  
and other documents designed to help countries effectively implement 
the FATF Recommendations. 68 
Two FATF documents that are specific to the legal profession are 
FATF’s 2008 “RBA [Risk Based Assessment] Guidance for Legal 
Professionals” 69  and the 2013 FATF Legal Profession Typologies 
report cited earlier. 70  Legal profession organizations originally had 
hoped that when FATF produced its legal profession  typologies 
document, that document would provide guidance about “red flags” 
that lawyers should look for in order to help them recognize money 
laundering and thus avoid inadvertently assisting criminals.71 When the 
2013 FATF Legal Profession Typologies Report was issued, however, 
its examples and case studies focused primarily on lawyers who had 
acted intentionally and were criminals, rather than lawyers who 
unintentionally or inadvertently helped their clients engage in money 
laundering activities.72 FATF’s focus on intentional wrongdoing led to 
 
 
68. See Terry, supra note 64, at 490-92. As of August 2, 2018, FATF’s “All Publications” 
webpage listed more than 700 publications. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, All Publications, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate) 
[https://perma.cc/H3EQ-FCWK]. Although there are many ways that one can perform a search 
on this webpage, including by country or topic, a drop down menu listed the following as the 
categories or types of publications that FATF has produced: Report (357); News (92); Meeting 
(59); Speech (58); Other (28); Guidance (21); Risk Based Approach (13); Recommendations 
(6); and Public Consultation (5). Id. 
69. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, RBA GUIDANCE FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (Oct. 
23, 2008), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA%20Legal%20
professions.pdf  [https://perma.cc/AL6Z-9UYV] [hereinafter FATF RBA FOR LAWYERS]. 
For additional information about the background and context of this document, see Terry, supra 
note 26, at 491-93; Kevin L. Shepherd, The Gatekeeper Initiative and the Risk-Based Approach 
to Client Due Diligence: The Imperative for Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for U.S. 
Lawyers, 2010 J. PROF. L. 83. 
70. FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27. 
71. See, e.g., IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide, supra note 4, at 6 (“Unfortunately, we do 
not believe this Report is as helpful as FATF intended, principally because it focuses heavily on 
situations in which lawyers are knowingly involved in money laundering and/or terrorist 
financing activities.”). 
72 . See generally FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27 (most examples involve 
intentional wrongdoing by lawyers); see also IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide, supra note 4, 
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the IBA/ABA/CCBE Guidance document cited earlier, which is  
directed towards lawyers who might inadvertently assist criminals, 
rather than lawyers who are criminal money launderers.73 
B. FATF’s Forty Recommendations and Related Documents  
FATF’s Recommendations have evolved over the years. They 
originally were adopted in 1990 to fight drug-money laundering. They 
were revised in 1996 to expand their scope beyond drug-money 
laundering, and were amended in October 2001 to include terrorist 
financing activities. 74  Significantly for lawyers, in 2003, FATF 
amended the Recommendations so that they applied to “designated 
non-financial businesses and professions” (“DNFBP”) who sometimes 
are called “gatekeepers.” DNFBPs include lawyers engaged in 
designated activities.75 
The FATF Recommendations took their current form in 2012, 
when they were significantly restructured and renumbered, and 
amended to add some new obligations.76 Subsequent to 2012, there 
 
 
at 6; Terry, supra note 26, at n.115 (quoting an Am. Bar Ass’n letter to FATF and a CCBE letter 
to FATF). 
73 . See generally IBA/ABA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide, supra note 4 (providing risk 
assessment and due diligence guidance and identifying potential red flags). 
74. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 7. 
75. Compare FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 1996) 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20
Recommendations%201996.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6H3-PMQB] (no reference to DNFBPs), 
with FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS (June 2003), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20
Recommendations%202003.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9NT-8TN9] (includes Recommendation 
12, which applies Recommendations 5, 6, and 8-11 to “designated non-financial businesses and 
professions” which include lawyers involved in certain activities). See generally Review of the 
FATF Standards and Historical Versions, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/review-and-history-of-fatf-
standards.html [https://perma.cc/RM4K-8ASN] (webpage includes links to prior versions). For 
a list of the covered activities, see infra note 85. 
76 . See, e.g., FATF Recommendations Media Narrative, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE 
(2012), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/Press%20handout%20FATF%20
Recommendations%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MVK-46AG] (FATF press release 
describing the changes). For an excellent discussion of the 2012 changes, see Gary W. Sutton, 
The New FATF Standards, 4 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 68, 68-136 (2012). Gary W. Sutton 
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have been minor changes. 77 At the time this Article was written, the 
FATF Recommendations had most recently been updated in 2018.78 
The FATF Recommendations include interpretive notes and additional 
material such as a glossary, a list of acronyms, useful links, and a 
revisions summary.79 
FATF-related documents and articles that are older than 2012 
often refer to the “40+9 FATF Recommendations.”80 This is because, 
in their pre-2012 format, the first forty recommendations addressed 
money laundering and the last nine recommendations addressed 
terrorist financing. 81  Although the Recommendations were 
restructured in 2012 and reduced to forty, no major concepts were 
deleted. 82  Since the 2012 restructuring, the Recommendations are 
called either the “FATF Forty Recommendations” or the “FATF 
Recommendations.”83 
Not all of the forty FATF Recommendations apply to DNFBPs.84 
The key FATF Recommendations that apply to DNFBP lawyers are 
Recommendations 22 and 23.  Moreover, lawyers are only covered by 
the DNFBP FATF Recommendations if they are engaged in one or 
more of five specified activities.85 
 
 
was “Senior Legal Advisor for Financial Crime in the Office of the General Counsel at the U.S. 
Treasury Department, where he served as a member of the U.S. Delegation to the FATF and 
participated in the FATF’s review of the standards.” Id. at 68. 
77. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 129-30 (summarizing the changes since 
2012, including the February 2018 and October 2018 changes). 
78. Id. at 3 (showing the 2018 adoption date). 
79. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 29-107 (Interpretive Notes) and id. 
at 108-28 (other items). 
80. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial Action Task 
Force and Its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. PROF. L. 3 (2010) (referring to the 40+9 
Recommendations). 
81. Id. at 9. 
82. See generally Sutton, supra note 76, at 74-75. 
83. Compare Twenty-Five Years, supra note 57 (referring to FATF Forty 
Recommendations), with Media Narrative, supra note 76 (referring to the FATF 
Recommendations); Terry, supra note 26, at 489. 
84 . See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 4 (the heading before 
Recommendations 22 and 23 is “Designated non-financial Businesses and Professions 
(DNFBPs)”). 
85. See FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at R. 22(d): 
22. DNFBPs: customer due diligence 
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Recommendation 22 is entitled “DNFBPs: customer due 
diligence.” It specifies that the “due diligence” and record keeping 
requirements found elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations also 
apply to covered DNFBPs, including lawyers.86 Recommendation 23 
is entitled “DNFBPs: Other measures” and it too incorporates by 
reference other FATF recommendations. 87  Recommendation 23 
incorporates by reference the following FATF Recommendations: 
Internal controls and foreign branches and subsidiaries (Rec. 18); 
Higher-risk countries (Rec. 19); Reporting of suspicious transactions 
(Rec. 20); and [No] Tipping-off and confidentiality (Rec. 21). 88 
Recommendation 23, which requires suspicious transaction reporting 
(“STR”) and prohibits disclosure of an STR (no “tipping off” or 
 
 
The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements set out in 
Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17 apply to designated non-financial businesses 
and professions (“DNFBPs”) in the following situations: 
. . . 
(d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – when 
they prepare for or carry out transactions for their client concerning the following 
activities: 
 buying and selling of real estate; 
 managing of client money, securities or other assets; 
 management of bank, savings or securities accounts; 
 organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of 
companies; 
 creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying 
and selling of business entities. 
86. Id. at 17-18 (DNFBPs include lawyers engaged in one of the five activities described 
supra, are subject to the customer due diligence and record keeping requirements in 
Recommendations 10, 11, 12, 15, and 17). Recommendation 10 is entitled “Customer due 
diligence”; Recommendation 12 is entitled “Politically exposed persons;” Recommendation 15 
is entitled “New technologies”; and Recommendation 17 is entitled “Reliance on third parties.” 
Id. at 12, 14-16. 
87. Recommendation 23 states in pertinent part: 
The requirements set out in Recommendations 18 to 21 apply to all designated non-
financial businesses and professions, subject to the following qualifications: 
(a) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants should 
be required to report suspicious transactions when, on behalf of or for a client, they 
engage in a financial transaction in relation to the activities described in paragraph 
(d) of Recommendation 22.  
Id. at 18-19 (Recommendation 23). 
88. Id. at 18-19. 
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“NTO”), has proven more controversial for lawyers than 
Recommendation 22.89 
The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 adds an important 
qualification. Because of the importance of this Interpretive Note and 
the frequency with which reference to this Note is omitted, 90  it is 
reprinted below in its entirety: 
INTERPRETIVE NOTE TO RECOMMENDATION 23 
(DNFBPS – OTHER MEASURES) 
1. Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and 
accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not 
required to report suspicious transactions if the relevant 
information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject 
to professional secrecy or legal professional privilege. 
2. It is for each country to determine the matters that would fall 
under legal professional privilege or professional secrecy. This 
would normally cover information lawyers, notaries or other 
independent legal professionals receive from or obtain through one 
of their clients: (a) in the course of ascertaining the legal position 
of their client, or (b) in performing their task of defending or 
representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative, 
arbitration or mediation proceedings. 
3. Countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal 
professionals and accountants to send their STR to their 
appropriate self-regulatory organisations, provided that there are 
appropriate forms of cooperation between these organisations and 
the FIU [Financial Intelligence Unit]. 
4. Where lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals 
and accountants acting as independent legal professionals seek to 
dissuade a client from engaging in illegal activity, this does not 
amount to tipping-off.91    
 
 
89. See, e.g., CCBE, Anti-Money Laundering Committee, Other Documents, 
https://www.ccbe.eu/actions/committees-working-groups/?idC=791&Committee=Anti-
Money-Laundering [https://perma.cc/LGE4-CGKP] (tab entitled “Other” including links to 
legal challenges brought in Belgium, France, and EU Courts); Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of Can. v. 
Canada, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.); see also Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the Financial 
Action Task Force and its 2008 Lawyer Guidance, J. PROF. L. 3, 39-45 (2010) (discussing “How 
Has the Legal Profession Responded to the FATF 40+9 Recommendations?”). 
90. See infra notes 125-71 and accompanying text (describing the treatment of the legal 
profession in FATF’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports). 
91. FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 11, at 83. 
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Parts IV and V, infra, provide additional information about the 
ways in which this Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 has—or 
has not—been cited by FATF or FATF-Style Regional Bodies in their 
mutual evaluations of their members. 
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND FATF’S FOURTH ROUND OF 
MUTUAL EVALUATIONS 
 
This Part focuses on the legal profession’s experience during the 
current round of FATF mutual evaluations. Section IV.A provides 
background information about the current evaluation round and 
identifies the documents that are most relevant to this process. Section 
IV.B analyzes how the legal profession has fared in the most recent 
round of FATF mutual evaluations. Section IV.C offers case studies 
from three countries that show different levels of engagement among 
legal profession and government representatives. 
A. FATF’s Ongoing Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations 
 
FATF’s Mutual Evaluations are peer reviews that “assess levels 
of implementation of the FATF Recommendations” and provide “an 
in-depth description and analysis of each country’s system for 
preventing criminal abuse of the financial system.”92 FATF currently 
is engaged in its fourth round of mutual evaluations.93 Although some 
countries have received fewer than four mutual evaluation reports and 
others have received more than four, this Article will refer to all of the 
current reports as FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports. 94 
 
 
92.  Mutual Evaluations, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate) 
[https://perma.cc/4AZP-MBTS] [hereinafter FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage]. 
93. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Procedures for the FATF Fourth Round of AML/CFT 
Mutual evaluations (updated June 2018), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
methodology/FATF-4th-Round-Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/E44T-T7LJ] [hereinafter 
FATF 4th Round Procedures]. 
94. Countries that belong to a FATF-Style Regional Body rather than FATF may have 
received fewer than four reports. Some countries have had more than four evaluations because 
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FATF’s fourth round of Mutual Evaluations differs from the third 
round because FATF members are attempting to measure both the 
effectiveness of a country’s AML measures, as well as that country’s 
technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations.95  
FATF’s Mutual Evaluations webpage contains a wealth of 
information about what countries can expect during the current mutual 
evaluation process.96 For example, the Mutual Evaluations webpage 
contains links to the most recent versions of a Mutual Evaluation 
Methodology document 97  and a Mutual Evaluation Procedures 
document.98 FATF has also prepared a much shorter document entitled 
“Consolidated Processes and Procedures for Mutual Evaluations and 
Follow-Up: ‘Universal Procedures,’” that states the procedures that 
should be followed by all assessment bodies, including the FATF-Style 
Regional Bodies and international financial bodies such as the World 
Bank.99 Among other things, the longer Mutual Evaluation Procedures 
document includes a sample timetable and explains the procedure for 
follow-up after a Mutual Evaluation Report is approved by the FATF 
 
 
there have been follow-up reports. See generally FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Countries, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/ [https://perma.cc/PYU5-M5F7]. Clicking on an individual 
country will lead to a webpage that usually includes links to prior mutual evaluation reports. But 
see supra note 7 (noting the broken links on FATF’s Peru page). 
95 . See generally Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF 
Recommendation and The Effectiveness of AML/CFT Systems FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (Feb. 
2018), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF%20Methodology%2022%20Feb%202013.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8SBA-9VG4] [hereinafter FATF 4th Round Methodology]. 
96. See Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92. 
97. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95. This methodology document has 
been updated several times. 
98. See FATF 4th Round Procedures, supra note 93. Similar to the FATF 4th Round 
Methodology document, supra note 95, the FATF 4th Round Procedures document has been 
updated several times. See, e.g., Procedures for the FAFT Fourth Round of AML/CFT Mutual 
Evaluations, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/methodology/FATF-4th-Round-
Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZHW-3DJX]. 
99. See Consolidated Processes and Procedures for Mutual evaluations and Follow-Up 
“Universal Procedures,” FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ¶ 2 (June 2018), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/FATF-Universal-Procedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY7G-HTSS] 
[hereinafter June 2018 FATF Universal Procedures]. This document has also been updated 
regularly. See, e.g., Consolidatd Processes and Procedures for Mutual Evaluations and Follow-
Up: “Universal Procedures,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/Universal-Procedures-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7YN-Y42X]. 
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Plenary. 100  Because a FATF mutual evaluation requires extensive 
preparation, legal profession representatives who want to provide input 
to their governments will need to prepare months before the country’s 
scheduled on-site assessment visit.101 
The FATF webpage includes a “calendar” link on the main menu; 
if one clicks on this link, one can then select either the “events 
calendar” or the “assessment calendar.” 102 Table 1 on the assessment 
calendar provides information about which countries have an 
upcoming mutual evaluation, which entity will conduct the evaluation, 
the date of the country’s last evaluation, the proposed date for the on-
site visit, and the tentative date during which that country’s Mutual 
Evaluation Report will be discussed by the FATF Plenary. 103  The 
assessment calendar webpage also contains two search windows that 
allow one to search by country or by examining body (e.g., FATF or a 
particular FATF-Style Regional Body).104 Table 2 on the Assessment 
 
 
100. See FATF 4th Round Procedures, supra note 93, at 27-31 (timeline) and 16-17 (post 
Plenary procedures). 
101. See id. at 27-31. Appendix 1 – Timelines For the 4th Round Mutual evaluation 
Process provides that at least six months before the on-site visit, the FATF assessment team will: 
1) commence research and desk-based review on technical compliance; 
2) confirm (or find) assessors drawn from countries which had volunteered and have the 
FATF President formally advise the country of the assessors once confirmed; and 
3) invite delegations to provide information about (a) assessed country’s risk situation and 
any specific issues which should be given additional attention by assessors and (b) their 
international cooperation experiences with the assessed country. 
Id. at 26. During this same time period, the country that is being assessed is expected to: a) 
designate contact point(s) or person(s) and set up an internal coordination mechanisms (as 
necessary); and b) respond to technical compliance update by providing updated information on 
new laws and regulations, guidance, institutional framework, risk and context. Id. Four months 
before a country’s Mutual Evaluation on-site visit, the country will have the opportunity to 
comment on the eleven Immediate Outcomes that are set forth in the FATF Methodology 
document and that will be the basis for a country’s “effectiveness” rating. Id. Two months before 
the on-site visit, the country has the opportunity to comment on the technical compliance 
assessment prepared by the assessment team. Id. 
102 . See Global Assessment Calendar, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/calendar/assessmentcalendar/?hf=10&b=0&s=asc(document_lastmodifieddate)&table
=1 [https://perma.cc/N5MQ-KR7X] [hereinafter FATF Global Assessment Calendar].  This is 
the Calendar page that one sees if one clicks on the “Assessment Calendar” tab from the FATF 
Calendar webpage, supra note 63.  
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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Calendar contains a list of countries to be assessed whose mutual 
evaluation dates have not yet been scheduled.105 These pages show that 
the legal professions in most countries either have had or soon will have 
their AML regulatory system evaluated by FATF members. 
FATF’s Mutual Evaluation Methodology document sets forth 
“immediate outcomes” that will be used to determine a country’s 
effectiveness rating during the FATF 4th Round of Mutual 
Evaluations. 106  Appendix II of this Methodology document is a 
template for the Mutual Evaluation Report that is prepared after the 
assessors’ mutual evaluation on-site visit. 107  This template 
recommends an executive summary of five pages or less, a report that 
is 100 or fewer pages, and annexes that are sixty pages or fewer.108 
Many reports, however, exceed this length. 109  Legal profession 
 
 
105. See FATF Global Assessment Calendar, supra note 102. 
106. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, at 93-122 (these pages specify the 
“Immediate Outcomes” that will be used to measure the effectiveness of a country’s 
implementation of the FATF Recommendations). See infra note 132 for information about the 
Immediate Outcomes most relevant to the legal profession. 
107. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, at 124-45. 
108. Id. at 124. 
109. The completed reports are available on the FATF Mutual Evaluations webpage, supra 
note 92. The fifty completed FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports are listed below. For 
ease of use, these citations have included the abbreviations of the FATF-Style Regional Body, 
if any, issuing the report. See supra note 56 and the accompanying text for these abbreviations 
and information about the FATF-Style Regional Bodies. Separate URLs are not included since 
all of these are available on the FATF Mutual Evaluations webpage. These are listed in 
alphabetical rather than chronological order. MONEYVAL, Anti-Money laundering and 
Counter-Terrorist Financing counter-terrorist financing measures, Andorra, Fifth Round 
Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorist financing measures, Armenia, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2015); 
FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Australia, Mutual 
Evaluation Report (Apr. 2015); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
measures, Austria, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2016); CFATF GAFIC, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, The Bahamas, Mutual Evaluation Report 
(July 2017); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, 
Bangladesh, Mutual Evaluation Report, (Oct. 2016); CFTAF GAFIC, Anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorist financing measures, Barbados, Mutual Evaluation Report (Feb. 2018); 
FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Belgium, Mutual 
Evaluation Report (Apr. 2015); APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing 
measures, Bhutan, Mutual Evaluation Report (Oct. 2016); ESAAM, Anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing measures, Botswana, Mutual Evaluation Report (May 2017); APG, 
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Cambodia, Mutual 
Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
measures, Canada, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2016); GIFLAT, Mutual Evaluation Report 
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of the Republic of Costa Rica (Dec. 2015); GIFLAT, Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic 
of Cuba (Dec. 2015); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, 
Denmark, Mutual Evaluation Report (Aug. 2017); ESAAM, Mutual Evaluation Report, Anti-
Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, The Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (May 2015); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
measures, Fiji, Mutual Evaluation Report (Oct. 2016); GIABA, Anti-money laundering and 
counter-terrorist financing measures, Ghana, Mutual Evaluation Report (May 2017); CFATF 
GAFIC, Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Guatemala (Nov. 2016); GAFILAT, 
Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Honduras (Oct. 2016); MONEYVAL, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Hungary, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation 
Report (Sept. 2016); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, 
Iceland, Mutual Evaluation Report (Apr. 2018); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorist financing measures, Ireland, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); MONEYVAL, 
Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Isle of Man, Fifth Round 
Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing measures, Italy, Mutual Evaluation Report (Feb. 2016); CFATF GAFIC, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Jamaica, Mutual Evaluation Report (Jan. 
2017); APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing measures, Macao, China, 
Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing measures, Malaysia, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); FATF, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Mexico, Mutual Evaluation Report (Jan. 
2018); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Mongolia, 
Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2017); GAFILAT, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA (Oct. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-
terrorist financing measures, Norway, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2014); GAFILAT, 
Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Panama (Jan. 2018); FATF, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Portugal, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 
2017); APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing measures, Samoa, Mutual 
Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing measures, Serbia, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (Apr. 2016); FATF, Anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Singapore, Mutual Evaluation 
Report (Sept. 2016); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing 
measures, Slovenia, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (June 2017); FATF, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Spain, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 
2014); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Sri Lanka, 
Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing measures, Switzerland, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016); FATF, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Sweden, Mutual Evaluation Report (April. 
2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Switzerland, 
Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016); APG, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing measures, Thailand, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2017); CFATF GAFIC, Anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Trinidad and Tobago, Mutual 
Evaluation Report (June 2016); MENA FATF, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing measures, Tunisia, Mutual Evaluation Report (May 2016); ESAAM, Anti-money 
laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, Uganda, Mutual Evaluation Report (Apr. 
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representatives can use this template when considering what 
information their governments and FATF will want to know about the 
country’s legal profession. 
FATF’s Mutual Evaluations webpage includes useful information 
about completed mutual evaluations. 110  For example, one of the 
subheadings on this page is entitled “Consolidated Assessment 
Ratings.”111 Underneath this heading one can find links to both PDF 
and Excel versions of a document entitled Consolidated Table of 
Assessment Ratings.112 These PDF and Excel documents summarize 
the results of the completed 4th Round FATF Mutual Evaluations.113 
The Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings is regularly updated.114 
This Article relies on the July 25, 2018 version of this document. 
 
 
2016); MONEYVAL, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures, 
Ukraine, Fifth Round Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2017); FATF, Anti-money laundering 
and counter-terrorist financing measures, United States, Mutual Evaluation Report (Dec. 2016); 
APG, Anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorist financing measures, Vanuatu, Mutual 
Evaluation Report (Sept. 2015); ESAAM, Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing measures, Zimbabwe, Mutual Evaluation Report (Sept. 2016). 
110.  See generally FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92. 
111. See FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. (including links to both PDF and Excel versions of the Consolidated Table of 
Assessment Ratings). See infra note 114 for links to the July 25, 2018 versions of the PDF and 
Excel documents, which are the versions that this Article relies on.  Because FATF updates these 
ratings table after each Plenary session, it is inevitable that this Article will not be fully up-to-
date when published.  The current versions of the Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings 
appear as links on the FATF Mutual Evaluations page, supra note 92.  The July 25, 2018 version 
on which this Article is based will continue to be available at a permalink cite, which is 
https://perma.cc/FSK6-57AZ] (It is perhaps worth noting that the title that appears on the FATF 
Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92, is slightly different than the title that appears on 
the PDF document when one selects the link and opens the document. The document itself 
begins with the word “Table” rather than the words “Consolidated Table.”). 
114 . Compare Table of ratings for assessment conducted against the 2012 FATF 
Recommendations, using the 2013 FATF Methodology, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (updated  
July 25, 2018), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FSK6-57AZ] [hereinafter July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment 
Ratings], with FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Table of ratings for assessment conducted against the 
2012 FATF Recommendations, using the 2013 FATF Methodology (updated Oct. 12, 2017), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y6P-
RMJN]. As explained supra note 94, some countries are listed more than once because the Table 
of Consolidated Assessment Ratings includes follow-up reports. Id. (showing follow-up reports 
for Austria). 
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The July 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings lists the 
name of each country whose 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report has 
been published and presents information about that country’s technical 
compliance ratings and its effectiveness ratings.115 As noted earlier, the 
FATF Mutual Evaluation Methodology document specifies that fourth 
round evaluations focus on both technical compliance and 
effectiveness, the latter of which is measured by examining eleven 
immediate outcomes. 116  For each of the forty FATF 
Recommendations, a country will receive one of the following 
technical compliance ratings: 
C  Compliant 
LC Largely compliant—There are only minor 
 shortcomings. 
PC Partially compliant—There are moderate 
 shortcomings. 
NC Non-compliant—There are major shortcomings. 
NA Not applicable—A requirement does not apply, due to 
 the structural, legal or institutional features of the
 country.117 
For each of the eleven “Immediate Outcomes” that are specified 
in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Methodology document and that are 
used to measure the “effectiveness” of a country’s implementation of 
the FATF Recommendations, 118  a country will receive one of the 
following “effectiveness” ratings: 
HE High level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome is  
achieved to a very large extent. Minor improvements needed. 
SE  Substantial level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome 
is achieved to a large extent. Moderate improvements needed. 
 
 
115. See July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114. 
116.  See supra notes 106, 118-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Immediate 
Outcomes.  
117. Id. 
118. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, at 93-122. For a discussion of the 
Immediate Outcomes most relevant to the legal profession, see infra note 132 and accompanying 
text. 
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ME Moderate level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome is 
achieved to some extent. Major improvements needed. 
LE Low level of effectiveness—The Immediate Outcome is not 
achieved or achieved to a negligible extent. Fundamental 
improvements needed.119 
Before a country’s data is included in a Consolidated Table of 
Assessment Ratings, the FATF Plenary will discuss the report and 
approve its publication.120 After the Plenary approves the publication 
of a Mutual Evaluation Report, there will be a follow-up process 
designed to ensure quality and consistency. 121  Once the required 
follow-up occurs, links to that country’s final Mutual Evaluation 
Report will be available on the FATF Mutual Evaluations webpage.122 
B. Findings About the Legal Profession in the Completed FATF 
Fourth Round Mutual Evaluations  
 Fifty jurisdictions were listed in FATF’s July 25, 2018 
Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings.123 All of these jurisdictions 
have received reports that evaluate both their technical compliance 
 
 
119. Id. 
120. See, e.g., June 2018 Universal Procedures, supra note 99, at 7-8 (including the 
sections on “Plenary discussion” and “Publication and other procedures following the Plenary”); 
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Outcomes of the Plenary meeting of the FATF, Paris, 22-24 
February 2017 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-plenary-
february-2017.html [https://perma.cc/7JLB-5L5E] (“Discussion of the mutual evaluation report 
of Sweden”). 
121. See, e.g., supra note 99 (citing FATF’s 4th Round Universal Procedures document). 
See supra note 120 (citing the February 2017 Plenary discussion of Sweden’s Mutual Evaluation 
Report). 
122 . See FATF Mutual Evaluations Webpage, supra note 92 (the reports are listed 
chronologically, but one can also search by country or region). A few countries have requested 
and received a rerating. See, e.g., Technical Analysis of FATF Recommendations – Rerating of 
Cuba, GAFILAT (Oct. 2017), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-
fsrb/FUR-Cuba-Oct-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/YER7-GQ83]. Some countries have follow-up 
reports, as well as the initial mutual evaluation report. See, e.g., 1st Follow-Up Report 
Mutual Evaluation of Fiji, APG (Oct. 2017), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/
reports/mer-fsrb/FUR-Fiji-Oct-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT9A-XC25] (follow-up from Fiji’s 
2016 FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 109). 
123. See FATF Consolidated Table of Assessments Ratings, supra note 114.  During the 
editing process for this Article, FATF posted November 2, 2018 versions of the Consolidated 
Tables of Assessment Ratings.  This Article is based on the July 2018 ratings.  As noted in the 
asterisk footnote to this Article, the FATF process is ongoing.  
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with the FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of their actions 
with respect to eleven Immediate Outcomes.124 As the discussion that 
follows demonstrates, the legal profession has not fared particularly 
well in these Mutual Evaluation Reports. 
FATF Recommendation 22 is the “due diligence” provision that 
applies to DNFBPs, including lawyers who are engaged in one of five 
activities. 125  The July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment 
Ratings lists the evaluated countries’ technical compliance ratings for 
Recommendation 22.126 These ratings are as follows: 
• Nine Non-Compliant Jurisdictions: Australia, Botswana, 
Canada, Fiji, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
and the United States. 
• Twenty-Three Partially Compliant Jurisdictions: 
Andorra, Austria, Bahamas, Cambodia, Costa Rica, 
Denmark, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Jamaica, Macao China, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, 
Samoa, Serbia, Singapore, Switzerland, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Vanuatu, and Zimbabwe. 
• Seventeen Largely Compliant Jurisdictions: Armenia, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Honduras, Isle of Man, Italy, Malaysia, Panama, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Trinidad & Tobago, and Ukraine. 
• One Fully Compliant Jurisdiction: Bhutan.127 
The July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings also 
lists the technical compliance ratings for Recommendation 23, which 
is entitled “DNFBPs – Other Measures.” 128  Recommendation 23 
includes the suspicious transaction reporting (“STR”) obligation  and 
 
 
124. For a discussion of the Immediate Outcomes, see supra notes 95, 118-19 (discussing 
the effectiveness ratings and the content of the eleven Immediate Outcomes). See also supra 
note 94 (explaining why the reports from some jurisdictions may not be called their 4th Report); 
supra note 114 (explaining why some jurisdictions are listed more than once on the Consolidated 
Table of Assessment Ratings). 
125. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the content of 
Recommendation 22. 
126. See July 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessments Ratings, supra note 114. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
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the “no  tipping off” (“NTO”) prohibition on notifying the person that 
a suspicious transaction report has been made. 129  Both of these 
obligations apply to DNFBPs, which includes lawyers who are 
involved in one of the five designated activities. 130  The FATF 4th 
Round Mutual Evaluation Report ratings for Recommendation 23 are 
as follows: 
• Six Non-Compliant Jurisdictions: Australia, Canada, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Nicaragua, and the United States. 
• Twenty-Four Partially Compliant Jurisdictions: Andorra, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Costa Rica, Fiji, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Isle of Man, 
Jamaica, Macao China, Samoa, Serbia, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Vanuatu, 
and Zimbabwe. 
• Eighteen Largely Compliant Jurisdictions: Austria, 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Cambodia, Cuba, Denmark, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, 
Panama, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Trinidad & Tobago, 
and Ukraine. 
• Two Fully Compliant Jurisdictions: Armenia and 
Spain.131 
 Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4 are the “effectiveness” ratings that 
are most relevant to the legal profession.132 None of the fifty countries 
 
 
129.  See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Recommendation 
23.  
130. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Recommendation 
23, including the requirements that DNFBPs report suspicious transaction and the prohibition 
on DNFBPs notifying or “tipping off” the individual in question that a report has been made. 
131. See Consolidated Table of Assessments Ratings, supra note 114. 
132. See FATF Methodology, supra note 95, at 93-102.  See supra notes 95, 118-19 and 
accompanying text for additional information about the inclusion in the fourth round of mutual 
evaluations “effectiveness” ratings which are measured by the “immediate outcomes.” The 
content of Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4 is set forth in the FATF 4th Round Methodology 
document, supra note 95, at 99-104. Some of the issues included in Immediate Outcome 3s 
effectiveness rating include “how well do supervisors, on a risk-sensitive basis, supervise or 
monitor the extent to which . . . DNFBPs are complying with their AML/CFT requirements?” 
and “to what extent are supervisors to demonstrate that their actions have an effect on 
compliance by . . . DNFBPs?” Id. at 100. Some of the core issues included in in Immediate 
Outcome 4’s effectiveness rating include “how well do . . . DNFBPs understand their ML/TF 
risks and AML/CT obligations?”; “How well do . . . DNFBPs apply the enhanced or specific 
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whose Mutual Evaluation Reports were published as of July 2018 
received a “high level of effectiveness” rating for either Immediate 
Outcome 3 or Immediate Outcome 4.133 Only six of fifty countries 
received a “substantial level of effectiveness” rating on Immediate 
Outcome 3 and only one country received a “substantial level of 
effectiveness” rating on Immediate Outcome 4. 134  The majority of 
countries evaluated received a rating of “moderate level of 
effectiveness,” although more than twenty-five percent received the 
lowest possible rating on Intermediate Outcome 3 and almost thirty-
five percent received the lowest possible rating on Intermediate 
Outcome 4.135 As noted earlier, the FATF effectiveness ratings are for 
all categories of DNFBPs; the legal profession is not rated 
separately.136 Interestingly, Australia and the United States received 
“noncompliant” ratings for their technical compliance with 
Recommendations 22 and 23, but received “moderate” effectiveness 
ratings for both Intermediate Outcomes 3 and 4.137 Canada received a 
noncompliant rating on both Recommendations 22 and 23, but it 
received one of the very few “substantial” effectiveness ratings on 
 
 
measures for [risk]?”; “to what extent do . . . DNFBPs meet their reporting obligations on 
suspect proceeds of crime . . . ?”; “How well do . . . DNFBPs apply internal controls and 
procedures . . . to ensure compliance with AML/CFT requirements?” Id. at 102-03. To show that 
these are the most relevant to the legal profession, see infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text 
(Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4 were the outcomes for which US legal profession representatives 
were asked to provide information). 
133. See July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114. 
134. Id. (showing that Canada, Cuba, Ireland, Macao China, Malaysia, and Spain received 
a “substantial” effectiveness rating on Intermediate Outcome 3 and Armenia received a 
substantial effectiveness rating on Intermediate Outcome 4). 
135. Id. (showing that thirty countries received the “moderate” effectiveness rating on 
Immediate Outcome 3 and thirty-two countries received the “moderate” effectiveness rating on 
Immediate Outcome 4. Fourteen countries received the “low” effectiveness rating on Immediate 
Outcome 3 and seventeen countries received the low effectiveness rating on Immediate Outcome 
4). Id. 
136. See supra notes 95, 118-19, 132 and accompanying text regarding the effectiveness 
ratings. 
137.  See July 25, 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114. 
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Intermediate Outcome 3 and received a “moderate” effectiveness rating 
on Intermediate Outcome 4.138 
Despite the range of scores for DNFBPs, when lawyer AML 
efforts are discussed in the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports, the tone 
is quite harsh. It is true that there are a few Mutual Evaluation Reports 
that are largely silent about the legal profession.139 It is also true that 
there are some Reports that note that most or all of the jurisdiction’s 
lawyers are not engaged in the kinds of activities to which the FATF 
Recommendations apply. 140 There are also a very few Reports that 
contain neutral or mostly positive reviews of the legal profession.141 
Overall, however, it is striking how many of the FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Reports contain negative comments about that legal 
profession’s AML regulations or implementation. This is true even for 
countries that received “largely compliant” technical compliance 
ratings for Recommendations 22 and 23.142 
 
 
138. Id. The Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings shows that some of the countries 
that performed the best on the DNFBP technical compliance ratings performed poorly on the 
effectiveness ratings and vice-versa. Id. 
139. See, e.g., Bangladesh MER, supra note 109. 
140. See, e.g., Andorra MER, supra note 109, ¶ 130; Cuba MER, supra note 109, at 124 
(“Under Decree-Law 317, the above professions are reporting entities when they prepare for, or 
carry out, transactions for customers concerning the management of client money, securities or 
other assets. However, at present this criterion does not apply as lawyers, notaries and other legal 
professionals and natural or legal persons working as accountants independent or under other 
forms of non-state management are not allowed to conduct this activity in accordance with the 
rules governing the power and activities of each sector (Decree-Law 81 for lawyers and Law 50 
for state notaries).”); Bahamas MER, supra note 109, at 51, ¶ 133 (“Although a majority of 
attorneys do not comply with AML/CFT measures since they do not perform the designated 
activities and have concerns regarding legal professional privilege, they are aware of their 
obligations . . . .”). 
141. See, e.g., Vanuatu MER, supra note 109, ¶ 256 (“Some lawyers do not regularly 
handle client funds, e.g. where litigation is the main business focus, but may from time to time 
receive funds through bank accounts (not cash) on behalf of customers as part of a property 
settlement transaction. AML/CFT procedures appear to be adequate in the major firms at least. 
Not all firms appear to have updated their AML/CFT policies and procedures to encompass the 
2014 legislative changes. The nature of their non-TCSP business has not warranted STRs to 
date.”); see generally Austria MER, supra note 109 (the tone seems more positive than most, 
citing information such as the lawyer discipline system and education efforts); Macao, China 
MER, supra note 109, ¶ 269 (“For other DNFBPs, the level of awareness of risk and AML/CFT 
requirements varies, with a good awareness of risks and obligations among notaries, lawyers 
and accountants, and a lower awareness among real estate agents and high value goods 
dealers.”). 
142. See, e.g., Italy MER, supra note 109. 
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The types of criticisms that appear in the FATF Mutual Evaluation 
Reports vary. For example, some of the Reports assert that the 
evaluated country has an inadequate AML regime for lawyers.143 This 
was the finding in the US Mutual Evaluation Report, which gave the 
United States a non-compliant ratings for its technical compliance with 
Recommendations 22 and 23.144 The concluding sentence in the “Key 
Findings” section of the US Mutual Evaluation Report was that the 
“most significant supervisory gap is lack of comprehensive [AML] 
supervisory processes for the DNFBPs, other than casinos.”145 
Another criticism of the legal profession that appears in the 
Mutual Evaluation Reports is that even when an AML regime for 
lawyers exists, lawyers do not understand that they are subject to those 
AML regulations. 146  Armenia, for example, received a rare 
 
 
143. See, e.g., Nicaragua MER, supra note 109,  ¶¶ 353, 358; Thailand MER, supra note 
109, ¶ 24 (“A significant scope gap remains with the lack of inclusion of lawyers or accountants 
in the AML/CFT framework in Thailand”), ¶ 373 (“include lawyers . . . in the AML/CFT 
framework. The particulars of obligations should reflect risk assessment findings”); Turkey 
MER, supra note 109, at r. 16 (Deficiency 1) (“Accountants, lawyers and other legal 
professionals are not required to submit STRs and are not subject to other measures covered by 
Recommendations 14, 15 and 21.”); Uganda MER, supra note 109, ¶ 37 (“The institutional 
framework providing for lawyers’ compliance with their AML/CFT CDD obligations is weak 
and for foreign corporate clients, lawyers heavily rely on verification information they request 
from their foreign counterparts without necessarily verifying it themselves.”); Guatemala MER, 
supra note 109, at 3 (“Activities carried out by lawyers and notaries referred to by the FATF 
Standards are not all subject to AML/CFT regulations and they are not supervised for such 
purpose.”); Austria MER, supra note 109,  ¶¶ 28, 33 (“Some DNFBP sectors, such as lawyers 
and notaries, showed a good understanding of TFS obligations . . . Notaries, lawyers, and 
accountants play a key role within the economic system as they are often involved in high risk 
business like company formations and real estate transfers. There are concerns whether they 
fulfil their gatekeeper role effectively.”). 
144. Id. at 257. 
145. United States MER, supra note 109, at 5. 
146 . See, e.g., Bhutan MER, supra note 109, ¶ 27 (describing lack of awareness by 
DNFBPs, which is a category that includes lawyers); Botswana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 276 
(“The real estate agents and lawyers are not aware of their CDD requirements such as due 
diligence measures to verify customer and conduct customer profiling.”); Fiji MER, supra note 
109, at 72-73, ¶¶ 263, 273 (noting the general understanding of ML risks was low with outreach 
to DNFBPs, including lawyers, low); Uganda MER, supra note 109, ¶ 215 (“Lawyers and 
Accountants have implemented basic Know Your Client and Due Diligence procedures. Due to 
the fact that no AML/CFT specific supervision activities have taken place in the DNFBP sector, 
very limited awareness of the AML/CFT obligations exist within the sector.”); Mexico MER, 
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“compliant” rating on Recommendation 23, but its Mutual Evaluation 
Report stated that “the legal community has a poor understanding of 
the AML/CFT law.”147 A third type of criticism is that the jurisdiction’s 
lawyers may understand as a theoretical matter that they are subject to 
their country’s AML regulations, but the lawyers do not understand the 
risks they face or they are not properly following or implementing the 
existing AML regulations.148 Some FATF Reports have also implicitly 
or explicitly criticized the entities that regulate lawyers.149 
 
 
supra note 109, at 87 (“Key Findings . . . Discussions suggested that lawyers and accountants 
generally have a lower level of awareness of their AML/CFT obligations.”). 
147. Armenia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 259. This Report stated that the “evaluation team 
was advised that the legal community has a poor understanding of the AML/CFT law, which 
suggests that risk and appropriate mitigating measures are not in place. The further provision of 
information to the legal sector was suggested as being necessary.” Id. 
148. See, e.g., Ghana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 201 (“Most of the lawyers interviewed by 
the assessment team demonstrated low level of understanding of ML/TF risks associated with 
the services they provide and their profession as a whole”); Mexico MER, supra note 109, at ¶ 
27 (“Reporting by DNFBPs is generally poor in both quantitative and qualitative terms, a 
particular concern being that professionals (lawyers and accountants) have not filed a single STR 
in the past three years”); Portugal MER, supra note 109, ¶ 267 (“Some other sectors (e.g. lawyers 
and notaries) do not consider that their services can be used for ML/TF purposes, even 
unwittingly, and therefore do not even consider the possibility that a transaction or service for a 
client could be suspicious. This reinforces the concerns expressed about the lack of 
understanding of ML risks by these professions . . .”), ¶ 115 (“However, actors like dealers in 
high-value goods, real estate agents and lawyers - some of which are considered at specific risk 
of ML/TF abuse - need to increase their AML/CFT involvement, which may require more 
awareness raising since their STR reporting is significantly lower than that of other entities.”); 
Trinidad and Tobago MER, supra note 109, ¶ 15 (“There is no evidence that the legal profession 
complies with AML/CFT measures. This is a serious deficiency having regard for the significant 
role played by these professionals as financial intermediaries (gatekeepers) in introducing and 
facilitating such a large percentage of financial transactions.”); Uganda MER, supra note 109, ¶ 
86 (“All lawyers practicing in Uganda are subject to AML/CFT obligations. However in terms 
of implementation, the lawyers in general have not been doing much to comply with their 
AML/CFT obligations.”); Zimbabwe MER, supra note 109, ¶ 86 (“Although at law the DNFBPs 
are subject to AML/CFT requirements, there is no implementation nor supervision for 
compliance with requirements.”); Hungary MER, supra note 109, at 88 (“The level of SAR-
reporting by the DNFBP sector - especially by lawyers, notaries and casinos - is not considered 
adequate by the assessment team considering their involvement in transactions with high-risk 
customers and products.”); Panama MER, supra note 109, ¶ 382; see also Barbados MER, supra 
note 109, ¶ 196 (not all lawyers involved in real estate dealings understand the risks they face); 
Ukraine MER, supra note 109, ¶ 400(c)-(d) (noting that lawyers did not recognize risks posed 
by the use of fictitious companies or by clients seeking work beyond the lawyer’s expertise). 
149. See, e.g., Portugal MER, supra note 109, at 95 (“For some DNFBPs (lawyers), 
AML/CFT supervision is not exercised at all.”); Ghana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 201 (although 
the IBA has AML/CFT guidelines for its members, the Ghana Bar Association, which is an IBA 
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There have also been criticisms of lawyers related to the Mutual 
Evaluation Process itself. In some countries, the legal profession has 
been criticized because its representatives did not participate in the 
country’s preparation of its national risk assessment report.150 In other 
countries, the legal profession contributed to the preparation of the 
national risk assessment report, but that country’s FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Report was critical of the conclusions about the legal 
profession found in the risk assessment report.151 A related criticism is 
 
 
member, has “yet to appreciate and adapt or develop similar guidance for its members”); 
Barbados MER, supra note 109, ¶ 233 (“Lawyers are obligated to become members of the 
Barbados Bar Association and are required to register with the supreme court, however no 
evidence was provided to the Assessors to demonstrate the integrity of the registration 
process.”); Iceland MER, supra note 109, ¶ 292 (“There is no designated supervisor in law for 
lawyers, and the [Iceland Bar Association, which is the mandatory professional body] did not 
demonstrate an understanding or consideration of the potential ML/TF risks within the legal 
sector.”); Macao, China MER, supra note 109, at 86 (“AAM [the Macao Lawyers Association, 
which is the chief supervisory body,] has undertaken no AML/CFT on-site inspections (off-site 
monitoring only) of lawyers since 2011 and the DSF on-site inspection visits have been 
irregular.”); Malaysia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 28 (“The DNFBP sectors, with the exception of 
the casino are under-supervised for AML/CFT compliance due mainly to a shortage of AML/ 
CFT supervisory staff in FIED, although risk-based approaches and cooperation with SRBs is 
allowing for steps to mitigate risks in the high-risk DNFBP sectors.” Elsewhere, however, the 
MER stated that “The Bar Council has a well-established track record of applying the fit and 
proper controls under the Legal Professions Act 1976.” Id. at 107); Thailand MER, supra note 
109, ¶ 416 (“Comprehensive fit and proper checks do not extend to DNFBPs. [The Lawyer 
Council includes] licensing criteria that cover some fit and proper elements, however these are 
not broad enough.”); see also Mexico MER, supra note 109, at 101, ¶¶ 270, 309 (noting that less 
than 3% of lawyers belong to one of seven bar associations and that lawyers who were not bar 
members were less aware of their AML/CFT obligations and recommending passage of the 
delayed legislation that would require that lawyers belong to professional bodies). 
150. See, e.g., Serbia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 448:  
The Bar Association does not undertake supervision and lawyers did not respond to 
the questionnaires issued with the intention of informing the ML NRA. The NRA 
designates the sector as low risk, which does not appear to be adequate in light of the 
systematic refusal of the sector to meet its AML/CFT obligations and the significant 
role played by lawyers in relation to legal persons and real estate transactions. 
Bhutan MER, supra note 109, at 29, ¶ 67 (noting the participation of all key stakeholders in the 
National Risk Assessment Working Group, except for various kinds of DNFBPs, including 
lawyers, who lack a professional association); see also Austria MER, supra note 109, ¶ 247 
(“There seems to be no sufficient overall approach within the profession of lawyers to analyse 
risks and develop AML/CFT systems to reduce these risks for the whole sector.”). 
151. See, e.g., Sri Lanka MER, supra note 109, at 75–76 (“The NRA considers notaries to 
have low exposure to foreign and high-risk customers, but does not elaborate on the basis for 
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that the legal profession has not properly acknowledged the risks 
lawyers present in facilitating money laundering activities.152 Some 
countries have been criticized because the lawyers who met with the 
on-site assessment team were unfamiliar with the national risk 
assessment. 153  Finally, some Reports seemed to criticize the legal 
profession because the FATF team did not meet with any lawyers 
during the mutual evaluation team’s on-site visit.154 
 
 
this assessment beyond professional judgment. There have been cases of ML investigations 
reported in relation to the legal profession and notaries in the last five years.”); Mexico MER, 
supra note 109, ¶ 321 (“The upgrading of the professional service providers (especially lawyers) 
to medium-risk in the SAT model appears to be more appropriate than the categorization in the 
NRA.”); Panama MER, supra note 109, ¶ 347 (“Although the National Strategy affirms that the 
impact of the [lawyers] sector’s vulnerabilities is low, recent events, particularly the “[Panama] 
Papers” case, indicate the opposite.”). 
152. See, e.g., Belgium MER, supra note 109, ¶ a5 101:  
The reservations expressed by the accountancy and legal professions, lawyers in 
particular, about the national risk assessments are problematic. The supervisory 
bodies for these professions did not provide a contribution to the national ML risk 
assessment, and although they say that they started to consider risk once they became 
aware of these analyses, they do not share the assessment’s conclusions, which 
present their professions as particularly risky in terms of ML. They consider that they 
have adequate controls in place to counter the main threats and that misconduct is 
largely the preserve of those outside the regulated professions. 
Honduras MER, supra note 109, ¶ 104 (“It is important to mention that lawyers and notaries do 
not agree with being obliged subjects and expressed that they should not be subject to any 
requirements established by the law. This represents a lack of awareness related to their role 
regarding AML/CFT.”); Italy MER, supra note 109, ¶ 250 (“There is no common appreciation 
of lawyers’ vulnerability to being used by ML facilitators, although most agreed that risks are 
highest in real estate transactions, advising on project capital, and/or providing tax advice.”); 
Spain MER, supra note 109, ¶ 5.4141041: 
Lawyers have a low level of awareness of ML/TF risks, do not recognise the level of 
risk in their profession, and feel that their AML/CFT obligations pose an unnecessary 
burden. . . . Lawyers have played a central role in establishing and operating the 
organised ML networks which have been at the centre of a number of high-profile 
ML prosecutions. . . . However, the involvement of lawyers in these cases is not seen 
as representative of the risks: the lawyers involved are considered as complicit 
criminals (Malaya) or as acting recklessly (White Whale). 
Mexico MER, supra note 109, ¶ 270 (“Representatives of these professions [including lawyers] 
who were met with do not seem to appreciate that the misuse of legal persons is a major ML risk 
facing their professions.”). 
153. See, e.g., Andorra MER, supra note 109, ¶ 197 (“The evaluation team met a lawyer 
that had not participated in the NRA process, and had not seen its output . . . .”). 
154. See, e.g., Samoa MER, supra note 109, at 74–75, ¶ 251: 
While the evaluation team did not meet with the Law Society, the AGO asserts that 
lawyers should be aware of their obligations under the MLP Act 2007, however this 
could not be verified by the evaluation team; nor was it possible to determine whether 
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Although there are many criticisms of lawyers in the FATF 
Mutual Evaluation Reports, only a few Reports cite or discuss the 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 or the administration of 
justice and rule of law concerns that underlie the Interpretive Note to 
Recommendation 23.155 One of the rare exceptions is Austria’s Mutual 
Evaluation Report, which talked about the need to balance AML goals 
and lawyer privilege. 156  The Report observes, however, that the 
“evaluation team is not convinced that Austria has succeeded to find 
the right balance.”157 
Although a number of FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports urged the 
examined country to adopt AML regulations for lawyers, 158  these 
Reports arguably use a “one size fits all” solution.  For example, none 
of the Reports cited the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 or 
examined the degree to which the country in question had weighed the 
competing arguments in order to determine for itself “the matters that 
 
 
lawyers accept their AML/CFT obligations . . . . However, no supervision of the legal 
profession has been undertaken by the SFIU and the understanding of risks, by both 
the profession and the regulator is uncertain. Authorities believe that lawyers are 
aware of the risks associated with onboarding clients or when offering financial 
advice to clients or when they are involved in handling accounts or opening/operating 
trust accounts on behalf of their clients, but it is not known whether lawyers are 
meeting their AML/CFT obligations. 
155. See, e.g., Andorra MER, supra note 109, ¶ 290 (citing the FATF MER footnote that 
referred to the interpretive note privilege issue); Ukraine MER, supra note 109, ¶ 210 (noting 
that the legal privilege-based exemption to lawyers’ and others’ reporting obligations do not 
appear to unduly or unreasonably obstruct the requirement of a legal professional to submit an 
STR and so is in line with the FATF standards). 
156. See Austria MER, supra note 109, ¶ 150. 
157. Id. It also stated: 
The strict conditions for obtaining/compelling information and the scope of 
professional privilege were mentioned as deficiencies already in the third mutual 
evaluation of Austria. The problems faced by prosecutors when pursuing ML 
investigations due to the factors mentioned above seems to prolong investigations and 
most probably also contribute to the high rate of dismissed investigations. 
Id. The Austria Mutual Evaluation Report cited with approval, however, a 2012 Austrian 
Supreme Court case. The case “stated in its decision that legal privilege does not cover 
instruments used for criminal acts, having facilitated criminal acts or having been produced by 
criminal acts . . . nor other pieces of evidence, in particular written documents which are not a 
communication between the professional and his client.” Id. ¶ 155. 
158. See, e.g., supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
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would fall under legal professional privilege or professional 
secrecy.” 159  Although FATF’s RBA [Risk Based Assessment] 
Guidance for Legal Professions discusses the “unique position of 
lawyers in society” and the importance of lawyers to the rule of law,160 
none of the FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Reports cited this 
FATF document. 161  FATF’s RBA Guidance for Legal Professions 
includes the following language  which echoes Recommendation 23’s 
Interpretive Note and emphasizes the important role that lawyers play 
in preserving the rule of law and administering a country’s system of 
justice: 
 
Lawyers are members of a regulated profession and are bound by 
their specific professional rules and regulations. Their work is 
fundamental to promoting adherence to the rule of law in the 
countries in which they practice. Lawyers hold a unique position 
in society by providing access to law and justice for individuals 
and entities, assisting members of society to understand their 
increasingly complex legal rights and obligations, and assisting 
clients to comply with the law.162 
 
None of the Reports contains an extended discussion of the potential 
tension between anti-money laundering goals, on the one hand, and the 
rule of law goals identified in the RBA and the Interpretative Note to 
Recommendation 23, on the other hand.163 None of the fifty Mutual 
Evaluation Reports issued by July 2018 discussed whether the country 
had done the type of balancing and evaluation that the Interpretive Note 
to Recommendation 23 contemplates.164 In those Mutual Evaluation 
Reports in which privilege is cited at all, the Reports  rather cavalierly 
dismiss the privilege and do not address the implications for the 
 
 
159. Compare  supra note 91 (Recommendation 23’s Interpretive Note language), with 
the Mutual Evaluation Reports, supra note 109. 
160.  See FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals, supra note 69, at 5-6. 
161. See generally FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports, supra note 109 (word search for 
“RBA” revealing no results). 
162. FATF RBA Guidance, supra note 69, at 5-6, ¶ 11. 
163.  See generally Mutual Evaluation Reports, supra note 109.  
164.  Id. 
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administration of justice or the rule of law if one fundamentally 
changes the nature of the lawyer-client relationship.165 
Consider, for example, Serbia’s Mutual Evaluation Report. 166 
This Report referred to the legal profession’s interest in client 
confidentiality as a “negative cultural approach.”167 This section of the 
Report did not include any discussion of whether client confidentiality 
might be warranted or whether lawyers in Serbia were invoking 
confidentiality inappropriately. Instead, it said: 
 
In particular, [the Serbian Bar Association] is aware that lawyers 
consider that AML/CFT obligations conflict with those emanating 
from legal privilege and as a result consider their priority to be 
their duty to their customer, leading to a lack of compliance by the 
legal sector with its AML/CFT obligations. The views expressed 
by the Bar Association, however, mirrored the negative cultural 
approach of the legal profession to AML/CFT obligations and it 
did not accept the existence of other risks connected with the legal 
sector or the gatekeeper role lawyers should hold.168 
 
 
 
165. See, e.g., Botswana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 30:  
[L]egal practitioners have been identified by both the private and public sectors as 
being high risk for ML yet these sectors have a very limited awareness of the ML/TF 
risks and the AML/CFT requirements that apply to them. Whilst, this is mostly 
attributed to the lack of supervision and monitoring of these sectors by their 
supervisors due to lack of internal capacity, the Law Society of Botswana is also of 
the view that application of the AML/CFT requirements will be in conflict with the 
client lawyer privilege. 
Id. ¶ 74; Ghana MER, supra note 109, ¶ 201 (noting that lawyers “feel that their AML/CFT 
obligations pose an unnecessary burden” without addressing the issue further other than to say 
that “[a]lmost all of the Lawyers do not fully understand the essence of their gatekeeper role 
within the AML/CFT regime and the responsibility and integrity that it requires.”). 
166. See Serbia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 448. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. The reference to “AML/CFT” refers to anti-money laundering (“AML”) and 
countering the financing of terrorism (“CFT”), both of which are topics addressed by the FATF 
Recommendations.  See supra notes 1 (citing the CFT acronym), 11 (citing the FATF 
Recommendations), 81 and accompanying text (explaining the expansion of the FATF 
Recommendations after the 9/11 attack to include a focus on terrorist financing).  
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Costa Rica’s Mutual Evaluation Report provides another 
example. It observes that the “reluctance showed by some 
professionals, such as lawyers, to provide information on their 
customers by virtue of professional secrecy significantly affects the 
transparency of legal persons domiciled in Costa Rica.”169 Despite this 
reference to privilege, Costa Rica’s Mutual Evaluation Report did not 
refer to Costa Rica’s privilege law, the Interpretative Note to 
Recommendation 23, the FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professions, 
or the underlying rule of law concerns that might lie behind lawyers’ 
attitudes.170 
There are additional examples that one could cite. 171  These 
examples, however, illustrate a tone that is commonly found in the 
FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports. Thus, the overall impression from 
reading these Reports is that few of the FATF Mutual Evaluation 
Reports, if any, are balancing AML obligations and rule of law-
privilege concerns, or evaluating whether privilege is warranted or how 
it has been applied.  The bottom line is that the Reports show that few, 
if any, of the legal professions around the world are doing what FATF 
wants or expects of them. 
C. Three Case Studies of Legal Profession Engagement in the FATF 
Mutual Evaluation Process 
This Section provides information about how the legal professions 
in three countries prepared for their FATF mutual evaluations. Legal 
profession representatives in Australia, Canada, and the United States 
appear to have had quite different levels of engagement with their 
governments. It appears that the US legal profession representatives 
likely had the most interaction with their government, followed by 
Australia, and then Canada. Although this sample size is small and the 
results may not be representative of other countries’ experiences, the 
range of experiences incurred by these countries may prove useful to 
 
 
169. Costa Rica MER, supra note 109, ¶ 450. But see Nicaragua MER, supra note 109, ¶ 
TC 345 (noting that Mutual Legal Assistance cannot be refused MLA for reasons of secrecy or 
confidentiality except that it is obtained in circumstances in which it applies the legal 
professional privilege or legal professional secrecy). 
170. See generally Costa Rica MER, supra note 109. 
171. See, e.g., Honduras MER, supra note 109. 
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legal profession representatives in countries that have not yet 
undergone their FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation. 
Australia not only was the first of these three countries to undergo 
its evaluation, but it was one of the first countries overall to complete 
its FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation. 172  The Law Council of 
Australia interacted with FATF on behalf of Australia’s legal 
profession.173 Law Council representatives shared with this Article’s 
Authors a description of their involvement and preparation efforts.174 
The Law Council reports that Australian government authorities 
did not seek any input from the Law Council when the government 
prepared Australia’s risk assessment or when preparing documents for 
the FATF on-site visit.175 It was, however, invited to participate in the 
on-site visit.176  
Before meeting with the FATF representatives, the Law Council 
representatives prepared for the on-site interview by: 
• Analyzing the ML risk assessment and the TF threat 
assessment (prepared by Australian government 
authorities) to ascertain the risks as they apply to the legal 
services sector; 
 
 
172. See Australia MER, supra note 109. Australia’s report is dated April 2015. Id. Only 
Norway and Spain have reports dated earlier—both of their reports are dated December 2014. 
See July 2018 Consolidated Table of Assessment Ratings, supra note 114, at 1 (includes the date 
of the final report). 
173. See About Us, LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIA,  https://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/about-
us [https://perma.cc/3CGE-77JZ]: 
The Law Council of Australia (Law Council) is the peak national representative body 
of the Australian legal profession. The Law Council represents the Australian legal 
profession on national and international issues, on federal law and the operation of 
federal courts and tribunals. It works for the improvement of the law and of the 
administration of justice. The Law Council is a federal organisation representing 
65,000 Australian lawyers through their bar associations and law societies and Law 
Firms Australia (the Constituent Bodies). 
174. See Email and attachments from Margery Nicoll, Deputy Chief Executive Officer & 
Director, International, Law Council of Australia, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 29, 2017) (on file 
with Author) [hereinafter Nicoll Email]. 
175. See Nicoll Email, supra note 174. 
176.  Id.  
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• Undertaking research to understand how and to what 
extent the risks are mitigated; and 
• Attempting to understand the assessment mechanism of 
the 2013 Methodology particularly in reference to 
effectiveness in the particular sense intended by the 
Methodology.177 
The Law Council proactively pursued regular engagement with 
Australian government authorities (both policy and regulatory 
authorities) and developed, where possible, areas of shared 
understanding.178 This process highlighted areas of concern for matters 
where little information seemed to be available, such as a cost/benefit 
analysis of AML/CTF regulation and evidence of whether the regime 
was impacting/reducing the incidence of serious crime.179 
 When the FATF representatives made their on-site mutual 
evaluation visit, Law Council of Australia representatives had the 
opportunity to meet with them.180 The Australian Attorney General’s 
department, which is responsible for AML policy development, 
coordinated these meetings.181 The practitioners who met with FATF 
representatives had volunteered in response to a memo sent by the Law 
Council to its members and the profession. 182  The Law Council 
representatives were chosen based on their expertise and knowledge of 
AML/CTF regulation, legal profession regulation, ethics, and the 
international picture.183 The Law Council sought the opportunity to 
provide documents directly to the mutual evaluation team without 
consultation with government.184 
Australia’s Mutual Evaluation Report rated it as “non-compliant” 
for Recommendations 22 and 23.185 Australia was rated as having a 
“moderate level of effectiveness” on Intermediate Outcomes 3 and 4, 
although the language regarding the legal profession was more critical 
 
 
177.  Id.  
178.  Id. 
179.  Id.  
180.  Id.  
181.  Id.  
182.  Id.  
183.  Id.  
184.  Id.  
185.  Australia MER, supra note 109, at 23 (showing noncompliant ratings for 
Recommendations 22 and 23). 
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than these effectiveness ratings might suggest.186 In essence, the Report 
placed some of the “burden of proof” on the legal profession and found 
that it had failed to carry that burden. 187  For example, Australia’s 
Report stated that: 
[S]ector [legal profession] representatives were unable to 
demonstrate to or convince the assessors how existing professional 
standards were sufficient to mitigate ML/TF risks over and above 
their personal business interests, or had enabled them to be an 
effective contributor in combating system-wide ML/TF risks. . . . 
[T]here is no conclusive evidence that these non-regulated 
DNFBPs are rejecting customers due to suspected ML/TF 
activities. They also do not have obligations to report suspicious 
matters to AUSTRAC, and do not do so in practice.188 
 
Canada provides this Article’s second case study regarding legal 
profession-government interaction. Canada had its on-site FATF 
mutual evaluation visit in November 2015, several months after 
Australia’s Mutual Evaluation Report was approved.189 The Federation 
of Law Societies of Canada [the Federation] is a coordinating body for 
Canada’s legal profession regulatory bodies. 190   The Federation’s 
preparation was, in many respects, similar to the experience of the Law 
Council of Australia. The Federation was not involved in the 
preparation of the Canadian government’s risk assessment document, 
nor was it asked to provide information that would help the Canadian 
 
 
186. Australia MER, supra note 109, at 94, 102-03, ¶¶ 6.1, 6.31-6.32 (Immediate Outcome 
3); 87-88, 91, ¶¶ 5.27-5.30, 5.51 (Immediate Outcome 4); 168, ¶ a5.105 (technical compliance 
with Recommendation 22); and 168, ¶ a5.108 (technical compliance with Recommendation 23). 
187.  See infra note 188.  
188. Australia MER, supra note at 109, ¶¶ 5.28-5.30.  
189. See Canada MER, supra note 109, at 3. 
190. See About Us, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, https://flsc.ca/about-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/FN42-M6PJ] (“The Federation of Law Societies of Canada is the national 
coordinating body of Canada’s 14 provincial and territorial law societies, which regulate more 
than 120,000 lawyers and 3,800 Quebec notaries and Ontario’s nearly 9,000 licensed paralegals 
in the public interest.”). 
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government prepare the legal profession portion of the documents 
required before Canada’s mutual evaluation on-site assessment.191 
Two representatives from the Federation met with FATF’s on-site 
assessment team.192 The Canadian Department of Finance initially had 
proposed that the FATF team meet with representatives of the Law 
Society of British Columbia. 193  Following internal discussions, the 
Federation proposed that the meeting be with Federation 
representatives in order to ensure that the assessors received a more 
complete picture of the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing 
activities of Canadian law societies.194 Departmental officials made 
those arrangements with the FATF team.195 
Before the FATF on-site visit, the Federation reviewed the risk 
assessment the Canadian government had prepared and made it 
publicly available.196 The Canadian government’s risk assessment had 
placed legal professionals in the “high vulnerability” category, 
indicating that lawyers presented the same level of anti-money 
laundering risk as bricks and mortar casinos, virtual currencies, and 
dealers in precious metals and stones, among others, and a greater risk 
than Provincial online casinos, accountants, and money services 
businesses.197  
 
 
191. See Email and attachment from Frederica Wilson, Senior Director, Regulatory and 
Public Affairs, FLSC, to Laurel S. Terry (Oct. 31, 2017) (on file with Author) [hereinafter 
Wilson Email].  For information about the Mutual Evaluation process and required documents, 
see supra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.  
192.  Id.  
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196 . Id. See also Assessment of Inherent Risks of Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing in Canada, CANADA DEPT. OF FINANCE, (2015), https://www.fin.gc.ca/pub/mltf-
rpcfat/mltf-rpcfat-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF5N-DJSX] [hereinafter Canada Risk 
Assessment]. 
197. Canada Risk Assessment, supra note 196, at 32 (listing in the “High Vulnerability” 
category Brick and Mortar Casinos; Life Insurance Companies; Company Services Providers; 
Registered Charities; Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires; Open-Loop Prepaid Access; 
Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones; Real Estate Agents and Developers; Foreign Bank 
Branches Securities Dealers; Foreign Bank Subsidiaries Smaller Retail MSBs; Internet-Based 
MSBs Trust and Loan Companies; Legal Professionals; and Virtual Currencies. The Canadian 
report gave a “very high vulnerability” rating to five types of entities: Corporations; National 
Full-Service MSBs; Domestic Banks; and Small Independent MSBs; Express Trusts. Id. Life 
Insurance Intermediary Entities and Agencies were the only kind of entity that received a “low 
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During FATF’s on-site visit, Federation representatives described 
the Canadian legal profession regulators’ commitment to fighting 
money laundering and terrorist financing, including the relevant rules 
and regulations and their enforcement.198 Federation representatives 
were also prepared to discuss their successful constitutional challenge 
to the government’s attempts to extend its regulatory scheme to 
members of the legal profession.199 
Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report treats the legal profession 
rather harshly and does not appear to reflect the information that the 
on-site inspectors heard from the representatives of the Federation of 
Law Societies of Canada during the on-site visit. 200  For example, 
Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report does not cite or refer to any of the 
mandatory AML rules that apply to Canadian lawyers.201 Indeed, for 
those who are unfamiliar with the AML rules in Canada’s lawyer 
regulatory system, the broad statements in Canada’s Mutual Evaluation 
Report might give the misleading impression that Canadian lawyers are 
not subject to any AML regulation at all.202 In addition to the broad 
 
 
vulnerability” rating. The five types of entities that received a “Medium Vulnerability” rating 
were Accountants; Provincial Online Casinos; British Columbia Notaries; Wholesale and 
Corporate MSBs; and Independent Life Insurance Agents and Brokers). Id. 
198.  Wilson Email, supra note 191. 
199. Id. 
200. Canada MER, supra note 109, at 207 (explaining that Canada received a rating of 
“noncompliant” for Recommendations 22 and 23. With respect to the effectiveness evaluation, 
it was one of the few countries so far that was rated as having a substantial level of effectiveness 
for Immediate Outcome 3; it was rated as having a moderate level of effectiveness with respect 
to Immediate Outcome 4).  
201. All Canadian lawyer regulators have implemented the FLSC’s Model Rule on Client 
Identification and Verification Requirements. See FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, Model Rule on 
Client Identification and Verification Requirements, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA (Dec. 12, 
2008), https://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/terror2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC9J-7WQ9]; 
FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, Model Rule on Cash Transactions, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA 
(July 2004), https://flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/terror1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3WN-
GTY3]; see generally FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, Model Rules to Fight Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing, FED. L. SOC’YS OF CANADA, http://flsc.ca/national-initiatives/model-
rules-to-fight-money-laundering-and-terrorist-financing/ [https://perma.cc/877Q-LFCH]. 
202. See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, at 205 (“1. Assessing risks & applying a 
risk-based approach: Lawyers, legal firms and Quebec notaries are not legally required to take 
enhanced measures to manage and mitigate risks identified in the NRA”); id. at 207 (“22. 
674 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
 
statements that suggest that Canadian lawyers are not subject to AML 
regulation, the FATF Report on several occasions cited the “high 
vulnerability” characterization of lawyers found in Canada’s 2015 Risk 
Assessment. 203  Moreover, when the Report referred to the recent 
Canadian Supreme Court case as an “impediment” to Canada’s AML 
scheme,204 it did not explain that the Supreme Court case was a lengthy 
one that had carefully weighed the competing interests and Canada’s 
constitution. 205 
The United States provides the third case study of legal profession 
mutual evaluation preparations. The US legal profession was aware of 
the US government’s June 2015 National Risk Assessment, but it did 
 
 
DNFBPs: Customer due diligence: AML/CFT obligations are inoperative for legal counsels, 
legal firms and Quebec notaries.”). 
203.  See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, at 15 nn.7, 16, 78. 
204. See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, at 7:  
AML/CFT requirements are inoperative towards legal counsels, legal firms and 
Quebec notaries. These requirements were found to breach the constitutional right to 
attorney-client privilege by the Supreme Court of Canada on 13 February 2015. In 
light of these professionals’ key gatekeeper role, in particular in high-risk sectors and 
activities such as real-estate transactions and the formation of corporations and trusts, 
this constitutes a serious impediment to Canada’s efforts to fight ML. 
The case that was an “impediment” was Canada (Attorney General) v. Fed’n of Law Soc’ys of 
Can, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.) (striking portions of Canada’s Proceeds of Crime (Money 
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act as inconsistent with Canada’s Charter). 
205. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (explaining one of the ways in which 
Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report discussed this case). Compare FATF RECOMMENDATION 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23, supra note 91, at 83, with Canada MER, supra note 
109, ¶ 266: 
The legal profession is not currently subject to AML/CFT supervision due to a 
successful constitutional challenge that makes the PCMLTFA inoperative in respect 
of legal counsels, legal firms, and Quebec notaries. There is therefore no incentive for 
the profession to apply AML/CFT measures and participate in the detection of 
potential ML/TF activities. The exclusion of the legal profession from AML/CFT 
supervision is a significant concern considering the high-risk rating of the sector and 
its involvement in other high-risk areas such as the real estate transactions as well as 
company and trust formation. This exclusion also has a negative impact on the 
effectiveness of the supervisory regime as a whole because it creates an imbalance 
amongst the various sectors, especially for REs that perform similar functions to 
lawyers. 
This discussion failed to acknowledge the fact that Canada’s Supreme Court case seems to 
be the country-specific approach recognized by Recommendation 23’s Interpretive Note. 
Compare Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23, supra note 91 and accompanying text, with 
Canada MER, supra note 109. 
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not contribute to this document. 206 However, in contrast to the situation 
in Australia and Canada, the US legal profession was able to submit 
information to government officials as they prepared the United States’ 
required mutual evaluation paperwork.207 In contrast to the situation in 
Canada and Australia, in the United States, it was primarily lawyers 
from the private sector and voluntary bar associations, rather than the 
professional staff from regulatory bodies or coordinating groups, who 
took the lead in preparing for the United States’ mutual evaluation. 
Most of the efforts were coordinated by Kevin Shepherd who is a 
lawyer in private practice who previously had served as Chair of the 
ABA Task Force on Gatekeeper Regulation and the Legal 
Profession.208 The members of this ad hoc FATF mutual evaluation 
working group included lawyers who were in private practice and 
active in the FATF-related ABA and ACTEC groups, legal academics, 
and staff lawyers from the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility. 
The working group consulted with, and drew upon, the resources of 
others, including malpractice insurers and officers in the National 
Organization of Bar Counsel (“NOBC”), which is a national 
organization that brings together state government officials who 
 
 
206 . See Nat’l Money Laundering Risk Assessment, supra note 6. This document 
contained a discussion of some DNFBP sectors, such as the casino sector and money service 
businesses, but it did not contain a section dedicated to DNFBPs or the legal profession. Id. at 
Table of Contents. Nor does a word search reveal a discussion of lawyers or the legal profession. 
Id. 
207.  Compare supra notes 175 (Australia) & 191 (Canada) and accompanying text, with 
infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text (United States).   
208 . Id. For additional information about the ABA Task Force, see Task Force on 
Gatekeeper Reg. and the Profession, AM. BAR. ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/gatekeeper.html [https://perma.cc/PJK8-
SLVR] [hereinafter ABA Gatekeeper Task Force Webpage]. Organizations whose 
representatives have participated in these efforts include The American College of Trust and 
Estate Counsel (“ACTEC”); the American College of Real Estate Lawyers; the American 
College of Mortgage Attorneys; and the American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers and 
staff lawyers from the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Terry, supra note 
26, at 501 n.61 (noting the cosponsors of ABA resolutions regarding AML issues).  In addition 
to the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force Webpage, there is information on a webpage maintained by 
the ABA Governmental Affairs office. See Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers, AM. BAR. 
ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/
priorities_policy/independence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act/ 
[https://perma.cc/QR9K-4K2S] [hereinafter ABA Gatekeeper Advocacy Webpage]. 
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regulate lawyers. For example, after being requested to do so by Kevin 
Shepherd, NOBC representatives sent out a listserv message asking 
their members for relevant information, such as lawyer discipline 
cases. 209  The ad hoc working group was also able to draw upon 
information that the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force had prepared for an 
internal ABA review called the “Scope” review and information in a 
document previously submitted to FATF.210 
Because of the timing of the US mutual evaluation, US legal 
profession representatives had the advantage of being able to speak to 
legal profession representatives from other countries about their 
experiences with the FATF mutual evaluation process. US legal 
profession representatives were aware that the US FATF mutual 
evaluation was on the horizon and regularly sought input from US 
government officials about the likely timetable and how the US legal 
profession could most effectively provide information and be of service 
as the United States completed its mutual evaluation paperwork. One 
of the reasons why lines of communication existed between US 
government officials and legal profession representatives was because 
of groundwork that had been laid in the preceding years. 211  For 
example, representatives from the US Department of the Treasury had 
 
 
209. See Email from author to Kevin Shepherd (July 10, 2015) (on file with Author). The 
NOBC is the organization that brings together those who discipline and regulate lawyers (on file 
with Author). 
210. See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd, Self Regulatory Bodies Call for Information and Cases, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/
2012nov26_gatekeeperreg.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6G2W-MHQC] (undated 
document prepared by the ABA in 2012 for FATF; it is available as a link from the ABA 
Gatekeeper webpage, supra note 208); see also Email from Kevin Shepherd to the Members of 
the ABA Gatekeeper Task Force (Jan. 9, 2015) (on file with Author). 
211 . See, e.g., Duncan E. Osborne, The Financial Action Task Force and the Legal 
Profession, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 421 (2014), which states: 
 For the past ten years, I along with others—as representatives of The American 
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) and of the American Bar Association 
(ABA)—have engaged with both the FATF and the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
. . . I would interject here that the interactions with officials from the Treasury 
Department have differed markedly from those with the FATF bureaucrats. Treasury 
personnel have certainly not always agreed with representatives of the US legal 
profession, but their communications have been open, rational, and reasoned. These 
substantive and meaningful dialogues have helped all parties find common ground 
and avenues for progress in the areas of AML and CFT. 
Id. at 423, 430. 
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met periodically with various legal profession representatives in order 
to discuss topics of mutual interest.212 
In March 2015, before the United States was required to provide 
its paperwork to FATF,213 Kevin Shepherd had reached out by email to 
officials at the US Department of the Treasury and offered to gather 
AML information related to the legal profession. 214  Although 
government officials did not immediately respond, they ultimately 
accepted the offer and asked for assistance in gathering information 
relevant to the legal profession and the mutual evaluation’s 
“effectiveness” prong.215 US legal profession representatives provided 
information about each of the six “core issues” listed under Immediate 
Outcome 3 and the six “core issues” listed under Immediate Outcome 
4. 216 
The US legal profession’s informal working group exchanged a 
number of internal drafts during July 2015 before transmitting its 
responsive document to US Department of the Treasury officials.217 
The final version of this document was lengthy—in excess of fifty 
pages. 218  This document addressed the core issues in Immediate 
Outcomes 3 and 4 and covered a range of topics.219 This document 
provided information regarding licensing requirements, discipline 
requirements, continuing education requirements, the role of 
malpractice insurance, and financial auditing mechanisms, among 
other things. In addition to providing narrative responses to the core 
issues, the ad hoc group’s document included seven Appendices.220 
The titles of these Appendices, which are listed below, illustrate the 
type of information provided: 
 
 
212. See Osborne, supra note 211. 
213. Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of these facts. See also FATF 
Procedures, supra note 93 (including a timetable of preparatory work). 
214.  Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of these facts. 
215. Id.  
216. Id. See supra note 118 and accompanying text for a list of the Intermediate Outcomes 
3 and 4 core issues. 
217.  Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of these facts. 
218. Id.  
219.  Id.  
220.  Id.  
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• Appendix 1: Rules and Regulations Relevant to a 
Lawyer’s Entry into the Profession;221 
• Appendix 2: Ongoing Governmental Supervision of 
Lawyers’ Conduct;222 
• Appendix 3: Governmental and Nongovernmental 
Sources That Educate State Regulators, Educators, 
Supervisors, Insurers, and US Lawyers about AML/CFT 
Issues and Lawyers’ Legal and Ethical Obligations;223 
• Appendix 4: Articles Used in the “Cradle to Grave” 
AML/CFT Education Approach (targeting regulators, 
legal educators, insurers, individual lawyers, law firms, 
and others involved in private ordering); 
• Appendix 5: Selected Presentations Since 2008 Used in 
the “Cradle to Grave” AML/CFT Education Approach 
(targeting regulators, legal educators, insurers, individual 
lawyers, law firms, and others involved in private 
ordering); 
• Appendix 6: Tools Used in US Legal Profession 
Stakeholder Education Efforts;224 and 
• Appendix 7: Representative Sample of Money-
Laundering Related Disciplinary Proceedings.225 
 
 
221. Id. This Appendix included links and other information related to legal education 
accreditation requirements and bar admission requirements. 
222. Id. This Appendix included a wide range of items such as a summary of the criminal 
laws that would apply to money laundering activities by lawyers; as well as rules of professional 
conduct that would subject a lawyer to discipline; government supervision programs such as 
random audit programs; required ongoing education requirements; and financial recordkeeping 
requirements. This Appendix also referenced the National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, 
surveys on lawyer discipline, and resources of the National Organization of Bar Counsel, which 
is an umbrella organization for those who regulate lawyers. 
223. Id. Among other things, this Appendix identified state and local bar association and 
specialty bar association websites that educated their members about AML issues. 
224. Id. This Appendix referenced the FATF-related items that US lawyers have used in 
their education efforts, including the FATF Recommendations, the FATF RBA for Legal 
Professionals, the FATF “Typologies” report for the legal profession, as well as a number of 
US-based education items such as the ABA/IBA/CCBE Lawyer’s Guide cited supra note 4. It 
also cited items discussed in Terry, supra note 26, such as ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 463, 
infra note 235, and the ABA’s Voluntary Good Practices Guide, infra note 233. 
225. Id. This Appendix was in the form of a table that showed disciplinary action taken by 
the supervising authority, typically a state’s highest court, against lawyers who were charged 
with, or convicted of, money laundering offenses. The Appendix included a caveat that the list 
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When the FATF on-site assessment team came to the United 
States in February 2016, it met with Kevin Shepherd and William 
Clark, who were the past and future chairs of the ABA Gatekeeper Task 
Force.226 The US Department of the Treasury had requested that these 
two individuals meet with the evaluation team.227  US officials did not 
participate in that meeting. 228  After the meeting concluded, Kevin 
Shepherd reported to the ad hoc working group that the meeting had 
lasted approximately two hours and that the FATF team was familiar 
with the materials about the legal profession the US government had 
submitted. 229  The FATF team asked the US legal profession 
representatives to provide follow-up information on two topics: 1) 
disciplinary actions taken by state disciplinary authorities, especially 
disbarment and suspension statistics; and 2) the circumstances under 
which US lawyers might consider advising the creation of non-US 
trusts for their clients and the implications of that advice. 230  The 
working group provided follow-up information to the US Department 
of the Treasury which presumably transmitted the information to the 
FATF team.231 
One reason why the US working group was able to prepare its 
lengthy submission to the US government over the course of only a few 
weeks was that most of its members had been heavily involved in AML 
efforts for a number of years. 232  Members of the working group 
 
 
it provided should not be construed as containing an exhaustive catalog of disciplinary action 
taken against these lawyers. This Appendix noted that criminal cases against US lawyers had 
been included in the FATF Typologies report described supra note 27.  
226 . See Email from Kevin Shepherd to author (July 6, 2016) (on file with Author) 
(reporting on the individuals who were asked to meet with the FATF on-site evaluation team). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. See Email from Kevin Shepherd to various US Treasury Officials (July 29, 2015) (on 
file with Author). 
232. See, e.g., Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative and 
the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 607 
(2009); John A. Terrill II & Michael A. Breslow, The Role of Lawyers in Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: Lessons from the English Approach, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 433, 435-36 (2014) (describing some of these efforts); Terry, supra note 26, at 501-10. 
Some, but not all, of the group’s efforts appear on the webpage of the ABA Gatekeeper Task 
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included lawyers who had led ABA AML initiatives that included the 
ABA’s Voluntary Good Practices Guide, 233  the ABA-IBA-CCBE 
Guide mentioned earlier, 234  ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 463 that 
focused on lawyers’ AML efforts,235 as well as efforts that contributed 
to the Conference of Chief Justices’ adoption of a resolution regarding 
AML and follow-up education efforts. 236  The working group’s 
members, which also included lawyers from ACTEC and other groups, 
had also been heavily involved in additional AML education efforts, 
many of which have been documented in a law review article entitled 
U.S. Legal Profession Efforts to Combat Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing.237 
Despite the existence of, and enforcement of, criminal and 
regulatory lawyer AML provisions, and education efforts, the United 
 
 
Force, such as the letters sent by various ABA Presidents to state and local bar leaders notifying 
them of new AML resources for their lawyers. See ABA Gatekeeper Task Force Webpage, supra 
note 208 (includes links to a July 31, 2013 letter from ABA President Laurel Bellows and an 
April 8, 2011 letter from ABA President Stephen Zack to state and local bars leaders regarding 
AML issues). But not all of the efforts described here appear on this webpage. 
233. Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/voluntary_good_pr
actices_guidance.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NCA-EKZN] [hereinafter ABA AML 
Guidance]; see also AM. BAR. ASS’N, ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 
116 ADOPTING THE VOLUNTARY GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND 
COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2010), , 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2010_am_116.authcheckdam
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZSV-YHG9] [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION 116] (August 2010 ABA 
adoption of the endorsement of the ABA AML Guidance); Laurel Terry, Summary & 
Supplement to the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance, http://tinyurl.com/VGPG-ABA 
[https://perma.cc/G5XB-YU6F] (two-page summary of the red flags found in the ABA 
Voluntary Good Practices Guidance document). 
234. See supra notes 4, 32, 73 and accompanying text (discussing the IBA/ABA/CCBE 
Guide). 
235. AM. BAR ASS’N, FORMAL OPINION 463: CLIENT DUE DILIGENCE, MONEY 
LAUNDERING, AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2013), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/form
al_opinion_463.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/C93X-9V99] [hereinafter ABA FORMAL 
OPINION 463]. 
236. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, RESOLUTION 7: IN SUPPORT OF THE VOLUNTARY 
GOOD PRACTICES GUIDANCE FOR LAWYERS TO DETECT AND COMBAT MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND TERRORIST FINANCING (2014), 
http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/ccj/resolutions/07232014-support-of-voluntary-
good-practices-for-lawyers.ashx [https://perma.cc/9KJU-63CB]. 
237. See Terry, supra note 26. 
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States received a technical compliance rating of “noncompliant” for 
both Recommendations 22 and 23 in its December 2016 FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Report.238 The FATF Mutual Evaluation Report started out 
by noting that the US anti-money-laundering framework was “well-
developed and robust.”239 The Report acknowledged that US lawyers 
are subject to ethical and licensing requirements that differ from those 
of other DNFBPs and that this mitigated some of the risks.240 The 
Report also acknowledged US lawyers’ increased awareness of AML 
issues, 241  although it observed that this awareness was less than 
systematic.242 But the Report nevertheless found that comprehensive 
AML regulation did not apply to US DNFBPs, including lawyers, and 
that “the vulnerability of these minimally covered DNFBP sectors is 
significant, considering the many examples identified by the national 
risk assessment process.”243 The Report specifically highlighted the 
fact that the US had not implemented for the legal profession  
Recommendation 23, which includes a suspicious transaction reporting 
(“STR”) obligation.244 There was no discussion in this Report of the 
 
 
238. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (reporting the compliance results for 
the United States and other countries). 
239. See United States MER, supra note 109, at 3. 
240. Id. at 120, ¶ 280 (“[E]thical obligations placed on lawyers and accountants[] mitigate 
some of these risks.”). 
241. Id. at 9, ¶ 22: 
Of late, there appears to be greater appreciation of ML/TF vulnerabilities and 
implementation of preventive measures by casinos; and some professional guidance 
exists for other sectors (in particular, lawyers) on AML/CFT issues. However, 
DNFBPs other than casinos and dealers in precious metals and stones have limited 
preventive measures applied leaving vulnerabilities particularly in respect of the high-
end real estate sector and those sectors involved in the formation of legal persons. 
242. Id. at 10, ¶ 22 (“Lawyers . . . [and other DNFBPs] are not subject to comprehensive 
AML/CFT requirements, and are not systematically applying basic or enhanced due diligence 
processes and other preventive measures, as needed; and this is further exacerbated by the 
deficiencies in the Beneficial Ownership requirements.”). 
243. Id. 
244 . See, e.g., id. at 22, ¶ 42(b) (“Technical compliance of DNFBPs not subject to 
comprehensive AML/CFT measures: A number of DNFBPs that do perform activities listed in 
Recommendations 22 and 23 (real estate agents, trust and company service providers, lawyers, 
and accountants) are not subject to comprehensive AML/CFT measures.”); id. at 10, ¶ 24:  
[O]ther DNFBPs are subject to less supervision as they are not subject to 
comprehensive AML/CFT preventive measures. This is mitigated somewhat for 
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Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23 or the FATF RBA Guidance 
for Legal Professions. 245  While one might argue that the relevant 
“Priority Action” item left room for interpretation, 246  the 
recommendation found in the body of the Mutual Evaluation Report is 
more direct.247 It states that “on the basis of a specific vulnerability 
analysis, appropriate AML/CFT obligations particularly relating to 
CDD and SAR filing, should be imposed on lawyers, accountants, and 
trust and company service providers as a matter of priority.” 248 
Although the information that US legal profession representatives 
provided to their government and to the FATF on-site assessment team 
may not have changed the technical compliance ratings the United 
States received, the documentation US legal representatives provided 
may have influenced the tone in the US Mutual Evaluation Report.249 
For example, although Canada has an explicit legal profession due 
diligence rule and an annual reporting obligation, and the United States 
does not, Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report arguably uses a more 
hostile tone towards lawyers than the tone in the US Mutual Evaluation 
Report.250 Moreover, Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report does not cite 
the extensive efforts by its regulators to combat lawyer involvement in 
money laundering. The omission of information about Canada’s AML 
system in its Mutual Evaluation Report may be due to the fact that the 
Federation was not invited to submit any documentation before the 
FATF on-site assessment team visit. 
In sum, these three case studies illustrate differing levels of 
engagement among governments and legal profession representatives 
regarding the FATF Mutual Evaluation process. The level of 
engagement a profession has may be significant because FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Reports appear to rely heavily on each country’s risk 
assessment report and on the information that country submits before 
 
 
lawyers and accountants who have strong professional entry and continuing ethical 
requirements, though these do not adequately address ML/TF vulnerabilities or 
require reporting of suspicious activity to authorities. 
245. See generally id.  
246. See generally id. 
247.  See United States MER, supra note 109, at 118. 
248. See id. 
249.  US Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 109.  
250.  Compare supra notes 200-05 (Canada MER) and accompanying text, with supra 
notes 238-48 and accompanying text (United States MER). 
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the FATF on-site visit. 251  Thus, in the future, legal profession 
representatives may find it useful to consider these and other case 
studies and the ten suggestions contained in the Appendix to this 
Article.252 
V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF AML SCANDALS AND 
COMPETING NARRATIVES ON LAWYER AML REGULATION 
This Part of the Article focuses on the United States and Peru, 
which are the Authors’ home countries. This Part discusses the anti-
money laundering regulatory structure in each country, the role of 
FATF, and highlights scandals in each country that already have 
influenced or may in the future influence discussions of lawyer AML 
regulation. This Part concludes by identifying two competing 
narratives about lawyer AML issues in anticipation of Part VI, which 
 
 
251 . See generally FATF MER REPORTS, supra note 109. The reports also include 
information the FATF assessment team obtains during the on-site visit. Id. 
252. Some countries have access to case studies beyond the three described in this Article. 
For example, the Authors are aware that the CCBE has facilitated discussions on this topic 
among European legal profession representatives and that different EU Member States have had 
differing levels of engagement with their governments. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Peter 
McNamee, Senior Legal Advisor, CCBE, by Laurel Terry (Nov. 29, 2017). Legal profession 
groups that want to reach out to other countries can use the resources of the Bar Issues 
Commission of the International Bar Association and the International Conference of Legal 
Regulators (“ICLR”). The ICLR is a relatively new, and entirely free, organization whose goal 
is to provide an international forum where those who regulate legal services can meet one 
another and exchange ideas and resources.  For additional information about the ICLR, see INT’L 
CONFERENCE OF LEGAL REGULATORS, https://iclr.net/ [https://perma.cc/8CKJ-CXGV]. The 
ICLR held its fifth-ever conference in September 2017 in Singapore. See Int’l Conf. Legal 
Regulators 2017, INT’L CONFERENCE OF LEGAL REGULATORS 
https://iclr.net/conference/international-conference-of-legal-regulators-2017/ 
[https://perma.cc/8VJG-VC5Z]. One of the sessions was entitled “Anti-money laundering and 
Counter-Financing of Terrorism” and it “explore[d] the role which regulators can and should 
take in better educating the legal profession about its obligations, the steps that regulators can 
take in combating money-laundering and terrorist financing, and issues of client confidentiality 
and legal professional privilege.” Int’l Conf. Legal Regulators, Singapore 2017 Programme: 
Legal Regulation in a Borderless World: Building Networks, THE LAW SOCIETY (Oct. 5, 2017), 
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/conference/ICLR2017/pdf/Programme%20Outline(02102017).p
df [https://perma.cc/YXE4-ZF9H]. See also Laurel S. Terry, Creating an International Network 
of Lawyer Regulators: The 2012 International Conference of Legal Regulators, 82(2) THE BAR 
EXAMINER 18 (June 2013) (short article about the creation of the ICLR). 
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offers suggestions on how to improve the FATF Mutual Evaluation 
process. 
A. United States 
US lawyers are subject to a number of different federal criminal 
laws that prohibit money laundering activities by lawyers and others. 
These criminal laws include the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act, the 2001 
Patriot Act, the Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, and the Money Laundering Control Act.253 For example, the 
Money Laundering Control Act makes it illegal to knowingly “(i) 
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, 
or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or (ii) to 
avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal 
law.” 254  “Structuring” cash payments to avoid the reporting 
requirements is also a crime.255 
In addition to these criminal laws, US lawyers are required to 
abide by lawyer regulatory provisions as a condition of receiving a law 
license.256 These regulatory provisions include the rules of professional 
conduct from the state(s) in which the lawyer is licensed or is 
practicing. 257  The rules of professional conduct are enacted by the 
highest court in each state  and are based on the ABA Model Rules of 
 
 
253. See U.S. Dept. of Treasury, History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, Fin. Crimes 
Enf’t Network, https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws [https://perma.cc/
7XB9-8VJC]. 
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (2013). The Internal Revenue Code governs the 
receipt of more than US$10,000 in cash and authorizes the existing reporting requirements. See, 
e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5331 (2011) (reports relating to coins and currency received in nonfinancial 
trade or business). 
255 . See, e.g., 31 U.S.C § 5324 (2004) (prohibiting structuring transactions to evade 
reporting requirement); 26 U.S.C. § 6050I(f)(1) (1996) (prohibiting structuring transactions to 
evade reporting requirements). Thus, it would be a crime for a lawyer to deposit US$9,500 and 
thereafter deposit US$600 in order to avoid the IRS US$10,000 reporting requirement. 
256. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.  
257. See, e.g., Policy Implementation Committee, Variations of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 8.5: Disciplinary Authority; Choice of Law, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_8_5.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QKU2-S3K4] (state implementation of Rule 8.5(a) regarding disciplinary 
authority). 
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Professional Conduct.258 Thus, for ease of reference, this Article will 
use the ABA Model Rules as a proxy to describe lawyer regulation in 
US jurisdictions. 
The ABA Model Rules contain at least three different rules that 
are relevant to lawyer AML obligations. ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) 
provides that “a lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”259 
ABA Model Rule 1.1 establishes a duty of competence.260 It defines 
competence to include knowledge of the relevant facts.261 ABA Model 
Rule 1.16(a) creates a mandatory duty on the part of the lawyer to reject 
certain clients.262 The rule  states that “a lawyer shall not represent a 
client . . . if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules 
of professional conduct or other law[.]”263 In addition to creating a 
mandatory duty to reject certain client matters, ABA Model Rule 
1.16(a)(1) creates a mandatory duty to withdraw if the lawyer’s 
continued representation of the client “will result in a violation of . . . 
 
 
258 . See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal 
Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2719-22 (2012) (describing the regulatory system for 
US lawyers). As of 2018, California’s rules are also based on the ABA Model Rules and thus 
all fifty US states use the ABA Model Rules. See generally ST. B. CALIF., Current Rules of 
Professional Conduct, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-
of-Professional-Conduct/Current-Rules [https://perma.cc/E8W8-ZVRL] (webpage shows that 
California’s new rules, which took effect Nov. 1, 2018, use the ABA Model Rules format). 
259. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.2(d). 
260. Id. at r. 1.1 (stating that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”). Id. 
261. Id. at r. 1.1, cmt. [5] (“Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry 
into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and 
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate 
preparation.”). Id. 
262.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.16(a). 
263. Id. at r. 1.16(a)(1). For a UK article that cited the potential benefits of a regulatory 
approach in addition to criminal law provisions, see Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 663: 
 For us, the notion that if crime is committed, the response should be either criminal 
justice or nothing seems absurd: the licensing and inspection regime for professionals 
may be expected to have a preventative effect on the scale of criminality, even if ex 
post facto professional sanctions do not deter completely, and especially if 
professional inspections and sanctions are much more likely than criminal conviction 
to happen. 
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other law.”264  As noted previously, the United States has criminal laws 
that prohibit lawyers from engaging in money laundering or assisting 
money laundering activities.265 
 When read together, Rules 1.1, 1.2(d), and 1.16(a) arguably 
impose a “due diligence” obligation on lawyers.266 Moreover, the “duty 
to reject” provisions in US lawyer regulation arguably go further than 
FATF Recommendations 22 and 23 because Rule 1.16(a)(1) puts 
responsibility on the lawyer to stop interacting with the 
criminal/client.267 The FATF Recommendations, in contrast, transfer 
that responsibility from the lawyer to a supervisory body. Transferring 
responsibility to a supervisory body might work adequately in 
jurisdictions in which the AML supervisor is well-resourced. It is also 
possible, however, that a system that removes the “stop work” 
responsibility from the lawyer and transfers it to another entity will 
result in more money laundering rather than less money laundering. 
As this paragraph explains, in addition to the mandatory duty to 
reject and the mandatory duty to withdraw provisions to which US 
lawyers are subject, US lawyers have broad discretion to reject or 
withdraw from representation in additional circumstances. This 
discretion to reject or withdraw from a lawyer-client relationship exists 
at both the front [acceptance] end of the relationship and the back 
[termination] end of the lawyer-client relationship.268 With respect to 
the front end of the lawyer-client relationship, it is noteworthy that, 
except for a very narrow exception regarding court appointments,269 
US lawyers do not have a general “duty to accept” any client who 
 
 
264. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.16(a)(1). 
265.  See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.  
266 .  See supra notes 259-64, infra note 294 (explaining how these three rules work 
together).  
267.  Compare r. 1.16(a), supra note 264 (imposing a duty to reject the money laundering 
client), with FATF Recommendation 23, supra note 87, (imposing a duty to file a suspicious 
transaction report).  
268.  The discretion to withdraw from representation appears in Rule 1.16(b). The 
discretion to reject representation can be inferred from the fact that the only rule that requires a 
lawyer to accept a case is Rule 6.2 regarding court appointments.  
269. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 6.2. See also 
Russell Pearce et al., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, 94 
(Interactive Casebooks) (West 2d ed. 2013) (“Because the general rule is that a lawyer is not “a 
public utility” who must provide service to every client that requests it, a lawyer has great 
freedom in deciding which clients to represent.”). 
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wishes to retain that lawyer’s services and is able to pay for the 
lawyer’s service.270  The US situation, which gives a lawyer broad 
discretion to reject potential clients, is different than the situation that 
one sometimes finds in other countries.271  With respect to the back-
end or termination of the lawyer-client relationship,  Rule 1.16(b) 
makes it clear that US lawyers have tremendous discretion  to decide 
to part company with the client.272  Under Rule 1.16(b), so long as a 
lawyer is not representing a client in litigation, that US lawyer may 
withdraw from representation at any time and for any reason provided 
that the withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse 
effect on the interests of the client.273 Moreover, even if the withdrawal 
would cause material adverse effects on the client’s interests, the US 
lawyer has the discretion to withdraw if any of several rather broad 
enumerated provisions are satisfied.274 
Both the AML criminal laws and the relevant disciplinary rules 
have been enforced against US lawyers.275 The FATF Legal Profession 
Typologies Report, for example, lists a number of lawyers who have 
 
 
270. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 6.2, with the 
remainder of the ABA Model Rules.  In some states, lawyers may also be subject to anti-
discrimination provisions. See, e.g., Nathanson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination, 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 76, 2003 WL 224806881 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003). 
271.  Compare the lack of a mandatory duty to accept rule in the ABA Model Rules, supra 
note 269, with the “cab rank” rule that applies to barristers in England and Wales and that 
specifies that barristers have a duty to accept a mandate unless an exception applies. For a 
discussion of the cab rank rule, see Bar Standards Board, Consultation, The Cab Rank Rule: 
Standard contractual terms and the list of defaulting solicitors (March 2015), 
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1657974/cab_rank_rule_consultation_final_-
_march_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P55-QWH7].   
272. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 34, at r. 1.16(b)(1). 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at r. 1.16(b).  
The enumerated reasons include the following that are relevant to this Article: 
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; 
(3) the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; 
(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which 
the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; [or] 
(7) other good cause for withdrawal exists.  
Id. 
275.  See infra notes 276 & 279 (citing discipline and criminal cases).  
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been convicted of violating these federal AML laws. 276 A 2016 plea 
bargain by a San Diego lawyer demonstrates that federal prosecutors 
are willing to prosecute lawyers on the basis that the lawyer knew or 
should have known that the activity involved illegal money 
laundering. 277  The San Diego lawyer in that case agreed to a plea 
bargain and was sentenced to a five-year prison term.278 US lawyers 
have also been disciplined for AML-related involvement and have lost 
their licenses to practice law.279 
As noted in Section III.B, although the US was rated 
noncompliant for Recommendations 22 and 23, it was rated as having 
a moderate level of effectiveness for Immediate Outcomes 3 and 4.280 
US lawyer organizations. including the ABA and ACTEC, have put 
considerable effort into educating lawyers about their AML obligations 
and helping them spot money laundering red flags. 281  To date, 
however, neither the ABA nor ACTEC has gone on record as 
supporting efforts to impose on US lawyers mandatory federal laws 
that impose due diligence obligations.282 The ABA’s policy webpage 
related to lawyer AML issues notes the ABA’s opposition to several 
specific bills and expresses the ABA’s overall concerns about proposed 
federal legislation 283   Some of the ABA’s policy statements have 
 
 
276. See Terry, supra note 26, at 499 nn.54, 57 (listing in one place the criminal cases 
cited throughout the lengthy FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27). The US has been one of 
the jurisdictions that has prosecuted the most lawyers. Id. at 499. 
277. See Laurel Terry, 5 Year Prison Term for a Lawyer Using his IOLTA Account to 
Launder Money, CONTEMPORARY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BLOG (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://contemporaryprofessionalresponsibility.com/2016/09/07/5-year-prison-term-for-a-
lawyer-using-his-iolta-account-to-launder-money/ [https://perma.cc/2KM3-GKLW]. 
278. Id. 
279. See Terry, supra note 26, at 500 nn.57-58 (listing, inter alia, discipline cases in the 
FATF Typologies Report, supra note 27); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Blair, __ A.3rd 
___, 2018 WL 3414216 (Md. Ct. of Appeals, July 13, 2018) (discussing a suspended lawyer 
who was permanently disbarred for money laundering activities). 
280.  See supra notes 238-48 and accompanying text (describing the results of the US 
Mutual Evaluation Report).  
281. See Terry, supra note 26, at 501-10. 
282. The ABA’s 2010 red flags guide uses the word “voluntary” in its title.  See ABA AML 
Guidance, supra note 233. See also infra note 283. 
283. See Policy: Gatekeeper Regulations on Lawyers, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/priorities_policy/indep
endence_of_the_legal_profession/bank_secrecy_act.html [https://perma.cc/ASP6-7DK5]: 
The ABA supports reasonable and necessary domestic and international measures 
designed to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. However, the 
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included in one document discussion of lawyer regulation principles 
and discussion of substantive corporate law beneficial ownership 
disclosure rules.284  
The discussions about US lawyer AML obligations have taken 
place against the backdrop of AML scandals, several of which were 
previously cited in Section II.B, as well as debates about corporate 
secrecy laws and the overall robustness of the US’ AML regime. For 
example, US law firms did not figure as prominently in the Panama 
Papers leak as law firms from some other countries, but their 
involvement has been noted.285 After several high profile news stories 
about the use of shell corporations to purchase luxury US real estate,286 
the United States imposed “Geographic Targeting Orders” (“GTOs”) 
that require disclosure of beneficial ownership information in certain 
high-value real estate markets and thus affect lawyers and others who 
are assisting clients with certain kinds of real estate transactions.287 
While the full impact of these GTOs is not yet known, a July 2018 
headline in the Miami Herald stated: How Dirty Is Miami Real Estate? 
Secret Home Deals Dried Up When Feds Started Watching.288 Because 
 
 
Association opposes legislation and regulations that would impose burdensome and 
intrusive gatekeeper requirements on lawyers, including bills that would subject the 
legal profession to key anti-money laundering compliance provisions of the Bank 
Secrecy Act. If adopted, these measures would undermine the attorney-client 
privilege, the confidential lawyer-client relationship, and traditional state court 
regulation of the legal profession, while also imposing excessive new federal 
regulations on lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 
284.  See supra note 208 and accompanying text (citing the ABA webpage that contains 
multiple policy statements).  
285. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 41; John Cassidy, Panama Papers: Why Aren’t There 
More American Names?, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 5, 2016). 
286. See, e.g., Story & Saul, supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
287. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, Press Release: FinCEN Expands Reach of Real 
Estate “Geographic Targeting Orders” Beyond Manhattan and Miami, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T 
NETWORK (July 27, 2016), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-expands-reach-
real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-beyond-manhattan [https://perma.cc/L8A7-T2XD]. 
288. See How Dirty is Miami Real Estate, supra note 47. This news story included a 
summary of a study entitled Anonymous Capital Flows and U.S. Housing Markets written by an 
employee of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a professor at the University of Miami. 
It concluded that the transparency order affected markets beyond the high-priced markets where 
it was enforced. Id. 
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of the manner in which lawyer AML obligations and substantive 
corporate disclosure laws related to beneficial ownership have been 
intertwined in FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports and public 
discussions, 289 the US author of this Article believes that beneficial 
ownership real estate scandals such as those in New York and Miami 
are likely to create additional pressure in the United States for lawyer 
regulation reform.290 
What arguably has gotten the most attention in the United States, 
however, is the 60 Minutes/Anonymous Inc. TV program. As noted 
earlier, a number of individuals have criticized the behavior of the US 
lawyers who were the subjects of the Global Witness “sting” in which 
an actor sought legal assistance for a simulated transaction that it 
intended to represent a money laundering scheme. 291  Although the 
American Bar Association292 and a prominent US legal ethics expert293 
 
 
289.  See, e.g., supra note 242 and accompanying text (US Mutual Evaluation Report 
combined discussions of lawyer AML obligations, lawyer privilege, and beneficial ownership 
rules) & note 49 (citing a number of articles that discussed both substantive corporate law 
beneficial ownership disclosure rules and lawyer regulation and privilege issues).  The US 
Author finds it regrettable that lawyer regulation and beneficial ownership issues have become 
commingled.  In her view, the desirability of substantive corporate law disclosure rules—that is, 
beneficial ownership rules—is not a lawyer regulation issue.  Discussions that equate these two 
issues and that commingle discussion of corporate beneficial ownership rules with lawyer 
regulation issues arguably put the traditional role of lawyers at risk.  
290.  In addition to these real estate scandals discussed supra notes 286-88, US lawyers’ 
representation of Equatorial Guinea’s president Teodoro Obiang Nguema, has often been the 
subject of scathing critique.  See, e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, Little Theodor’s Big Troubles, 
AM. LAW. 62. Feb. 1, 2013). US lawyers’ representation of Obiang has been the subject of 
Congressional Hearings and other reports.  See S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs, 
supra note 48; Puppet Masters, supra note 39. 
291. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; Michael D. Goldhaber, When A Kleptocrat 
Comes Calling, AM. LAW, Mar. 2016, at 18. 
292. See ABA President Paulette Brown responds to “60 Minutes” segment, supra note 49 
(explaining that the ABA supports the highest ethical standards for lawyers as well as reasonable 
efforts to combat money laundering and that “both 60 Minutes and Global Witness confirm 
Silkenat acted legally and ethically.”). 
293. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 49, at 3: 
Silkenat provided the ABA Journal with an opinion by ethics expert Stephen Gillers 
of New York University School of Law. ‘A preliminary meeting with a prospective 
client,’ he wrote, ‘is ordinarily not the place to voice suspicions about what the 
prospective client has said or to accuse the prospective client of dissembling, lying or 
violating the law.’ Generally explaining vehicles for home ownership is not unethical, 
Gillers said. 
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have defended the actions of the former ABA President who was one 
of the targets of the sting, the US Author’s anecdotal impression is that 
US lawyers are embarrassed by the 60 Minutes/Anonymous Inc. TV 
program. The 60 Minutes/Anonymous Inc. TV program arguably has 
contributed to greater interest in, and discussion of, the topic of lawyer 
involvement in money laundering activities. 
Regardless of the reason, there seems to be growing interest in the 
United States in creating or making more explicit 294  lawyers’ due 
diligence obligations.295 The ABA “Gatekeeper” Task Force has been 
the primary group responsible for initiating discussions about ethics 
rule changes.296 Task Force representatives have spoken with members 
and staff of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility and the ABA Standing Committee on Discipline.297 
They have asked these committees to amend the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct in order to add or make more explicit lawyers’ 
AML due diligence obligations. 298  Although the phrase “due 
diligence” is not one that is used in the ABA Model Rules, the idea that 
 
 
But see Memorandum from John Leubsdorf, Distinguished Professor of Law and Judge 
Frederick B. Lacey Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers School of Law & William H. Simon, Arthur 
Levitt Professor, Columbia Law School, and Gertrude and William Saunders Professor 
Emeritus, Stanford Law School, to Global Witness (Jan. 28, 2015), 
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/18209/Opinion_of_John_Leubsdorf_and_William_
Simon.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C6R-UYFH] (“In our opinion, the conduct by the above-named 
lawyers shown in these interviews does not comply with the professional responsibilities of 
lawyers asked for assistance with potentially unlawful transactions.”). 
294. Author Laurel Terry is among those who have argued that if read together, Rules 1.1, 
1.2(d), and 1.16(a) create a due diligence obligation. For a discussion of these Rules, see supra 
notes 259-64.  
295. See Kevin Shepherd, ABA Needs a New Model Legal Ethics Rule, LAW 360 (Apr. 6, 
2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/910316/aba-needs-a-new-model-legal-ethics-rule 
[https://perma.cc/AKG5-GFFG]. There may also be growing interest in the United 
States in “decoupling” US lawyer AML regulation issues from substantive corporate law issues 
about disclosure of beneficial owners and the optimal level of corporate transparency. There 
arguably are quite strong reasons to support this decoupling, but this issue is beyond the scope 
of this Article. See supra note 289. 
296. Author Laurel Terry has personal knowledge of this fact.  
297. Id.  This Committee is now known as the ABA Standing Committee on Regulation. 
Id. 
298. Id. 
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a lawyer may have a duty to make a factual inquiry is a familiar one.299  
For example, it is the US Author’s impression that few people would 
allow a lawyer to avoid the mandatory conflicts of interest provisions 
by simply failing to inquire about the identity of the opposing party. A 
New York City Bar ethics opinion recently concluded that when a 
lawyer is asked to assist in a transaction that the lawyer suspects may 
involve a crime or fraud, a duty of inquiry in some circumstances is 
implicit in the Rules.300  
In sum, the US has both a criminal law system and a lawyer 
regulatory system that prohibits lawyers from assisting clients or others 
in money laundering activities. Moreover, there are ongoing 
conversations in the United States about the scope of a lawyer’s ethical 
duties, including whether Rule 1.1 or another rule imposes a “due 
diligence” obligation on lawyers, and whether the ethical rules should 
be amended to supplement or make more explicit existing obligations.  
Meanwhile, the US’s AML system for DNFBPs has been rated 
“noncompliant” by other FATF Members.  Moreover, one of the action 
items in the 2016 US Mutual Evaluation Report called on the United 
States to apply “appropriate AML/CFT obligations” on lawyers.  This 
FATF Report and the recent money laundering scandals are likely to 
create pressure for change in the US AML-lawyer regulatory situation. 
B. Peru 
This Section begins with background information about Peru and 
its lawyers. In 2016, Peru’s population was approximately 32 
million. 301  It has one of the fastest growing economies in Latin 
 
 
299.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, cmt. [5] (“Competent handling 
of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the 
problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent 
practitioners.”). 
300.  NEW YORK CITY BAR, Formal Opinion 2018-4: Duties When an Attorney Is Asked 
to Assist in a Suspicious Transaction, https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.nycbar.org/
files/2018415-Assisting_Suspicious_Activity.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQ3F-ARKH]. 
301. World Bank, Country Profile: Peru, WORLD BANK, http://databank.worldbank.org/
data/views/reports/reportwidget.aspx?Report_Name=CountryProfile&Id=b450fd57&tbar=y&d
d=y&inf=n&zm=n&country=PER [https://perma.cc/M4QG-93WG] [hereinafter World Bank 
Data Peru]. During 2016, its inflation rate was 2.9%. Id. 
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America.302 Between 2007 and 2012, it had an average GDP growth of 
almost seven percent303 and in 2016, Peru’s annual GDP growth was 
four percent.304 In addition to growing its economy overall, Peru has 
made impressive progress in reducing its poverty rate.305 The World 
Bank describes Peru as an “upper middle income” country.306 
Peru is a member of the World Trade Organization,307 as well as 
a number of other international organizations.308 Peru is also a party to 
more than fifteen bilateral or regional free trade agreements, including 
an agreement with the United States.309 The US-Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement entered into force in 2009.310 In July 2018, the Office of the 
US Trade Representative described trade between the United States 
and Peru as follows: 
 
 
302.  THE WORLD BANK IN PERU, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/peru/overview 
[https://perma.cc/V7X8-5ZD7] (“Between 2002 and 2013, Peru was one of the fastest-growing 
countries in Latin America, with an average GDP growth rate of 6.1 percent annually.”). 
303 .  Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, Peru, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
WT/TPR/S/289 ¶¶ 3, 6 (Oct. 9, 2013), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s289_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7EM-WN4J]. 
304. World Bank Data Peru, supra note 301. 
305. See id. (showing a drop in poverty from 30.8% in 2010 to 20.7% in 2016); World 
Bank, Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=PE [https://perma.cc/G9H6-
KU5N] (poverty has been reduced from 59% in 2004 to 21% in 2016). 
306.  World Bank, Peru, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/country/peru 
[https://perma.cc/DS6Q-A5TR] [hereinafter World Bank Peru Data Choices]. 
307. See Trade Policy Review, supra note 303.  
308. See Peru Factsheet U.S. Relations with Peru, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35762.htm [https://perma.cc/8AWH-ULC3] (“Peru and the 
United States belong to a number of the same international organizations, including the United 
Nations, Organization of American States, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization.”). 
309. See CIA, The World Factbook: Peru, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html 
[https://perma.cc/B8A5-55ZC] [hereinafter World Factbook] (“[S]ince 2006, Peru has signed 
trade deals with the US, Canada, Singapore, China, Korea, Mexico, Japan, the EU, the European 
Free Trade Association, Chile, Thailand, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Honduras, concluded 
negotiations with Guatemala and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and begun trade talks with El 
Salvador, India, and Turkey.”). 
310. See Final Text, U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement Peru TPA, OFFICE OF U.S. 
TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text 
[https://perma.cc/8VXA-HARM] [hereinafter US-Peru Trade Agreement]. 
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U.S. goods and services trade with Peru totaled an estimated $20.5 
billion in 2015 (latest data available). Exports were $12.6 billion; 
imports were $7.9 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade 
surplus with Peru was $4.7 billion in 2015. Peru is currently our 
35th largest goods trading partner with $14.3 billion in total (two 
way) goods trade during 2016.311 
The US-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement applies to professional 
services, including legal services.312 
Peru is a civil law country.313 It has a divided legal profession that 
includes Abogado(a) and notaries. 314  Information in English about 
Peru’s legal profession can be found in the 2016 International Bar 
Association (“IBA”) Directory of Regulators,315 the 2014 IBA Global 
Legal Services Report, 316  and on the IBA Anti-Money-Laundering 
 
 
311.  Peru, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/peru 
[https://perma.cc/BGM5-3CW9]. 
312. For a discussion of the treatment of legal services in this agreement, see THE U.S.-
PERU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT REPORT OF THE INDUSTRY TRADE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
SERVICES AND FINANCE INDUSTRIES (ITAC 10) (Feb. 1, 2006 ), 
https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Reports/asset_upload_fi
le209_8983.pdf [https://perma.cc/58HD-BZXR]; Laurel S. Terry, From GATS to APEC: The 
Impact of Trade Agreements on Legal Services, 43 AKRON L. REV. 875, 937-38 (2010) 
(comparing the legal services portion of the US-Peru TPA to those found in fourteen other US 
free trade agreements). 
313. See, e.g., World Factbook, supra note 309. 
314. Compare INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA Global Regulation and Trade in Legal Services 
Report 2014 (Oct. 2014), at Peru, 363-366, 
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=1D3D3E81-472A-40E5-
9D9D-68EB5F71A702 [https://perma.cc/BJ8F-4HMB] [hereinafter IBA Global Legal Services 
Report] (discussing the rules applicable to the profession of abogado (male) and abogada 
(female) and citing the regulatory body of the Junta de Decanos de los Colegios de abogados del 
Peru), with Junta de Decanos de los Colegios de Notarios del Perú, 
http://www.juntadedecanos.org.pe/ [https://perma.cc/H57T-5E3S] (website of the regulatory 
body of the Peruvian profession of notary). 
315. See also Directory of Regulators of the Legal Profession,  INT’L BAR ASS’N (2016), 
144, 
https://www.ibanet.org/Legal_Regulators_Directory.aspxhttps://www.ibanet.org/Legal_Regul
ators_Directory.aspxhttps://www.ibanet.org/Legal_Regulators_Directory.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/MRN4-PQ3G] [hereinafter IBA Directory of Regulators]. 
316. See IBA Global Legal Services Report, supra note 314. 
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Forum webpage,317 as well as in other sources.318  The US Library of 
Congress hosts a website about Peru that includes links to Peruvian 
laws and government websites, as well as a number of addition useful 
links.319  
According to the IBA Global Legal Services Report, in order to 
be admitted to practice, a lawyer in Peru must meet the following 
requirements: “The requirements for admission to practise are a five 
year university education, followed by registration with the 
[Superintendencia Nacional de Educación Superior Universitaria 
(SUNEDU)] and . . . incorporation into a [Regional] Bar Association 
of Peru.”320 
Regional bar associations in Peru belong to the Junta De Decanos 
De Los Colegios De Abogados Del Perú—this might be translated as 
the National Board of Deans of the Bar Associations of Peru.321 This 
 
 
317 . See INT’L BAR ASS’N, Peru, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING FORUM (last updated 
01/07/2017), https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/southamerica/Peru.aspx [https://perma.cc/
Z57S-L39Y]. As noted infra notes 356-63 and accompanying text, Peru has adopted new AML 
laws that apply to lawyers. These new laws are not yet listed on the IBA website. Id. 
318. See, e.g., Ana Cecilia MacLean, Legal Education in Peru: Are We Ready for Integration 
and Globalization, 19 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 201, 216201216 (2013) (noting that Peru had 
seventy-six law schools, of which nineteen were public universities (25%) and fifty-seven were 
private universities (75%)); THE CYRUS R. VANCE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVES,  Country Report, Peru (2011) http://www.vancecenter.org/vancecenter/
images/stories/vancecenter/country%20report%20-%20peru.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5XQ-
VWU9]; Latham & Watkins, Pro Bono Practices and Opportunities in Peru, LATHAM & 
WATKINS,  489 (Sept. 2015), https://www.lw.com/admin/Upload/Documents/
Global%20Pro%20Bono%20Survey/pro-bono-in-peru.pdf [https://perma.cc/23HP-G38E] 
(stating that in 2014, Peru had 130,000 Bar-affiliated lawyers, which was approximately one 
lawyer for every 234 habitants.”).  
319.  Guide to Law Online: Peru, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, (last visited Oct. 5, 2018) 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/guide/nations/peru.php [https://perma.cc/QVY7-FE4E]. See also 
Peru, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/peru [https://perma.cc/34SG-QZSE]. 
320. IBA GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 314, at 363. This IBA Report 
indicates that although an abogado/a must register with a regional bar association, that lawyer 
may practice throughout the country and need not work in the region in which he or she 
registered. Id. 
The language in brackets was provided by one of this Article’s Authors, who is Peruvian. 
It corrects the registration entity listed in the IBA Report and deletes the statement that a lawyer 
must register with the Superior Court of Lima. Id. at 363.   
321. See COLEGIO DE ABOGATOS DE LIMA, Junta De Decanos De Los Colegios De 
Abogados Del Perú , http://www.cal.org.pe/junta_decanos_peru.html [https://perma.cc/CN8Q-
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national organization, which is established by law and represents more 
than thirty bar associations, meets periodically.322 
The Junta De Decanos De Los Colegios De Abogados Del Perú 
has certain overarching responsibilities related to lawyer regulation. 
For example, it adopted Peru’s 2012 legal ethics code323 and lawyer 
disciplinary procedures.324 A preface to the 2012 ethics code includes 
interesting background information, including the fact that it was 
modeled after the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.325 
Peru’s 2012 ethics code has been well publicized. For example, 
the Colegio de Abogados de Lima (Bar Association of Lima)326 has a 
 
 
T8LT] [hereinafter National Board webpage] (this page, which is available as a link from an 
older webpage of the Colegio de Abogados de Lima (Bar Association of Lima) includes links to 
a number of items, including its governing document, the Estatuto De La Junta De Decanos De 
Los Colegios De Abogados Del Peru). See also Colegios Profesionales, CONSEJO NACIONAL 
DE DECANOS DE LOS COLEGIOS PROFESIONALES DEL PERÚ SIGA EL SIGUIENTE E NLACE 
(CDCP), http://cdcp.org.pe/colegios-profesionales/ [https://perma.cc/C89H-6MQ3] (includes 
links to members, as well as links to the Peruvian laws that created these organizations).  
322 . See, e.g., Junta Nacional de los Colegios de Abogados del Perú, COLEGIO DE 
ABOGADOS DE LIMA (July 25, 2018), http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/junta-nacional-de-los-colegios-
de-abogados-del-peru/ [https://perma.cc/5WTR-XRQW] (reporting on a July 20, 2018 meeting 
of the national board); JUNTA DE DECANOS DE LOS COLEGIOS DE ABOGADOS DEL 
PERÚ, http://www.cal.org.pe/junta_decanos_peru.html [https://perma.cc/2AN7-GWGX] 
(linking to several meetings). 
323. See generally Junta Law No. 001- 2012-JDCAP-P, Código De Ética Del Abogado 
[The Code of Ethics for Lawyers], COLEGIO DE ABOGATOS DE LIMA (Apr. 14, 2012), 
http://cal.org.pe/archivos_oficiales/2015/etica/codigo_de_etica_del_abogado_051114.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FQE7-E22Z]. Links to this ethics code are available in a number of different 
locations. See, e.g., IBA Directory of Regulators: Peru, supra note 315, at 144. 
324. Law No. 002-2012-JDCAP-P, Reglamento Del Procedimiento Disciplinario De Los 
Órganos De Control Deontologico De Los Colegios De Abogados Del Perú [Disciplinary 
Regulations for Peruvian Lawyers], COLEGIO DE ABOGATOS DE LIMA (Apr. 14, 2012), 
http://cal.org.pe/archivos_oficiales/2015/etica/reglamento_de_los_procedimiento_disciplinario
_051114.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRX9-93NR]. 
325 . See Prefacio, RAMA JUDICIAL, 2-3, http://www.ramajudicial.pr/reglas-de-
conducta/Cap-1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U9T-K7YJ]. A link to this preface is included in the 
Peru entry in the IBA Directory of Regulators, supra note 315, at 144. The preface explains that 
the drafters consulted a number of resources including the ALI’s Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and ethics codes from 
Spain and the European Union, among other items. Prefacio, supra, at 1-2. As the Preface 
explains, the drafters ultimately decided to use the ABA Model Rules as the model for Peru’s 
revised ethics code. Id. at 2-3. This preface identifies the drafters and the difference in approach 
in the 2012 ethics code compared to the earlier version. Id.  at 1-2. 
326 . See, e.g., COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA, (last visted Oct. 5, 2018), 
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/ [https://perma.cc/6DG4-AWUT].  Peru also has a bar association for 
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professional ethics office which has a webpage. 327  This webpage 
includes, inter alia, links to the 2012 ethics code, the 2012 disciplinary 
enforcement rules, a complaint form for consumers, directions to 
consumers about the grounds for a complaint and how to fill out the 
form, as well as a list of lawyers who have been disciplined.328 The Bar 
Association of Lima’s Ethics webpage also includes links to various 
reports  and its workplan.329 
Although there is relatively little demographic data about Peru’s 
legal profession,330 Peru has fewer large law firms than the United 
States, and the largest firms  are smaller.331 There are also relatively 
 
 
North Lima and South Lima. Pronouncement of the Board of Deans, COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS 
DE LIMA, http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/28482-2/ [https://perma.cc/F633-ECUS]. 
327. See Dirección De Ética Profesional, COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA,  
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/etica-profesional/ [https://perma.cc/D43H-ZFDT] [hereinafter Lima 
Bar Ethics Webpage]. 
328. See id. 
329. Id. The Lima Bar’s older webpage also included a robust ethics page with information 
about the implementation plan for the 2012 ethics code. See Ética Profesional, COLEGIO DE 
ABOGADOS DE LIMA, http://www.cal.org.pe/etica.html [https://perma.cc/7U98-48CU] 
[hereinafter Older Lima Bar Ethics page]. The older Lima Bar Ethics page included a link to a 
document that had interesting implementation information: the Plan de Trabajo. COLEGIO DE 
ABOGADOS DE LIMA, Plan de Trabajo (2014) http://www.cal.org.pe/pdf/etica/2014/marzo/P-T-
Etica.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP2E-RJMC]. 
330. See, e.g., Los abogados en el Perú, LE LEY (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://laley.pe/not/1215/los-abogados-en-el-peru/ [https://perma.cc/TA93-BNM6] (containing 
demographic information); See also Cyrus Vance Peru Report, supra note 318, at 13-14 (citing 
a report that in May 2010, there were approximately more than 97,000 lawyers in Peru, also 
noting city concentration and law student practice area interests, but noting that there is no direct 
data that reflects the geographic concentration of lawyers or distribution of lawyers across 
sectors). 
331.  Compare 2018 Latin Lawyer 250, LATIN LAWYER (2018), 
https://latinlawyer.com/ll250/countries/2257/peru [https://perma.cc/7G6N-Y5D5] (2018 Latin 
Lawyer 250 ratings list only four Peruvian firms that have more than one-hundred lawyers), with 
Global 100: Most Lawyers, AM. LAW. 42-46 (Oct. 2018) (listing many US law firms with more 
than 700 lawyers and no Peruvian firms). A 2013 ABA report noted in that in 2005, 
approximately seventy-five percent of lawyers were in private practice and of those, 
approximately seventy-five percent practiced as solos or in firms of twenty or fewer lawyers. 
See AM. B. ASS’N, Lawyer Demographics [2012], https://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2013.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6MH-5CR2]. It seems logical that most Peruvian lawyers also practice 
as solos or in small law firms. 
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few “global” law firms with offices in Peru.332   For example, the 2014 
IBA Global Legal Services Report stated that the “Spanish firm Uría 
Menéndez and the legal arms of the large accountancy networks (PwC 
legal and Ernst and Young) have for some time been the only foreign 
firms with a foothold in Peru. Baker and McKenzie recently tied up 
with a local firm.”333 After the IBA Report was written, a Peruvian law 
firm merged with Dentons, which is one of the world’s largest law 
firms.334 Other global law firms now have a presence in Peru.335 In 
2018, Chambers & Partners has offered the following description of the 
Peruvian legal market: 
The fast-growing Peruvian economy has opened many doors for 
both multinational companies wanting to take advantage of the 
country’s business reputation, as well as local entities that are 
using the current momentum to expand beyond their borders. This 
has therefore increased the need for advice of an international 
standard and cross-border legal advice in the country. It then 
comes as no surprise that Peru has recorded historic M&A 
transactional amounts in the last decade especially in 2007 
(USD5.3 billion), 2013 (USD6.8 billion) and 2014, a record-
breaking year with over USD11 billion. The mergers and 
acquisitions market for 2016 saw a 20% growth when compared 
to 2015, with a reported 131 significant transactions. 
As a result, international law firms have started to enter Peru over 
the past four years, either independently or by incorporating an 
existing national firm into their structure. In return, Peruvian 
lawyers that have chosen to remain independent have embraced 
the need for increasing their regional profile, building a strong 
 
 
332.  See infra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.  
333. IBA GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 314, at 364. 
334. Dentons combines with Peru’s Gallo Barrios Pickmann, DENTONS (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.dentons.com/en/whats-different-about-dentons/connecting-you-to-talented-
lawyers-around-the-globe/news/2017/october/dentons-combines-with-perus-gallo-barrios-
pickmann [https://perma.cc/QHC7-AA9W]; Paula Kulig, Dentons plans combination with 
Peruvian law firm, THE LAW. DAILY (May 24, 2017), https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/family/
articles/3803/dentons-plans-combination-with-peruvian-law-firm [https://perma.cc/P58N-
LAM9] (noting the proposed merger with Gallo Barrios Pickmann and the fact that Peru is “one 
of the strongest and fastest-growing economies in Latin America”). 
335. Compare 2018 Latin Lawyer 250, supra note 331 (recommended firms include CMS 
Grau, DLA Piper Pizarro Botto Escobar, and Garrigues (Peru)), with Global 100, supra note 331 
(CMS and DLA Piper are among the ten largest firms listed). 
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reputation to prove to their current and potential clients that they 
are more than capable of handling complex and even cross-border 
transactions with the required international standard of quality.336 
 
When evaluating the AML situation for Peru’s lawyers, one must 
take note of the fact that Peru has faced significant corruption issues,337 
including the 2018 resignations of its president338 and the head of its 
judiciary.339 Lawyers, as well as Peru’s president, have been caught up 
in the massive “Lava Jato” scandal that prominently featured bribery, 
money laundering, and the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht.340 
 
 
336. See Peru Overview, CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, 
https://www.chambersandpartners.com/guide/latin-america/9/171/1 [https://perma.cc/3NT7-
EUSD]. 
337. See, e.g., Adriana Peralta, Peru’s Most Wanted Gangster Captured after 4 Months on 
the Run, Panampost (Nov. 2014), https://panampost.com/adriana-peralta/2014/11/14/perus-
most-wanted-gangster-captured-after-4-months-on-the-run/?cn-reloaded=1 
[https://perma.cc/SYU4-3RBN]. See also TRANSPARENCY INT’L, Peru, 
https://www.transparency.org/country/PER [https://perma.cc/B4HN-BV98] (ranking Peru 
ninety-sixth out of 180 countries for 2017). 
338. Peru’s President Pablo Kuczynski resigned in March 2018 after an impeachment 
threat related to a corruption scandal tied to Brazilian construction company Odebrecht. See 
Marcelo Rochabrún & Andrea Zarate, ʻWeʼve Had Enoughʼ Says Peruʼs New President, N.Y. 
TIMES (March 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/world/americas/peru-kuczynski-
vizcarra.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FPeru [https://perma.cc/X8DQ-E7BN private]; 
Nicholas Casey & Andrea Zarate, Corruption Scandals with Brazilian Roots Cascade Across 
Latin America, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017) (noting the arrest warrant for former president 
Toledo and the conviction of former president Alberto K. Fujimori). See also Miller & Chevalier, 
Latin America Corruption Survey (2016), 
https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/2016-Latin-America-Corruption-
Survey-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QX3T-RNGJ]. 
339. See, e.g., Head of Peru’s Judiciary Resigns as Crisis Grips Justice System, REUTERS 
(July 19, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-corruption-resignation/head-of-perus-
judiciary-resigns-as-crisis-grips-justice-system-idUSKBN1K92OH [https://perma.cc/NB83-
3FW9]. 
340. See, e.g., Óscar Castilla et. al, La lista negra del Caso Lava Jato, Ojo Publico, (Feb. 
5, 2017, updated 02/28/2018), https://lavajato.ojo-publico.com/articulo/lista-negra-caso-
lavajato/ [https://perma.cc/6LN2-4872]; Fabiano Angelico, Brazil: Open Data Just Made 
Investigating Corruption Easier, Transparency Int’l (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/brazil_open_data_just_made_investigating_corrupt
ion_easier [https://perma.cc/2TYR-HCJ8] (referring to the “Lava Jato” money laundering 
scandal and explaining its relationship to Odebrecht). See also Aquino, infra note 341. 
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The Panama Papers scandal has also reached Peru. For example, in 
2016, Peruvian authorities raided the Lima office of the now-closed 
law firm, Mossack Fonseca, whose leaked papers launched the Panama 
Papers scandal. 341  The Panama Papers database maintained by the 
International Consortium of Journalists lists a number of firms with 
Peruvian connections.342 Recently, the Lava Jato Commission of the 
Peruvian Congress agreed to waive the tax secrecy of fifty of the main 
Peruvian large law firms hired by the Brazilian construction company 
Odebrecht. 343  While these developments are discouraging to read 
about, one of the authors of this article believes that from a legal ethics 
perspective, the Lava Jato/Odebrecht scandal may be—and needs to 
be—to Peru what Watergate was to the United States—the catalyst that 
leads to legal ethics becoming more prominent.344 
Peru has taken a number of steps to fight corruption and money 
laundering. For example, in July 2018, Peru became a party to the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) 
Anti-Bribery Convention and the Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
 
 
341. See Marco Aquino, Peru Raids Local Mossack Fonseca Office, Seizes Documents 
(April 11, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-panama-tax-peru/peru-raids-local-
mossack-fonseca-office-seizes-documents-idUSKCN0X82MD [https://perma.cc/S7F7-
DWQ4]. 
342 . See ICIJ Database, supra note 44. At Search Results for Peru, 
https://offshoreleaks.icij.org/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=peru&e=&commit=Search 
[https://perma.cc/CGC7-BB2F]. As the “consent” box that one must agree to before accessing 
this database prominently notes, being listed in the database does not mean that the person or 
firm has done anything illegal or improper. 
343. See Levantarán secreto tributario de 60 estudios de abogados por contratos con 
Odebrecht, LA REPÚBLICA (July 28, 2018), https://larepublica.pe/politica/1284591-lava-jato-
secreto-bancario-60-estudios-abogados-contratos-odebrecht [https://perma.cc/N9J3-QB9L]. 
344. As many US lawyers know, the involvement of lawyers in the Watergate scandal that 
led President Nixon to resign was one of the main reasons why the American Bar Association 
changed the legal education accreditation requirements to include a legal ethics education 
requirement. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate: How a “Third-Rate 
Burglary” Provoked New Standards for Lawyer Ethics, 98 A.B.A. J. 36 (2012). For a Peruvian 
article that cites this Watergate article and makes this analogy, see José Carlos Llerena Robles, 
De los Petroaudios a Odebrecht ¿estamos en el caso de un Watergate peruano en la enseñanza 
del derecho?, CAFELEGAL (Feb. 6, 2017), https://cafelegal.lamula.pe/2017/02/06/de-los-
petroaudios-a-odebrecht-estamos-en-el-caso-de-un-watergate-peruano-en-la-ensenanza-del-
derecho/jcllerena84/ [https://perma.cc/5BHR-R69Q] (discussing current and past scandals and 
whether they might prompt reforms). 
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Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. 345 Most significantly for 
purposes of this Article, Peru is a member of GAFILAT, which is one 
of the FATF-Style Regional Bodies described earlier.346 GAFILAT 
was established in 2000 and consists of sixteen countries from South, 
Central, and North America.347  GAFILAT uses training measures and 
mutual evaluations to support its members in the “implementation of 
the 40 Recommendations and the creation of a regional prevention 
system against money laundering.”348 
Peru’s most recent completed mutual evaluation is its 3rd Round 
Mutual Evaluation Report, which is dated July 2008.349  According to 
a summary of that report, Peru was deemed compliant with ten 
recommendations, largely compliant with fourteen recommendations, 
 
 
345. See OECD, Newsroom: Peru to join two major OECD Conventions: Anti-Bribery 
Convention and multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matter, 
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/peru-to-join-two-major-oecd-conventions-anti-bribery-
convention-and-multilateral-convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-tax-
matters.htm [https://perma.cc/UBT2-RQMA] (Peru became the forty-fourth party to the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention on July 27, 2018 and acceded to the Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, effective September 1, 2018). 
Peru has ratified the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (“CICC”) in 1997 and 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption (“UNCAC”) in 2004. See, e.g., PERU PODER 
JUDICIAL, Lucha contra la Corrupción, https://www.pj.gob.pe/wps/wcm/connect/
cooperacion/s_corte_suprema_utilitarios/as_inicio/as_normas_internacionales/as_lucha_contra
_corrupcion [https://perma.cc/U2W7-VVQZ]. 
346. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text for information about the FATF-Style 
Regional Bodies. See infra note 347 regarding Peru’s membership. 
347. See, e.g., GAFILAT, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf- 
gafi.org/countries/#GAFILAT [https://perma.cc/FG3P-YJWG] (shows that Peru is a 
member of GAFILAT, which former was known as GAFISUD). It can be difficult to find an 
English version of the GAFILAT webpages. Compare GAFILAT: Home, 
http://www.gafilat.org/index.php/en/ [https://perma.cc/S4M6-2M4D], with 
http://gafilat.org.iplan-unix-03.toservers.com/content/quienes/&lang=en 
[https://perma.cc/A5UJ-HAAN]. 
348. See FATF GAFILAT, supra note 347. 
349. See 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation, supra note 7. Unlike some of the FATF 4th Round 
reports for Spanish-speaking countries, Peru’s 2008 Mutual Evaluation Report is available only 
in Spanish. Compare 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 7 (available only in 
Spanish), with Mexico MER, supra note 109 (available in English and Spanish); Nicaragua 
MER, supra note 109 (available in English and Spanish). Peru received several progress reports 
after its third mutual evaluation report. See, e.g., III Informe de Avance de la Evaluación Mutua 
de Perú, Informe de la Secretaría Ejecutiva (These reports are not listed on the FATF Peru page 
and currently are password protected on the GAFILAT website). 
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and partially compliant or non-compliant with four of the six core 
recommendations. 350  At the time of Peru’s 3rd Round Mutual 
Evaluation Report, Peru’s lawyers were not subject to Peru’s anti-
money laundering regime.351 
Peru’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report has not been issued, 
but the FATF Plenary discussion of this Report currently is scheduled 
for December 2018.352  Peru has a webpage with extensive materials 
related to its 2017-18 Mutual Evaluation, although most are exclusively 
in Spanish.353  This government webpage includes documents related 
to Peru’s national threat assessment and action plan.354A July 2018 
IMF report contains an English summary of Peru’s national threat 
assessment.355   
 
 
350. See Know Your Country, Peru, https://www.knowyourcountry.com/peru1111 
[https://perma.cc/4KAW-DRYB]. 
351. See 2008 Peru Mutual Evaluation Report, supra note 7, at 67. Accord IBA AML 
Forum, Peru, supra note 317, at 1 (“There’s no regulation regarding money laundering guidance 
for lawyers.”). 
352. See FATF Global Assessment Calendar, supra note 102, at Peru, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/calendar/assessmentcalendar/?hf=10&b=0&r=%2Bf%2Ffatf_country_en%2Fperu&s=
asc(document_lastmodifieddate)&table=1 [https://perma.cc/GW4Y-TC4P]. 
353.  See SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCA, SEGUROS Y AFP, Guías para el proceso de 
Evaluación Mutua, http://www.sbs.gob.pe/prevencion-de-lavado-activos/Sistema-de-Lucha-
Contra-el-LA-FT/Evaluacion-Mutua-Peru-2017-2018/Guias-para-el-proceso-de-Evaluacion-
Mutua  [https://perma.cc/N424-L6QJ]. 
354.  SUPERINTENDENCIA DE BANCA, SEGUROS Y AFP, Plan Nacional contra el Lavado 
de Activos (LA) y el Financiamiento del Terrorismo (FT) 2018-2021, 
http://www.sbs.gob.pe/prevencion-de-lavado-activos/Sistema-de-Lucha-Contra-el-LA-
FT/Plan-Nacional-contra-el-Lavado-de-Activos-y-el-Financiamiento-del-Terrorismo-2018-
2021 [https://perma.cc/XFM5-PGLY].  
355 .  See INT’L MONETARY FUND, Peru, Financial Sector Stability Assessment, IMF 
Country Report No. 18/238 (July 2018), https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/CR/2018/cr18238-PeruFSSA.ashx [https://perma.cc/T7CD-K6T7]. This IMF 
report stated, inter alia, that “drug trafficking, corruption, and environmental crimes were 
identified as key threats, while the informal economy’s size and the inadequate controls over 
movement of cash were listed as major vulnerabilities. The acquisition of real estate was recently 
noted as a significant ML typology.” Id. at 28. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I Drug and Chemical Control 272-73 
(March 2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222881.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TXM3-4GS8] (“The Government of Peru has demonstrated increasingly strong political will to 
address drug production and trafficking in Peru, both through funding a significant share of 
eradication operations for the first time and through its successful operations in the VRAEM to 
bring down high-ranking members of Shining Path.”).  See also supra note 353 (SBS Mutual 
Evaluation webpage). 
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When Peru’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report is published, 
the legal profession portion will look very different than Peru’s prior 
Mutual Evaluation Report. As this paragraph explains, this is because 
Peru has now added lawyers to the groups who are subject to Peru’s 
AML laws.356 In November 2016, the Peruvian government enacted a 
new law known as Legislative Decree No. 1249. 357 Legislative Decree 
1249 includes attorneys among the professionals who are obliged to 
report suspicious transaction under Peruvian anti-money laundering 
rules.358 Legislative Decree 1249 provides that an attorney who is in 
solo practice or in a law firm, who, on a habitual basis and on behalf a 
third party or on his own, is required to report the following activities: 
 
a) Purchase and sale of real estate; 
b) Management of money, securities, accounts of the 
financial system or other assets; 
c) Organization of contributions for the incorporation, 
operation or administration of legal entities; 
d) Incorporation, management, or reorganization of legal 
entities or other legal structures; and 
e) Purchase and sale of shares or social participations of 
legal persons.359 
 
 
 
356.  Compare infra notes 357-62 and accompanying text (discussing Decree 1249), with 
IBA Anti-money Laundering Forum webpage for Peru, supra note 317 (“ARE LAWYERS 
COVERED BY ANTIMONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION? Anti[-]money laundering 
legislation does not cover lawyers specifically. Nevertheless, Notaries are obligated to inform 
any suspicious  
Operation to the UIF Perú. In general they are supervised by the Council of Notaries.”). 
357. See Decreto Legislativo N° 1249 que dicta medidas para fortalecer la prevención, 
detección y sanción del lavado de activos y el terrorismo, [Legislative Decree 1249], 
http://www.leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/2016_2021/Decretos/Legislativos/01249.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4PLU-4KZH]. This law is available as a link from the webpage of Peru’s AML 
supervisor. See SUPERINTENDENTA DE BANCA, SEGUROS Y AFP 
Normas de aplicación general en materia de LAFT, http://www.sbs.gob.pe/prevencion-de-
lavado-activos/normas-de-aplicacion-general-en-materia-de-laft [https://perma.cc/L2W4-
LS3H]. 
358. See Legislative Decree 1249, supra note 357. 
359. Id. 
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Legislative Decree 1249 establishes that the information 
mentioned above and reported to the AML Peruvian Authority shall not 
be protected by attorney-client privilege. 360  In March 2018, the 
Peruvian Banking Regulator, Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y 
AFP, issued Resolution 789-2018.361 This twenty-four page Resolution 
provides additional detail about the regulation contained in Decree  
1249.362 Resolution 789-2018 includes information about topics such 
as the content of the Transactions Registers that attorneys must keep as 
part of a prevention system, the requirement that attorneys report, and 
the sanctions applicable to the breach of AML duties by lawyers.363 
According to this Article’s Peruvian Author, the Peruvian legal 
community has not yet started to have an open and deep debate about 
the consequences of Resolution 789 and Decree 1249. There are not 
yet clear parameters about what kind of information an attorney shall 
report to the Peruvian AML Authority without breaching the attorney-
client privilege that is regulated by Peruvian Political Constitution364 
and the Peruvian Code of Legal Ethics.365 In the Peruvian Author’s 
view, this is a challenge that the Peruvian legal community needs to 
tackle in the short term in order to have clearer knowledge about 
 
 
360.  Legislative Decree 1249, supra note 357, at art. 3.29. 
361. See República del Perú, Resolución SBS Nº 789-2018, Norma para la prevención del 
lavado de activos y del fi nanciamiento del terrorismo aplicable a los sujetos obligados bajo 
supervisión de la UIFPerú, en materia de prevención del lavado de activos y del financiamiento 
del terrorismo, EL PERUANO http://epdoc2.elperuano.pe/EpPo/DescargaIN.asp?Referencias=
MTYyMjE0NV8xMjAxODAzMDM= [https://perma.cc/TK3M-AQ2G] [hereinafter Resolution 
789-2018]. 
362. Id. 
363. Id.  This law excludes law firms as legal entities obliged to report. Id. 
364 . See República del Perú, Constitución de 1993 incluyendo reformas hasta 2005, 
POLITICAL DATABASE OF THE AMERICAS, http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Peru/
per93reforms05.html [https://perma.cc/8F2G-RN2P]. One of the Author’s translation is as 
follows: 
Article 2 of Peruvian Political Constitution 
Every person has the right: 
( . . . ) 
18. To keep his political, philosophical, religious or any other type of conviction 
private, as well as to keep professional secrets. 
365. See Peruvian Code of Legal Ethics, supra note 323, at art. 30. Article 30 might be 
translated as follows: “Attorney client privilege is the duty of reserve that the lawyer has to 
protect and maintain in the strictest confidentiality the facts and information referred to a client 
or potential client who knows on the occasion of the professional relationship.” (translation by 
one of the Authors). 
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attorneys’ new regulatory duties. However, because of the deep and 
wide presence of illegal activities related to drug trafficking in Peru, 
the Peruvian AML Authority does not have enough resources and 
political support to deal with all the issues related to money laundering 
activities.366 Because of this, the activities that are prioritized in the 
struggle against money laundering are things such as the construction 
sector, real estate companies, and entertainment, rather than legal 
services.367  
Peru’s 2012 legal ethics code will be an important part of the legal 
profession’s AML discussions and an important tool in Peru’s fight 
against money laundering and corruption. Before 2012, Peru had been 
using an ethics code based on the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics.368 As 
the Preface to Peru’s new 2012 ethics code recognizes, the 1908 ABA 
Canons do not provide a useful basis for lawyer discipline.369 Peru now 
has a set of ethics rules—as opposed to aspirational principles—that 
can provide a basis for regulating and disciplining Peru’s lawyers who 
assist clients in money laundering activities.370 
In 2016, Legislative Decree 1249 established a national register 
of disciplined lawyers. 371  The names of disciplined lawyers from 
around the country and the sanctions they received are prominently 
listed on a Peruvian Government webpage managed by the Peruvian 
Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.372 As noted earlier, the Lima 
 
 
366. See, e.g., supra notes 337-43 and accompanying text (describing widespread 
corruption scandals); National Action Plan, supra notes 354-55 (showing that lawyers are not a 
primary target of Peru’s AML efforts).  
367.  See generally National Action Plan, supra notes 354-55 (setting forth Peru’s AML 
priorities).  
368. See Prefacio to the 2012 Peru Ethics Code, supra note 325, at 2 (“Como se sabe, los 
Cánones de Ética Profesional de 1935 fueron una traducción directa al castellano de los Cánones 
de 1908 aprobados por la A.B.A.”). 
369. Id. at 3-4. 
370.  See Prefacio, supra note 325 (describing Peru’s new 2012 ethics code and noting that 
the prior ethics code was modeled on the 1908 ABA Canons of Ethics).  
371. See supra note 357. Disciplined lawyers also are listed on the webpages of regional 
bar associations such as the Bar Association of Lima. See supra note 329 and accompanying 
text. 
372. See Registro Nacional De Abogados Sancionados Por Mala Práctica Profesional, 
https://rnas.minjus.gob.pe/rnas/ [https://perma.cc/4XPH-Y8Q5], which is linked from Gov’t of 
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Bar Association’s ethics webpage includes a link to the lawyers that it 
has disciplined.373 
Peru and its legal profession have taken a number of additional 
steps to fight lawyer involvement in money laundering. For example, 
in 2018, Peru created a register of lawyers involved in corruption.374 In 
June 2018, the Lima Bar Association held a conference on anti-money 
laundering.375 In July 2018, the Junta De Decanos De Los Colegios De 
Abogados Del Perú held a press conference in which it called for a 
quick investigation against the judges and members of the National 
Council of the Magistracy (“CNM”) involved in cases of corruption.376 
Some of these recent steps may have been triggered or accelerated by 
lawyer involvement in the Lava Jato/Odebrecht and Panama Papers 
scandals.377 But as the US experience with Watergate demonstrates, 
sometimes a scandal can prompt useful and radical reforms in order to 
really change the structural roots that create trouble and to recover the 
population’s confidence in institutions. 378  In Peru, the FATF 
Recommendations may provide support for those who want additional 
tools to identify and resist lawyer involvement in corruption and money 
laundering. 
 
 
Peru, Defensa, Seguridad y Justicia, https://www.gob.pe/categorias/15-defensa-seguridad-y-
justicia [https://perma.cc/6PZE-623W]. 
373. See Lima Bar Association Ethics Webpage, supra note 327. 
374 . See COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA, Se Creará El Registro De Abogados 
Implicados En Actos De Corrupción (Jan. 25, 2018), 
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/se-creara-el-registro-de-abogados-implicados-en-actos-de-
corrupcion/ [https://perma.cc/WP7M-AFSS]. 
375.  COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA, Lavado de Activos (May 31, 2018), 
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/conferencia-lavado-de-activos/ [https://perma.cc/D3LB-Q6MG]. 
376 . See Conferencia de Prensa: Colegios de Abogados del Perú piden una rápida 
investigación y una drástica sanción. See COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DE LIMA (July 11, 2018), 
http://www.cal.org.pe/v1/conferencia-de-prensa-colegios-de-abogados-del-peru-piden-una-
rapida-investigacion-y-una-drastica-sancion/ [https://perma.cc/8MY9-CKS2 ] (“Junta de 
Decanos de los Colegios de Abogados del Perú pidió una rápida investigación y una drástica 
sanción contra los jueces y miembros del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (CNM) 
involucrados en casos de corrupción y tráfico de influencias.”). 
377.  See, e.g. supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text for articles about these 
developments.  
378.  See supra note 344.  
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C. The Use of Competing Narratives to Discuss Lawyer AML Issues: 
“Lawyers as Sieves” Versus “Lawyers as Atlas” 
This Article asserts that when one reads about lawyer involvement 
in money laundering and lawyer AML regulation issues, one 
encounters quite different starting premises and perspectives. This 
disconnect between the perspectives is dramatic and evocative of the 
movie Rashomon, in which the same event is told from very different 
perspectives. 
It is a thesis of this Article that one of the two competing 
narratives one encounters is a narrative that this Article has labeled the 
“lawyer as sieve” narrative.379 In the lawyer as sieve narrative, lawyers 
who assist criminal money launderers are not an occasional aberration, 
but are the “sieve” through which criminal proceeds regularly flow. 
Lawyers are seen as either the equivalent of other “gatekeeper” 
DNFBPs such as casinos or precious metal dealers or as something 
even worse because of lawyers’ willingness to help criminals launder 
money. If one consciously or unconsciously accepts this narrative, then 
there is little or no need to weigh the costs and benefits of AML lawyer 
regulation or the effect of such regulation on lawyer-client privilege or 
the rule of law because strict lawyer AML regulation is obviously 
necessary. 
The lawyer as sieve narrative frequently appears in media reports. 
Section II.B cites a number of examples that use this perspective.380 
The following statement by Michael Goldhaber may be one of the most 
memorable examples of this perspective: “Unfortunately, if a 
kleptocrat seeks a more respectable middleman, American lawyers 
seem only too happy to comply.”381  The international organization 
Global Witness which sponsored the “sting” operation that was shown 
on the TV show 60 Minutes has used language that evokes the lawyer 
as sieve narrative.382 
 
 
379.  See infra notes 404-09 and accompanying text.  
380.  See, e.g., supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. 
381. Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: The Money Laundering Mills of Panama 
and You, AM. LAW. DAILY (April 4, 2016). 
382.  See Global Witness, supra note 49.   
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The lawyer as sieve narrative also appears in FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Reports and in other intergovernmental documents. For 
example, the Serbia Mutual Evaluation Report’s description of 
professional secrecy as a “negative cultural approach” arguably reflects 
this perspective. 383  The Authors submit that the lawyer as sieve 
narrative might also explain the hostility towards the legal profession 
that appears in Canada’s Mutual Evaluation Report.384 That Report 
cavalierly dismissed a lengthy and thoughtful Canadian Supreme Court 
case that had tried to balance the government’s interest in fighting 
money laundering and the constitutional rights associated with lawyer 
privilege, describing the case as an “impediment” to Canada’s AML 
system.385 The World Bank’s Puppet Masters Report, which was cited 
in Section II.B, also seems to use this perspective. 386 
One characteristic of the lawyer as sieve narrative the Authors 
have identified is the tendency to apply or recommend stringent AML 
provisions for  lawyers with limited or no discussion about lawyers’ 
roles in the legal system or the potential impact on administration of 
justice or the rule of law.387 Those who espouse an extreme version of 
this narrative typically want lawyers regulated in a manner identical to 
other DNFBPs and do not explore whether there might be reasons to 
regulate lawyers differently than other potential money-laundering 
conduits.388 
 
 
383. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (describing Serbia’s MER). 
384.  See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text for a discussion of Canada’s Mutual 
Evaluation Report. 
385. See, e.g., Canada MER, supra note 109, ¶ 27: (“[AML/CFT] requirements were 
found to breach the constitutional right to attorney-client privilege by the Supreme Court of 
Canada on 13 February 2015. In light of these professionals’ key gatekeeper role . . . this 
constitutes a serious impediment to Canada’s efforts to fight ML.”). Id. The Canadian Supreme 
Court decision, which is more than fifty pages long, struck down parts of the government’s AML 
regulations directed towards lawyers, but refused to adopt the more profession-friendly 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals. Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies 
of Canada, 2015 SCC 7. 
386. See, e.g., Puppet Masters, supra note 39, at 94-97 (this discussion of the way in which 
the attorney-client privilege impedes AML enforcement contained little to no discussion of what 
might be lost by changing lawyers’ regulatory structure). 
387. See, e.g., id.; Canada MER, supra note 109. 
388 . It is worth noting, however, that the lawyer as sieve narrative is sometimes 
intertwined with criticisms of substantive corporate law rules, such as those found in Delaware, 
Wyoming, and elsewhere, that do not require disclosure of the corporation’s “beneficial 
owners.” These kinds of “shell” corporations make it easier to hide the proceeds of crime. See, 
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Although the lawyer as sieve narrative is prevalent in AML 
discussions, it is not the only narrative that has been used to discuss 
AML lawyer regulation discussions. This Article asserts that there is a 
competing narrative, which this Article refers to as the “lawyer as 
Atlas” narrative.  In Greek mythology, Atlas held up the sky on his 
shoulders.389 The narrative that this Article has labeled the lawyer as 
Atlas narrative focuses on the role of lawyers in upholding the rule of 
law and ensuring a robust administration of justice system. 
A number of international documents recognize lawyers’ unique 
role and provide support for the lawyer as Atlas perspective. For 
example, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 
includes the following clause: “Whereas adequate protection of the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms to which all persons are 
entitled, be they economic, social and cultural, or civil and political, 
requires that all persons have effective access to legal services provided 
by an independent legal profession.”390 
The United Nations  Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 
further provides that “[g]overnments shall recognize and respect that 
all communications and consultations between lawyers and their clients 
within their professional relationship are confidential.”391 Additional 
 
 
e.g., Costa Rica MER, supra note 109, ¶¶ 450-51; Zimbabwe MER, supra note 109, at 97-98, 
102-03; Hungary MER, supra note 109, at 38 n.19; United States MER, supra note 109, ¶ 22; 
Goldhaber, supra note 381 (“The even bigger embarrassment is the ABA’s obstruction of 
commonsense reform such as the Incorporation Transparency Act . . . .”). As explained supra 
notes 289, 295, there may be advantages to “decoupling” AML lawyer regulation issues, on the 
one hand, and beneficial ownership corporate transparency laws on the other hand, but that issue 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
389. See Edith Hamilton, MYTHOLOGY: TIMELESS TALES OF GODS AND HEROES 25 
(Warner 1969); see also Lynne S. Wilcox, Who Holds Up the World?, 4(2) Preventing Chronic 
Dis. A20 (Apr. 2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1893119/ 
[https://perma.cc/TA27-5PTX] (“In Greek mythology, for example, Atlas was forced to support 
the earth after fighting unsuccessfully against Zeus, the leader of the Olympian gods. . . . 
Fortunately, countries throughout the world today are approaching their responsibility to support 
their citizens’ health more willingly than Atlas approached his task.”). 
390. Eighth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 27 
August–7 September 1990, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, UN Doc 
A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
RoleOfLawyers.aspx [https://perma.cc/4EQW-S9EL] [hereinafter UN Basic Principles]. 
391. Id. ¶ 22. 
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statements about the role of lawyers in upholding the rule of law are 
found in the Council of Europe’s Recommendation about the Legal 
Profession, 392  European Parliament resolutions, 393  IBA resolutions, 
such as the International Bar Association Resolution on the Regulation 
 
 
392. Council of Europe Recommendation Rec (2000) 21 of 25 October 2000 on the 
freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer, 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=
09000016804d0fc8 [https://perma.cc/6PBY-Y93N]. The “whereas” clauses include the 
following: 
Underlining the fundamental role that lawyers and professional associations of 
lawyers also play in ensuring the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; 
Desiring to promote the freedom of exercise of the profession of lawyer in order to 
strengthen the Rule of Law, in which lawyers take part, in particular in the role of 
defending individual freedoms; 
Conscious of the need for a fair system of administration of justice which guarantees 
the independence of lawyers in the discharge of their professional duties without any 
improper restriction, influence, inducement, pressure, threats or interference, direct 
or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason; 
Aware of the desirability of ensuring a proper exercise of lawyers’ responsibilities 
and, in particular, of the need for lawyers to receive sufficient training and to find a 
proper balance between their duties towards the courts and those towards their clients. 
Id. at 1. 
393. European Parliament resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in 
the functioning of legal systems, P6TA (2006)0108 (March 23, 2006), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-
2006-0108+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [https://perma.cc/BW7Y-8N5L]. This resolution included 
the following paragraphs relevant to the role of lawyers in establishing and maintaining the rule 
of law: 
1. Recognises fully the crucial role played by the legal professions in a democratic 
society to guarantee respect for fundamental rights, the rule of law and security in the 
application of the law, both when lawyers represent and defend clients in court and 
when they are giving their clients legal advice; . . . 
3. Notes the high qualifications required for access to the legal professions, the need 
to protect those qualifications that characterise the legal professions, in the interests 
of European citizens, and the need to establish a specific relationship based on trust 
between members of the legal professions and their clients; 
4. Reaffirms the importance of rules which are necessary to ensure the independence, 
competence, integrity and responsibility of members of the legal professions so as to 
guarantee the quality of their services, to the benefit of their clients and society in 
general, and in order to safeguard the public interest[.] 
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of the Legal Profession, 394 statements by the CCBE,395 rule of law 
initiatives,396 the IBA/ABA/CCBE Typologies document previously 
 
 
394. See, e.g., International Bar Association, Resolution on the Regulation of the Legal 
Profession (adopted at the IBA Council Meeting Vienna, 1998), https://www.ibanet.org/
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=4094F728-9035-4C6C-8AB6-DE645546D26C 
[https://perma.cc/L6AX-KJYN] [hereinafter IBA Core Values Resolution]. The “whereas” 
quotes include the following: 
HAVING due regard to the overriding public interest that the legal profession should 
fulfil a special function in serving society which distinguishes it from other service 
providers in that it has 
c) a role in facilitating the administration of, and guaranteeing access to, justice; 
d) a duty to the courts; 
e) a duty to uphold the rule of law; 
f) a duty to keep client matters confidential; 
g) a duty to avoid conflicts of interest; 
h) a duty to uphold specific ethical and professional standards; 
i) a duty to provide clients with the highest and most beneficial quality of advice, 
representation and legal services; 
j) a duty, in the public interest, of securing its independence, professionally, 
politically and economically, from any influence affecting its service; and 
HAVING due regard to the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers adopted by the 
Eighth United Nations Congress meeting in Havana on 7 September 1990; . . . 
Id. 
395. CCBE, Position of the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Union 
(CCBE) on the requirements on a lawyer to report suspicions of money laundering and on the 
European Commission Proposal for a Third EU Directive on Money Laundering Regulations 
(Nov. 2004), ¶¶ 19-20, https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/
documents/ANTI_MONEY_LAUNDERING/AML_Position_papers/EN_AML_20041104_C
CBE_position_on_the_requirements_on_a_lawyer_to_report_suspicions_of_money_launderin
g_and_on_the_European_Commission_Proposal_for_a_Third_EU_Directive_on.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2PRQ-BX3T]:  
19. . . . The CCBE cannot stress enough that requirements on a lawyer to report 
suspicions regarding the activities of clients based upon information disclosed by 
clients in strictest confidence is a violation of a fundamental right.  
20. The CCBE requests that the Commission, Council and the Parliament bear in mind 
that a lawyer is a member of a regulated profession, is part of the process which 
ensures the rule of law, and has the duty to apply the law and have it applied. The 
CCBE emphasises that when lawyers actually provide legal advice on money 
laundering, they are party to an offence and should not benefit from any exemption. 
396. See, e.g., ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, Legal Profession Reform Index Factors, 
https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/publications/assessments/lpri/lpri_factors.
html [https://perma.cc/G8HV-2X8W] (“Factor 4. Lawyer-Client Confidentiality The state 
recognizes and respects the confidentiality of professional communications and consultations 
between lawyers and their clients.”). See also ABA ROLI Annual Report 2016-17, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/roli/misc/aba-roli-annual-report-
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cited, 397  and the FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professions cited 
earlier.398 
 The lawyer as Atlas narrative emphasizes the fact that there is a 
global consensus that a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, or professional 
secrecy or privilege, is one of the core values and key attributes of the 
legal profession and often cites one or more of the documents listed 
above.399 The lawyer as Atlas narrative recognizes that lawyers should 
not be permitted to assist their clients in illegal activities, 400 but it  
highlights the lack of empirical data about intentional or unwitting 
lawyer involvement in illegal money laundering activities. 
In the same way that examples of the lawyer as sieve narrative 
sometimes omit references to concerns involving the lawyers’ role in 
upholding the rule of law and administration of justice, examples of the 
lawyer as Atlas narrative sometimes omit or minimize discussion of the 
money laundering concerns that have given rise to the competing 
perspective. Consider, for example, the report accompanying ABA 
Resolution 104, which was the first of the ABA’s three resolutions on 
 
 
2016-2017.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAV2-JWLY] (“An independent, fair and 
efficient justice system requires clear and transparent laws, skilled and ethical professionals, and 
effective and accountable institutions.”). 
397. See supra note 4 (IBA/ABA/CCBE Typologies document). 
398. See FATF RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals, supra note 69. 
399. See, e.g., UN Basic Principles, supra note 390, ¶ 22; IBA Resolution, supra note 394, 
at (f); Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 392, at Principle 1, ¶ 6. Because of space 
limitations, this footnote does not cite the many other examples available including the Charter 
of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and the 2005 Statement of Core Principles 
of the Legal Profession signed by the presidents of more than 100 legal profession organizations. 
While countries differ from one another with respect to the exact terminology they use and the 
exact parameters of these doctrines, the UN Basic Principles, the IBA Core Values Resolution, 
and the other documents cited supra demonstrate the deeply-embedded and global nature of 
legal profession values such as confidentiality, loyalty, and independence. These documents also 
highlight lawyers’ important role in ensuring a robust rule of law culture.  
400 . See, e.g., CCBE, European Parliament Committee of Inquiry into Money 
Laundering, Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion (PANA) Committee of inquiry questions to the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE), 1, 4 (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/speciality_distribution/public/documents/ANTI_MONEY_LA
UNDERING/AML_Position_papers/EN_AML_20170124_Responses_of_inquiry_questions_t
o_the_CCBE_from_EP_Committee_of_Inquiry_into_Money_Laundering__Tax_Avoidance_a
nd_Tax_Evasion__PANA_.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VXT-DS73] (“Professional secrecy/legal 
professional privilege do not apply if a lawyer takes part in illegal actions of the client. This is 
the case in every EU Member State.”). 
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this topic.401 The opening paragraph of the Resolution mentions the 
need for “reasonable and balanced initiatives designed to detect and 
prevent domestic and international money laundering and terrorist 
financing,”402 but the accompanying report arguably does not convey 
the scope of the money laundering problem or explain why criminals 
need to seek out others, such as lawyers, to help them achieve the 
“layering” and “integration” stages of money laundering.403 In other 
words, it omits the type of discussion found in Section II.A of this 
Article that explains why AML laws exist and the role that lawyers 
might  play in addressing a serious societal issue by decreasing money 
laundering activities. 
Outside of the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports, it is common to 
find both the lawyer as sieve and lawyer as Atlas narratives, although 
rarely in the same document.404  For example, popular press articles 
often use the lawyer as sieve perspective. 405  Bar association 
documents, on the other hand, often use the lawyer as Atlas 
perspective.406  Inside the four corners of the FATF Mutual Evaluation 
Reports, however, the lawyer as sieve narrative seems dominant, with 
little acknowledgment of the issues raised by the lawyer as Atlas 
narrative. Some Mutual Evaluation Reports, such as the previously 
cited Serbia report,407 are explicitly hostile to the issues that underlie 
the lawyer as Atlas narrative. 408  Other FATF Mutual Evaluation 
 
 
401. Compare Section II.A, supra (discussing the extent of the problem and the stages of 
money laundering), with ABA Resolution 104, infra note 402. See also supra notes 295, 388, 
which cite the commingling of lawyer regulation AML issues, on the one hand, and substantive 
corporate law and beneficial ownership issues, on the other hand, but note that this issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
402 . AM. BAR. ASS’N, ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 104 
(2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2003_my_104.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8PE-M54D]. 
403. Id. at 3-16. 
404. See infra notes 405-06 and accompanying text. 
405.  See, e.g., supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text. 
406. See generally ABA Gatekeeper Advocacy webpage, supra note 208; CCBE Anti-
Money Laundering Committee, https://www.ccbe.eu/actions/committees-working-
groups/?idC=791&Committee=Anti-Money-Laundering [https://perma.cc/2FEJ-4BKS].  
407. See Serbia MER, supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text. 
408.  See generally supra notes 139-70 and accompanying text. 
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Reports implicitly demonstrate their hostility to the lawyer as Atlas 
issues by their failure to respond meaningfully to the privilege 
arguments raised by the legal profession during the FATF mutual 
evaluation process.409  As noted previously, none of the fifty FATF 
Mutual Evaluation Reports discussed in this Article provides a nuanced 
discussion of the difficult issues involved and the valid points that have 
given rise to both the lawyer as sieve and lawyer as Atlas 
perspectives.410 Part VI, infra, argues that the polarized nature of the 
lawyer AML discussions has been counterproductive and offers 
suggestions about how the FATF Mutual Evaluation process could 
more effectively harness the energy of the legal profession and reduce 
lawyer involvement in illegal money laundering activities. 
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HOW TO 
STRUCTURE FATF MUTUAL EVALUATIONS TO REDUCE 
LAWYER FACILITATION OF ILLEGAL MONEY LAUNDERING 
Reading the legal profession sections of FATF Mutual Evaluation 
Reports can be quite depressing. On the one hand, the FATF Mutual 
Evaluation Reports express frustration with the legal profession’s 
failure to adopt or implement the FATF Recommendations in the same 
manner as other DNFBPs. 411 Legal profession representatives, on the 
other hand, seem frustrated by the lack of acknowledgement in the 
Mutual Evaluation process of the role that lawyers play in establishing 
a vibrant rule of law culture and the ways in which FATF’s approach 
undermines the fundamental nature of the lawyer-client relationship 
and widely-accepted values within the legal profession. 412  In short, 
both sides seem frustrated with the current situation.   
This Article submits that there is a better way forward than the 
approach that has been used in FATF’s ongoing Mutual Evaluations.  
Lawyers can be and should be powerful tools in the fight against 
criminal money laundering. But instead of the current 
counterproductive approach that diverts energy by trying to fit a square 
peg (lawyers) into a round hole (FATF’s existing DNFBP rules and 
mutual evaluation process), society arguably would be much better off 
 
 
409. See generally supra notes 165-69 and accompanying text. 
410.  See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. 
411. See supra notes 139-71 and accompanying text. 
412. Id. 
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if the FATF Mutual Evaluation process could recognize and harness 
the differences that exist between lawyers on the one hand and 
DNFBPs such as casinos, precious metal dealers, and real estate 
brokers, on the other hand.  It is fully consistent with lawyers’ 
professional values to ask them to be robust gatekeepers at the front 
end of the lawyer-client relationship and to avoid assisting criminals in 
their money laundering efforts.413 By focusing on the “front end” of the 
lawyer-client relationship and by bringing together AML and legal 
profession experts, FATF could harness a tremendous amount of 
energy and arguably would make greater progress in reducing lawyer 
facilitation of illegal money laundering.  
Consider, for example, what might happen if FATF and its 
stakeholders could agree on the following three goals:414 
 
• Reducing the overall amount of money laundering; 
• Reducing lawyer facilitation of money laundering; and 
• Having a vibrant rule of law system. 
 
Asking stakeholders to endorse these three goals or regulatory 
objectives and to address them in the legal profession portion of a 
FATF Mutual Evaluation could have a significant impact on AML 
conversations. Those who articulate an extreme version of the lawyer 
as Atlas narrative could be reminded of the need to acknowledge the 
global consensus that money laundering is a serious societal problem 
that needs to be addressed, the fact that criminal money launderers are 
likely to seek out lawyers for assistance during the layering and 
integration stages of money laundering, 415  and the need to have a 
robust lawyer AML regulatory and education system in order to 
achieve the agreed-upon goal of minimizing lawyer involvement in, 
and facilitation of, criminal money laundering  Those who articulate an 
 
 
413.  See supra notes 260-66, 400 and accompanying text (citing the CCBE’s response to 
the EU Pana Committee and traditional legal profession documents and US legal ethics rules).  
414. See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry et al., Adopting Regulatory Objectives for the Legal 
Profession, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2012) (arguing in support of explicit regulatory 
objectives).  
415.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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extreme version of the lawyer as sieve narrative could be reminded of 
the importance of having a robust rule of law system not only because 
it is healthy for a society, but because a robust rule of law culture can 
help a jurisdiction reduce money laundering. 416  These individuals 
could also be reminded of the important role that lawyers play in 
ensuring a robust rule of law culture and the fact that loyalty and 
confidentiality are recognized as universal lawyer values that are core 
to lawyers’ self-identity, even if countries differ in the exact manner in 
which they implement these values.417    
The Authors submit that using the three goals listed above as the 
framework for the legal profession portion of a Mutual Evaluation not 
only could lead to changed conversations, but it likely would lead to 
improved outcomes and a reduction in lawyer involvement in money 
laundering.  These goals retain the concept of “lawyer as gatekeeper” 
and include as a critical goal the reduction of lawyer facilitation of 
money laundering.  But instead of treating lawyers in a manner that is 
identical to all other DNFBPs but inconsistent with traditional lawyer 
values, a principles-based approach based on the three goals listed 
above could take advantage of, and leverage, the strengths, expertise, 
and values of the legal profession in the fight against money 
laundering.  
What might a principles-based FATF Mutual Evaluation of the 
legal profession look like?  Consider how much progress might be 
made if the legal professions in FATF jurisdictions were asked to 
address the following four questions during the FATF Mutual 
Evaluation process.  First, the legal profession portion of a FATF 
Mutual Evaluation might begin by asking the country in question to 
confirm that it has a regulatory system that makes it clear that money 
laundering is illegal and that lawyers are aware of these criminal laws.  
Having clear, well-publicized, and well-understood AML laws is a 
 
 
416.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing UN statements regarding the harm 
caused by money laundering).  
417.  See supra note 399 and accompanying text (citing documents that set forth these 
values). Ignoring these traditional values can lead to an AML approach that treats lawyers 
identically to other DNFBPs but changes the fundamental nature of lawful lawyer-client 
relationships. This change could have negative consequences for the rule of law. If clients view 
their lawyers as arms of the state who have a very low threshold for reporting potential 
misconduct, clients may be less willing to raise concerns with their lawyers and lawyers may 
have less opportunity to dissuade their non-criminal clients from improper activity. It could also 
contribute to societal distruct of the legal system.   
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critical prerequisite to reducing lawyer facilitation of money 
laundering.  The Authors believe that in each of their countries, there 
is room for improvement in educating lawyers about the underlying 
AML criminal laws.  Lawyers may not currently understand that 
actions that may be perfectly legal in one context, such as setting up a 
corporation, will be illegal if the client’s motive is to conceal the illegal 
proceeds of criminal activities.  Thus, the first set of questions that a 
FATF Mutual Evaluation might focus on is whether the country has 
adopted anti-money laundering criminal laws and whether the lawyers 
in that country understand what conduct constitutes criminal money 
laundering activity.   
Second, the legal profession portion of a FATF Mutual Evaluation 
might ask the country in question to confirm that it has a regulatory 
system in place that makes it clear that lawyers are prohibited from 
assisting their clients in illegal money laundering activities. Many 
countries already include such provisions in their lawyer regulatory 
systems.418  As numerous legal profession documents, including some 
cited earlier in this Article, have made clear, assisting a client in illegal 
conduct is not a core value of the legal profession.419  The CCBE made 
this point to a Panama Papers committee when it observed that 
“Professional secrecy/legal professional privilege do not apply if a 
lawyer takes part in illegal actions of the client. This is the case in every 
EU Member State.”420  Thus, even if a country has not yet adopted 
explicit laws on this point, the legal profession should not object to 
adopting ethical rules or other regulatory provisions that make it clear 
that a lawyer may not assist a client with his or her illegal money 
laundering.    
Third, if a country has the appropriate AML criminal laws and 
lawyer regulatory system in place, this portion of the FATF Mutual 
Evaluation could focus on how the country implements its regulatory 
system that prohibits lawyers from facilitating money laundering.  It 
 
 
418. See, e.g., supra notes 259-74 and accompanying text (discussing ABA Model Rules 
1.1, 1.2(d), and 1.16(a)). 
419. See supra notes 390-98 and accompanying text (citing documents about the legal 
profession). 
420. See supra note 400 and accompanying text (citing the CCBE’s statement to the EU 
PANA Committee).  This is also true in the United States. See supra notes 275-79 and 
accompanying text (discussing US criminal and lawyer discipline provisions).  
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might begin by asking whether the jurisdiction is doing all it could to 
ensure that its lawyers understand why criminals who launder money 
are likely to seek the assistance of lawyers.  This section of the Mutual 
Evaluation might continue by asking the jurisdiction what steps it has 
taken to educate its lawyers so that they recognize money laundering 
situations and recognize when they have been asked to assist a client 
with the client’s criminal money laundering.   As noted in the prior 
paragraph, lawyers would be forbidden by both criminal law and the 
lawyer regulatory system from assisting criminals in their money 
laundering efforts and this stage of the Mutual Evaluation process 
would focus on education efforts that would teach lawyers to recognize 
when clients were seeking such services.   
The fourth section of the legal profession portion of a FATF 
Mutual Evaluation could focus on enforcement of the lawyer regulatory 
system.  This section would ask whether and how the jurisdiction 
enforces its regulatory provisions that prohibit lawyer facilitation of 
money laundering and whether there is room for improvement in the 
enforcement system.  During this stage of the Mutual Evaluation, 
countries could be asked to explain whether their lawyer regulatory 
enforcement actions are publicized since publication can serve both 
education and deterrent functions.   
In responding to these four sets of questions, a FATF country 
might find it helpful to consult the questions found in Outcomes 3 and 
4 of the Effectiveness Assessment in the FATF Mutual Evaluation 
Methodology document.421  A country might also find it helpful to 
examine practices and examples from other countries.422   It seems 
likely that if this type of Mutual Evaluation approach were used, FATF 
or legal profession representatives might decide that it would be helpful 
to have a legal profession-specific master document that listed 
examples from around the world of lawyer regulatory provisions, 
implementation efforts, and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, even if a 
country was not using a particular AML tool at the time of its Mutual 
Evaluation, it could use the Mutual Evaluation process as an 
opportunity to educate itself about what other jurisdictions were doing 
 
 
421.  See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
422.  See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text (the Appendices listing various US 
initiatives and efforts).   
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and obtain feedback about the strengths and weaknesses of its own 
approach.423 
As a corollary to this latter point, FATF might want to consider 
whether and how it might facilitate in-depth peer-to-peer evaluations 
by legal profession representatives.  Lawyers from different 
jurisdictions are accustomed to talking to each other, exchanging ideas 
with one another, and learning from one another.424  It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to document the contexts in which multi-
jurisdictional legal profession conversations have occurred, but these 
kinds of conversations are common and influential in the legal 
profession 425  If FATF combined these kinds of peer-to-peer 
conversations with its existing AML expertise, it would be harnessing 
 
 
423.  For information about how US lawyer regulation use peer review, see Email from 
Ellyn Rosen, ABA Center for Professional Responsibility Regulation and Global Initiatives 
Counsel and Counsel to the Professional Regulation Committee, to Laurel Terry (Nov. 11, 
2018). This email discussed the domestic US impact of peer review:  
The ABA Standing Committee on Professional Regulation (formerly Discipline) has, 
since 1980, provided to state supreme courts a lawyer and judicial discipline system 
consultation service. At the invitation of a state supreme court, the Committee 
conducts a comprehensive study of the jurisdiction’s disciplinary system that includes 
a multi-day onsite visit.  At the conclusion of its review, the Committee submits to 
the court, on a confidential basis, a report that highlights the system’s strengths and 
makes recommendations for improvements using ABA policies as guidelines, as well 
as noting, where appropriate, practices in other jurisdictions that have proven 
successful.  A consultation report is submitted to the court on a confidential basis, and 
it is left to the court to determine whether and when to make it public.  More 
frequently courts have decided to do so.  The Committee has conducted over 65 
consultations, and adoption of its recommendations have resulted in the adoption of 
changes that have improved the effectiveness, efficiency, fairness, transparency, and 
resourcing the system.  
Id. See also Laurel S. Terry, Preserving the Rule of Law in the 21st Century: The Importance 
of Infrastructure and the Need to Create a Global Lawyer Regulatory Umbrella Organization, 
2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 735 (discussing, inter alia, the power of regulatory networks, model 
standards, and peer review).    
424.  See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, The Impact of Global Developments on U.S. Legal Ethics 
During the Past Thirty Years, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 365, 381-85 (2017); Laurel S. 
Terry, Creating an International Network of Lawyer Regulators: The 2012 International 
Conference of Legal Regulators, 82(2) BAR EXAMINER 18, 18-19 (June 2013); Laurel S. Terry 
& Carole Silver, Transnational Legal Practice [2014], 49 ABA/SIL (n.s.) 413 (2015) 
(discussing TLP-Nets that interact in the legal services and legal services regulation space).   
425.  See supra note 424 (cited sources provide numerous examples of conversations 
among legal professionals).   
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tremendous knowledge, skill, experience, expertise, energy, 
cooperation, and engagement.  Legal professions could learn from one 
another regulatory design options, implementation and education tools 
that have proven effective, and enforcement systems and options.  The 
focus would be on the front-end of the lawyer-client relationship and 
making sure that lawyers know that it is improper for them to assist 
clients in money laundering activities and teaching lawyers to 
recognize when potential clients are seeking the lawyer’s services for 
this purpose. Peers might not always agree with all of the methods or 
choices that others have made, but a peer review system could provide 
a mirror through which legal profession representatives could reflect 
on the strengths and weaknesses of their own system and introduce 
them to new ideas.   
Despite the education and information-sharing that would take 
place through a peer-evaluation process, it is highly likely that there 
will continue to be a few “bad apple” individual lawyers who will 
choose to become criminals and who will knowingly help their clients 
illegally launder money.426  But if these “bad apple” lawyers are not 
deterred by the existing criminal law sanctions, it is unlikely that they 
will be deterred by a lawyer regulatory system, even a well-designed 
and well-implemented system. Thus, if a primary goal is to reduce, if 
not completely eliminate, lawyer facilitation of illegal money 
laundering, surely it is better to enlist the full support of lawyer 
regulators and law-abiding members of the legal profession and focus 
on educating those lawyers who would not knowingly and willingly 
become criminal money launderers.    
To implement this approach, jurisdictions should work to ensure 
that they have in place laws that criminalize money laundering, that 
lawyers know what those criminal laws say, that there are lawyer 
regulatory provisions that prohibit lawyers from assisting criminal 
money laundering clients, that lawyers are educated so that they 
recognize when they are being asked to assist in money laundering, and 
that there are enforcement mechanisms for lawyers who ignore these 
obligations. FATF Mutual Evaluations that helped jurisdictions 
achieve these steps arguably would be much more effective in reducing 
 
 
426.  In the future, there will likely be disagreements about how aberrational it is for 
lawyers to knowingly assist criminals in their efforts to launder money.  The Authors hope, 
however, that we can agree that not all lawyers would knowingly and willingly assist those who 
are engaged in money laundering.   
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lawyer facilitation of money laundering than the Mutual Evaluation 
approach currently used and would be more likely to affect permanent 
change.   Treating lawyers as gatekeepers who have a duty not to assist 
criminal money laundering activity leverages lawyers’ identity as 
“professionals” and is fully consistent with the traditional values that 
gave rise to the lawyer as Atlas narrative.427  
FATF Members have accurately recognized that lawyers can be 
powerful tools in the important fight against criminal money 
laundering, but they arguably have not yet harnessed the full power of 
the legal profession in this fight.  One of the reasons why this has not 
occurred is that the legal profession views FATF’s one-size-fits-all-
DNFPBs approach as fundamentally at odds with lawyers’ historic and 
globally-accepted values. 428  This Article recommends that, in the 
future, the legal profession portions of FATF Mutual Evaluations 
should focus on the three goals listed previously and should help 
countries develop a culture in which their lawyers internalize AML 
sensitivity in the same way that lawyers have internalized conflicts of 
 
 
427.  See supra notes 259-74, 400 and accompanying text (citing ABA Model Rules that 
prohibit lawyers from assisting clients in illegal activities and the CCBE’s statement to the EU 
PANA Committee making a similar point). 
428. See, e.g., Helgesson & Morth, supra note 45, at 234-37, 244 (their interviews with 
Swedish lawyers highlighted the clash between professional norms and FATF obligations). In 
the Authors’ view, this study illustrates the benefits that might come from an education-heavy 
approach that seeks to have lawyers better understand ML risks and internalize their responses, 
rather than perform a “check off the box” exercise or expect many suspicious transaction reports. 
The article concluded: 
A remaining question is thus whether it would be possible for lawyers to better help 
prevent crime among their clients, and contribute to the quest for security in society, 
with recourse to other types of regulatory tools. To that end, further research could 
focus on the political willingness to give lawyers possibilities to combine activities 
of ‘true’ pro-active crime prevention with their strong professional norm of client 
confidentiality. So far, the FATF recommendations and EU directives do not appear 
to make enough of a distinction between the banking sector and the non-banking 
sector. Here, our case suggests that the reluctance among lawyers to become engaged 
in ‘true’ pro-active crime prevention, and not only in being compliant enough in order 
to avoid punishment and sanctions, is dependent on if and how the FATF can listen 
more closely to how the front-line workers perceive and handle the regulations on 
AML/CTF in practice. 
Id. at 241. See also Middleton & Levi, supra note 28, at 656-57 (examples cited arguably 
illustrate the benefit that might come from additional education). 
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interest sensitivity.  This type of approach truly could result in lawyers 
being the type of gatekeepers who would help stop the flow of illegal 
money laundering. 
In closing, it is worth noting that the treatment of lawyers in the 
FATF Mutual Evaluations—and the aftermath—is an issue that all 
legal services regulation stakeholders and AML stakeholders should 
care about.  As Part I of this Article explains, money laundering is a 
serious societal problem with widespread negative consequences.429  
Because of the three-step process of money laundering,430 criminals are 
likely to seek out the services of lawyers.431 While improvements have 
been made, AML scandals in the United States, in Peru, and elsewhere 
show that there is room for improvement in the way in which lawyers 
are handling their gatekeeping role.432   Moreover, AML regulation of 
lawyers implicates a number of much broader issues, including issues 
related to the type of lawyer regulation that promotes or impedes a 
robust rule of law system. Thus, it is in the interests of those who care 
about AML issues and those who care about lawyer regulation to 
consider the current and future design of FATF’s Mutual Evaluations 
and the best way to advance the goal of reducing lawyer facilitation of 
illegal money laundering activities.  
 
  
 
 
429.  See supra notes 2-21 and accompanying text.  
430.  See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.  
431.  See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.  
432.  See, e.g., supra notes 266, 295 and accompanying text (discussing the US author’s 
views about needed improvements), supra notes 365-66, 378 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Peruvian Author’s views about needed improvements).  
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APPENDIX I 
Checklist of Ten Issues for Legal Profession Representatives 
Whose FATF Mutual Evaluations Have Not Yet Occurred 
This Appendix summarizes information discussed elsewhere in 
this Article. It is based in large part on the advice from the three “case 
study” jurisdictions and offers a checklist of issues for jurisdictions that 
have not yet undergone their FATF 4th Round Mutual Evaluation. 
1. Confirm Timing: The FATF webpage contains a searchable 
calendar that indicates the timetable for each country’s Mutual 
Evaluation Report.433 The FATF Procedures document explains the 
steps and timetable. Legal profession representatives should recognize 
the significant lead time involved and become familiar with the 
deadlines for the national risk assessment and the documents submitted 
before the on-site assessment visit.434 
2. Identify Relevant Government Authorities: Jurisdictions 
differ with respect to the government body that takes the lead in 
interacting with FATF.435 If the legal profession representatives are 
able to locate the relevant government entity and establish a 
relationship with the government representatives in advance of the 
mutual evaluation, that should be helpful. 436  Government 
representatives might welcome this kind of relationship because the 
legal profession representatives have knowledge that will make the 
 
 
433.  See FATF Global Assessment Calendar, supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
434. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95 (discussing the FATF 4th Round 
Methodology document, its Timeline appendix, and the fact that tasks that are performed two, 
four, and six months before the FATF on-site visit). 
435. If legal profession representatives are not sure whom they should reach out to, one 
source that can provide a starting point is the International Bar Association’s Anti-Money-
Laundering Forum webpage. This webpage has listings for many countries in the world and 
these listings identify the relevant government bodies Anti-Money-Laundering Forum, INT’L B. 
ASS’N, https://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7YAN-YT9P]. 
436 . Cf. 2017 Canada Risk Assessment, supra notes 196-97, which assigned a high 
vulnerability rating to Canada’s legal profession and did not note professional regulation 
initiatives. At the time the Canadian government issued its threat assessment report, it had 
recently lost in the Supreme Court a fourteen-year legal fight with lawyer regulators regarding 
the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and regulations 
pertaining to the legal profession. 
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government representatives’ jobs easier in completing the necessary 
paperwork. 
3. Recognize the Importance of the National Risk Assessment: 
A country’s national risk assessment plays a key role in the FATF 
Mutual Evaluation. Some of these risk assessments have been prepared 
with little input from the legal profession in their countries. In order to 
maximize their chance of input, legal profession representatives should 
familiarize themselves with any prior risk assessments performed by 
their country and consider whether and how they can participate in the 
country’s forthcoming risk assessment.437 Because countries have been 
criticized for “stale” or weak threat assessments, governments should 
welcome the participation of the legal profession.438 The participation, 
however, must be meaningful. FATF Reports have expressed criticism 
of countries that painted too optimistic a picture of the risks posed by 
legal professionals.439 
 
 
437. There are three different reasons why legal professions might want to consider, in 
advance of the mutual evaluation, how they could contribute to the national risk assessment. 
First, legal professions that have ignored requests to participate have been criticized in their 
country’s FATF mutual evaluation Report. See supra note 150 (noting that Serbia’s MER 
criticized the legal profession for not responding to a questionnaire that solicited information for 
the National Threat Assessment). Second, legal professions might want to participate in the 
development of the risk assessment, rather than simply critiquing it later as unfounded, because 
the FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports give great deference to these national reports. See, e.g., 
FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95, ¶ 7 (“Assessors should use the country’s own 
assessment(s) of its risks as an initial basis for understanding the risks, but should not uncritically 
accept a country’s risk assessment as correct, and need not follow all its conclusions.”); id. at 8, 
¶ 15 (“Assessors are not expected to conduct an independent risk assessment of their own when 
assessing Recommendation1 and Immediate Outcome 1, but on the other hand should not 
necessarily accept a country’s risk assessment as correct. In reviewing the country’s risk 
assessment, assessors should consider the rigour of the processes and procedures employed; and 
the internal consistency of the assessment. . . .”) A third reason to participate and help shape the 
findings is because FATF reports have been critical of legal professions that are unfamiliar with 
or disagree with the findings contained in their country’s national risk assessments. See, e.g., 
supra note 153 (citing Andorra MER); Portugal MER, supra note 109, ¶ 300) (“[The regulator] 
could not provide an analysis of the conclusions of the [National Risk Assessment] that directly 
targeted their specific sector(s), nor clarify the source(s) of data.”). 
438. See, e.g., Australia MER, supra note 109, ¶ 2.8 (“The [National Threat Assessment’s] 
conclusions reasonably reflect most of Australia’s main risks (which likely still prevail), but the 
NTA is now three years old and assessors are not confident that it is current for all risks, 
including where subsequent assessments have superseded it in some areas . . .”). 
439. See, e.g., supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
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4. Look Outside the Country for Ideas About Risk 
Assessment: One of the recurring themes about lawyer AML issues is 
how little empirical data is available. Given the lack of data that legal 
profession representatives are likely to encounter, they may want to 
look outside their own country for ideas to consider in a risk 
assessment. 
5. Become Familiar with FATF’s Mutual Evaluation 
Template Documents: It is important for legal profession 
representatives to realize that their own country likely will submit 
information to the FATF on-site assessment team using the FATF 
template found in the FATF 4th Round Methodology document.440 
FATF’s 4th Round Mutual Evaluation Report is also likely to follow 
the structure in the template. Legal profession representatives would be 
wise to familiarize themselves with these documents and strive to 
collect the requested data. They will also need to learn how to present 
the information they consider relevant using the terminology and 
framework that the FATF assessors consider relevant. 
6. Document and Communicate Profession-Based AML 
Requirements: Legal profession representatives should understand 
that the assessment team, and perhaps the profession’s own 
government representatives, may not fully understand the nature and 
scope of professional regulation unless they are educated on that point. 
Moreover, the FATF assessment team is likely to assume that if a 
lawyer is not subject to the same AML regulations as all other 
DNFBPs, then the lawyer’s AML obligations are deficient. Legal 
profession representatives need to be familiar not only with their own 
regulations, but with the AML regulations applicable to other kinds of 
DNFBPs so that they can explain where there is overlap and why 
aspects of the national AML scheme applicable to other DNFBPs may 
be duplicative and thus unnecessary for lawyers.441 
 
 
440. See FATF 4th Round Methodology, supra note 95. 
441. See, e.g., Nicoll Email, supra note 174 (recommending additional education about 
the relationship of FATF to professional regulations). There may also be additional regulations 
with the forum, including regulatory requirements that overlay obligations for example of 
identification, verification in real estate transactions, foreign investment, company, trust 
formation, charities, and not for profit organizations that mimic or duplicate some or most of the 
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7. Develop, Document, and Communicate Professional 
Regulation Implementation Data: Legal profession representatives 
should be prepared to present documentation to support the 
jurisdiction’s lawyer AML education efforts and regulatory 
enforcement, including education efforts and criminal and disciplinary 
cases. 442  The legal profession in one country, for example, was 
criticized for not providing the FATF on-site team with its educational 
materials. 443  Legal profession representatives might want to use a 
forthcoming visit as an opportunity to educate or reeducate the 
jurisdiction’s lawyers using existing or new tools. For example, the 
Ghana Bar, which is a member of the IBA, was criticized for not 
circulating the IBA/ABA/CCBE Typologies Guide.444 
8. Identify Appropriate Legal Profession Representatives to 
Speak with the FATF On-Site Team: According to the FATF 
Procedures document, two months before the FATF assessment team’s 
on-site visit, the country must provide the assessment team with the 
program for its visit, which will include the private sector bodies the 
team will meet with. Legal profession representatives should work with 
government authorities to ensure that the appropriate legal profession 
representatives are invited to meet the FATF on-site team.445 They 
should also make sure that the individuals tasked to meet with FATF 
representatives have all of the information that would be helpful. 
 
 
AML/CTF regulatory requirements). Id. Many such regulatory obligations arise pursuant to state 
based legislative schemes. Id. 
442. See, e.g., supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (noting FATF interest in some 
of the information the US legal profession collected). 
443. See Iceland MER, supra note 109, ¶ 315 (observing, in an arguably critical manner, 
that the Iceland Bar Association had not provided the FATF on-site assessors with a copy of the 
guidance it provided to its members). 
444. See Ghana MER, supra note 148 (citing Ghana’s Mutual Evaluation Report). 
445. See Wilson Email, supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (reporting on 
discussions within Canada about whether the legal profession representatives should be from 
British Columbia or from the Federation, which had broader representation). If government 
representatives do not reach out to the legal profession representatives, legal profession 
representatives may want to take the initiative because countries have been criticized for their 
failure to have legal profession representatives meet with the on-site assessment team. See supra 
notes 153-54 and accompanying text (noting countries whose legal profession had been 
criticized because it had not met with the FATF on-site inspectors or the representatives were 
unfamiliar with the country’s risk assessment). 
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9. Consider Reaching Out for Advice to Legal Professions that 
Have Already Undergone Their Mutual Evaluations: Legal 
profession representatives who are planning for their country’s mutual 
evaluation may find it useful to consult with individuals from other 
countries who have already gone through the process. 446 Countries that 
have done so have found it useful. 447  Among other points, legal 
profession representatives may want to speak with one another to learn 
how they can most effectively remind the FATF on-site assessors (and 
perhaps their own government) of the points made in the FATF 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 23.448 
10. Consider Cost-Benefit Arguments and Data: FATF has 
been criticized for not adequately taking into the account the costs 
imposed by its Recommendations. The costs may be tangible, such as 
the financial cost of administering an AML system.449 However, the 
costs may also be intangible, such as a loss of confidence in the rule of 
law that might result under certain circumstances if lawyers are 
required to act as agents of the government and report suspicious 
transactions. Additional costs might include the loss of opportunities in 
which a lawyer persuaded a client to avoid money laundering activities. 
While this undoubtedly would not work for all clients, there might be 
some clients for which it would work. If legal profession 
 
 
446. See supra note 252 (recommending that countries that are looking for a venue in 
which to meet each other and have these kinds of conversations might consider using the 
webpage and resources of the International Conference of Legal Regulators (“ICLR”) and the 
IBA Bar Issues Commission). 
447. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text (describing Case Study #3 and US-
Australian information-sharing). 
448. See supra notes 91, 159-60 and accompanying text (describing the Interpretive Note 
to Recommendation 23 and the lack of discussion about this Note in the reports). 
449. The Law Society of England and Wales is one of the few groups that has collected 
empirical data about the costs and benefits of lawyer AML efforts. See Law Soc., The costs and 
benefits of anti-money laundering compliance for solicitors: Response by the Law Society of 
England and Wales to the call for evidence in the Review of the Money Laundering Regulations 
2007 (Dec. 2009), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/risk-compliance/anti-money-
laundering/documents/law-society-response-to-the-hm-treasury-money-laundering-review-
2009/ [https://perma.cc/8VZP-4NQW] (noting that solicitors filed a number of SARs, but few 
required government follow-up action; also includes cost information). See also Terry, FATF 
Introduction, supra note 89, at 29-32 (summarizing the data the Law Society presented to its 
government). 
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representatives want to offer cost-benefit arguments, they should 
consider how best to develop and frame those points. 
